

# YOU AND THE PEACE

BY

G. B. SHIRLAW AND L. E. JONES

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## PUBLISHERS' NOTE

THE plan of this book was originally conceived, and the first part written, by Captain G. B. Shirlaw, of the R.A.M.C. While the writing was still in progress Captain Shirlaw was sent overseas at a week's notice.

The topic — the part all of us can play in the making of a permanent peace — is of such importance that it was with the greatest reluctance that the author faced the prospect of laying aside what he had started to do. His friend, Major L. E. Jones, with whom he had discussed the plan of this book, agreed to finish the writing of it in so far as he felt competent to do so, although much of the original plan had to be omitted. The book therefore appears under a dual authorship. For the interest of those who wish to distinguish between the two contributions, Captain Shirlaw's written part ends on page 56. Major Jones is responsible for all that is written after that page, but has asked us to emphasise his indebtedness throughout to his co-author, as mainspring of the whole.

The problems of the peace create forebodings in the minds of everyone. Experts have already written on them in great detail. But experts are largely read by experts, or by the already partly-informed seeker after further knowledge. This book is written for the ordinary citizen. Its plan is to present some of the salient facts, to discuss them and analyse them, but to leave the ordinary reader to draw his own common-sense conclusions.

*September 1943*

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## CHAPTER I

### WHY THIS BOOK ?

BOOKS, like you and me, are conceived before they are born. The writing still has to be done (and very tedious work it is), but the soul of the book, its essential life, is begotten upon some single specific occasion.

I can think of no better introduction to this book than to recall the occasion when I decided to write it. For I want you to know the mood of this book from its first inception, in the hope that both reader and author may begin it in the same frame of mind.

The book came to life in an ordinary officers' mess, whilst we were all trying to enjoy that cup of N.A.A.F.I. coffee, after listening to the nine o'clock News. It was a familiar scene — a bunch of officers, *Punch*, the *Tatler* and a scramble for "Jane" of the *Daily Mirror* and *The Times* crossword. The inevitable question comes up — "When will this blasted war finish?" Usual divergence of opinion: "Six months," "One year," "Two years," "Five years," with arguments which naturally lead to the plight of subjugated Europe and its chance of survival. This brings to the fore "German cruelty", "War-guilt", "Punishment" and the question "What shall we do with the Hun after this war?" "Kill them all," "No," "Sterilise them," "Leave it to the Poles, Czechs or French," and so on, until some wet-blanket mars the whole proceeding by asking "How can you kill one hundred million Germans?" "Simple enough — just leave it to me," says the mildest-looking subaltern that ever wore spectacles. "Don't you agree, Major?" "I agree that it's time for a glass of beer before the pubs close." This contribution from the senior officer present is received with a general chorus of approval and once more the thorny question

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of the future peace has been successfully solved to everybody's entire satisfaction, and pigeon-holed until the next occasion when doubtless the same verdict will be reached.

I have heard this and similar conversations so often that the only surprising thing is that on this occasion it should have come over me : " Enough of this ; a glass of beer isn't going to solve this problem to my satisfaction any longer ; I must go a bit deeper into this, and see whether I can't come to some better conclusion than just drowning the problem with war-time alcohol." Hence this book, which has been written in the hope that, for some readers at any rate, it may take the place of that glass of beer. For when I found that there was no single publication short enough and handy enough to be carried and read on active service that raised or answered all the questions that came into my head, I decided it would be better to raise and try to answer them for myself. And where I could not answer them, at least to provoke discussion. Already I seem to hear some growling from odd corners of the Mess.

First growl : Why the hell should our armies waste their time discussing peace problems ? Their job is to fight the war and win it — otherwise where's your peace ?

Second growl : If you must discuss peace — all right, but wait till the war is won and you've got a peace to discuss.

Third growl : In any case, this is no job for us soldiers. The subject is much too difficult and complex. Even experts disagree, so how can you or I hope to solve it ? Let the experts thrash it out between them.

Fourth growl : These problems give me a headache anyway.

Fifth growl : Why discuss it at all ? Haven't we got a government we trust and an exceptionally decent, honest and able Prime Minister ? He's sure to do the right and proper things when the time is ripe. After all, the government knows *all* the facts, and you with your limited knowledge are not in a position to judge, so leave it to them.

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Haven't I heard all this before? *Ad nauseam*; and since these growls have a certain surface plausibility, and if they are right, it is a pure waste of my time in writing this book, let us examine them in slightly greater detail.

Point one — Armies should not waste their time discussing peace aims. Their job is to fight and win the war. Now, wait a moment — who is the Army? The young and healthy citizens of this country, both men and women, its future workers and rulers. They went to war voluntarily in order to preserve their right to freedom and to re-establish peace and (*inter alia*) their right to vote for the type of government they prefer. Some of them voted for the present government and all (if they do their duty) will vote, in due course, for a post-war government. A post-war government at any rate cannot shirk the responsibility of dealing with post-war problems. But if the citizens — our present soldiers — are to vote for that government, how the hell can they do so intelligently unless they have the relevant facts before them, discuss them and so form a worth-while opinion? Not to vote at all, or to vote unintelligently, would be to fail in their duties as citizens.

This view is, in fact, accepted by the Army Council, who set up the Army Bureau of Current Affairs and its monthly A.B.C.A. lectures and discussions, maps, publications, lecturers and education officers. Morale is the accepted prerequisite of a good soldier. Education is recognised by the Army as an aid to morale. Knowledge of what you want increases morale. Mental contentment is essential to fighting morale. And what after all is likely to lead to greater mental contentment than the feeling "I know what I want of the future, and what's more, I can help in achieving it"? No, there can be no doubt that "after the war" problems are among the most important subjects for discussion in the modern Army. The reason why they are so often neglected is purely because of the difficulties of the subject and the lack of lead from above. Officers are responsible in the

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Army for A.B.C.A. discussion. How can they discuss real and vital current affairs unless they make themselves thoroughly familiar with the problems and difficulties of peace-making ?

Now for the second point. Leave the discussion of peace till it is achieved. There will be no peace unless we win the war.

What we have just said really covers point number two, but there is a still more cogent objection. It is usual to offer peace terms to the vanquished either when or soon after hostilities cease. That means that the basic terms have to be decided upon either during the war or within a short time afterwards. You cannot formulate peace terms out of the blue in a few hours. Therefore you must discuss them during the war. Not only that, but the stability of the peace terms does not depend only on the enemy's acceptance of them. If he has lost the war he *must* accept them. Their stability depends primarily upon their being acceptable to the citizens of the victorious countries. After all they will have to do the dirty work of enforcing them, so that they will do well to be quite clear in their own minds, before the war ends, as to exactly what kind of peace they wish to enjoy after all the trials and hardships endured in order to achieve it. You cannot divide peace from war. One is the consequence of the other. A bad peace leads to another war. The reason for war is to achieve the peace you want. If you don't know what you want, what the heck did you go to war for ? Because, you say, it was forced upon you. Very well, then, at least one of your wants must be to have a positive plan for preventing another war being forced upon you.

Point three was — Leave it to the expert : it is too difficult for you ; it is even difficult for the expert, so how can you hope to solve it ? The trouble is, that if you leave it to the expert, nothing gets done. Experts are generally either students and professors, or civil servants. In either case they have no political pull, and so governments are apt to

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ignore them. Last time an expert — now Lord Keynes — pointed out all the disasters that would result from the economic clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. The politicians paid no attention to him, because the voters did not tell them to do so. In the years before this war the experts of the Foreign Office wrote memorandum after memorandum, pointing out why Germany was rearming and what Mussolini's ambitions were. Their views did not suit Mr. Chamberlain, and their reports were neglected or suppressed. If the people had been well-informed enough, and interested enough, to insist on the Cabinet hearkening to these people, it would have been a very different story. Actually, the expert has a double function ; first, to educate the people about the relevant facts ; and secondly, when the people have made it clear to the government what they want, to carry out the government's policy based upon the wishes of an informed majority. For it is the people who, in the last resort, must take the decision on broad principles ; the expert's job is to make those principles workable. It is the very essence of Democracy for the people to decide policy, and for the Civil Service to act as its servants in carrying it out. But if the people are apathetic and won't play, then either you get a government like Mr. Chamberlain's flying in the face of the experts, or you may get, what is little less dangerous, civil servants on their own initiative deciding on principles of policy. Because democratic governments, in the absence of a lead from their constituents, are apt to be guided by the permanent officials. But the policies of permanent officials are like trees without roots — suspended in mid-air. Policy should have deep roots ; it should rest upon the declared (and informed) wishes of the people. Perhaps many past failures in international policy have been due to the fact that our rulers, in this particular aspect, never bothered to enquire the wishes of their constituents, or when they did, often went against these wishes on the grounds of necessity, unavoidability or impracticability. Or was it

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because the peoples never bothered either? And didn't bother because they did not *know*?

The fourth point was that problems of this sort give people a headache.

As to the headache — well, it is a matter of choice. Personally I would rather have an occasional headache and a few hours of brain-fag than a bullet in my belly and my children asked to die for the same thing for which their father died, just because he and his contemporaries were afraid to think, work and accept their responsibilities.

The fifth point was — Leave it to the government. The government knows best. Well, of course, that would save you and me a great deal of trouble. But if it is right to leave peace-making to the government, on the score of its superior knowledge, then it must be right to leave everything to the government for the same reason. The government would be delighted. So would the bureaucrats; but if you really want to leave these vital decisions to the government, you should vote for a dictatorship right away, rather than risk your life in the fight to uphold Democracy. And if you don't like Dictators, then it is up to you to make your own decisions on these most vital questions.

The testing time for Democracy is now, to-day. Is it capable of reaching decisions on which will depend the very life, not only of our country but of all Europe?

A post-war election will not meet the case. We have shown how the basic points of the Peace must be decided upon before the end of hostilities. The conditions of surrender and Armistice terms must be ready for whenever the time comes. They cannot be prepared in a few hours or days, or even weeks. Treaties, vital treaties, will have to be signed with the Allies. Details may be left till later, but at least the main outlines should be agreed upon. We cannot just go back to things as they were. Public opinion must be enlightened on these grave matters before it is too late. That public opinion, once it is found, will have to make itself

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vocal, so that its views will be taken into account, for there are others who will be vocal enough — vested interests of one kind or another, not to speak of various unrepresentative members of national governments now in this country who have nothing to lose except their jobs.

We may then summarise as follows the conclusions arrived at so far :

(1) There is an urgent need for public education and discussion in the Army and elsewhere, on post-war and peace problems.

(2) All citizens who have the right and the duty of voting should be clear in their own minds about the facts, the possibilities and the difficulties, in order to arrive at an opinion which will allow them to discharge their duties as voters in the full sense of the word and not as mere automata.

(3) The peace problems are the crucial ones at the present time. Nothing worth-while can be hoped for until a stable, secure and decent peace — not only from a geographic but from a humanitarian and economic point of view — is established. Citizens should accordingly give their first attention to peace-making.

(4) There is no time to lose, as no one of us can predict when the decisions we have to make may be put into effect. The stakes are so big and the consequences may be so serious, that there is no room for laziness or *laissez-faire*.

(5) From the very nature of Democracy, the decisions cannot be left to others. Not even to one's own government, or to experts, or to any individual.

(6) The stability of the peace depends upon its acceptance by future governments. Its acceptance by future governments depends upon its acceptance by you — the citizen. If you, the citizen, are not aware of the problem, how can you decide ? And if you have no opinion on the matter, or do not make your opinion known, how is the government to know that its policy is the one people want ? There are two

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more vital considerations in favour of speed in discussion and in the formulation of policy and its public presentation.

### *Publish your Terms now*

Our governments have pledged us, and in many ways very wisely, to a policy of "Unconditional Surrender". But unconditional surrender does not mean that we cannot publish our peace aims before hostilities end. It only means that we shall not negotiate with the enemy or accept any of his conditions. He must accept our conditions *in toto* no matter what they may be. But if we do not publish them he may expect them to be very much harsher than they will, in reality, be, and so fight to escape defeat with all the more tenacity and all the more brutality as the signs of defeat become unmistakable. If we publish them in some detail, with the full force of a unanimous and determined public opinion behind them, the citizens of enemy countries may decide that they would rather surrender unconditionally, knowing our prospective peace terms, than support their government in a war which they know they are doomed to lose. Disunity, at any rate, may set in in the enemy ranks and victory be the sooner achieved. Publication, on the other hand, may tend to increase support for us in neutral countries. It may strengthen and encourage the subjugated peoples, give them hope for the future, make them feel it is worth taking risks in sabotage and in fighting the enemy. What I am fighting for, let each man of them feel, is real peace and not something which may lead me into the same mess once more.

The other consideration is this : publication of our terms will tend to clarify the question "Who is for us, and who against us ?" Alleged friends and supporters who refuse to associate themselves with our peace aims are after all not going to be much help in winning the peace, and it is now a commonplace that you cannot possibly win the war unless you win the peace that will follow it. We don't want a



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Pyrrhic victory. To increase your ranks by all and sundry who fight on your side for purely selfish reasons may seem an asset on paper, but they will not help you to achieve what you set out to achieve when you decided to fight this war. In point of fact when it comes to the reckoning they are going to weaken your side. We all know a lot about the part the fifth column plays in war. But it plays its part in peace-making as well, and now is the time when we should be looking for the potential fifth column of the peace who are as surely going to try to make us lose the peace as they tried to make us lose the war. They — the fifth column — are always with us, pretending to help us while taking good care that the medicine they offer, sweet and appetising as it may look, is as good a poison as they can produce, or sitting quiet as a church mouse and only laughing when their secret sabotage has succeeded.

It would be silly to think that the German, who before and during the war so cunningly established a political fifth column inside his opponents' ranks, should not be working furiously with an eye to the peace, making his strategic dispositions of these sinister individuals as an investment for a time when the war is lost and the game apparently up. His policy is "try and try again". Next time, he thinks, I may be successful. Even if I lose the war, who knows if I cannot prevent the enemy from winning the peace? This might give me another chance to start the game once again, and perhaps next time, with more experience and even more cunning, I shall succeed where I failed before.

Do not make that cardinal mistake of regarding enemy propaganda as only a short-term weapon. "If I can weaken and disunite the Allies in war, so much the better (and can we say he has not succeeded here and there?); if not, at least I am laying the foundations of disunity later. If Europe is disunited I shall come into my own again. In my war of retreat I shall devastate Europe as much as possible, and after that give in quickly. I think I can fool the Allies.

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Disunity is there anyway. Wait till they start discussing the peace. There's bound to be fireworks at the conferences, and fur will fly. And if I can fool the Allies, I certainly can fool my own people. Am I not the person who said 'The bigger the lie, the more easily will people swallow it'? The game's not up yet." Can't you imagine Hitler meditating on these lines in his front-line dugout at Berchtesgaden? At any rate we can say that, judging from the last peace, it is a policy which may, if we are not careful, lead to a certain measure of success. To counter it, we must establish unity of purpose and unity of action. And that takes a bit of doing.

So far, then, by way of introduction. I hope I have convinced you of the need for discussing the problem. Perhaps you will agree with me that there is need for a book which is going to help the man in the street, the soldier in khaki, the airwoman in blue, to find the facts; a book to present the problems and help him to search for his own answers. Whether this particular book is going to achieve that object will be for the reader himself to decide.

Before we begin, though, I want to stress that this is not a book by an expert. Nor is it for the expert. It is written for the man in the street who has not given this subject much thought. The expert may, perhaps, find it of interest to read for once in a while the views of a man in the street. It is written by a layman who wanted to read a book of this kind, failed to find one and so had to write it himself.

### *A Fair Question*

Many readers, I am certain, will at once retort: If you are not an expert, how came you to have the audacity to attempt a book on so vital a subject? The question is a fair one, and before I have the right to go any further must be answered.

For many years I have been working on the assumption that it is necessary for the layman, the ordinary citizen of this or any other country, to digest and study the relevant

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facts. For how else is he going to reach his own conclusions, rather than accept as gospel truth all the cut-and-dried solutions pushed under his nose by partisan newspapers or foreign propaganda services? Some of the relevant facts I got from books, periodicals and so on. But I found that I needed to get still closer to them. I wanted to see how things looked "on the spot". I therefore travelled as widely as my means would allow. Being able, without claiming to be a linguist, to speak half a dozen European languages, I found it fairly easy to gather facts first hand, and to enter into the moods and hopes of the various peoples. I worked in as many European countries as I could manage, and, working on this principle, I reached the conclusion that this war was unavoidable at a time when the professional politicians were still assuring us that, according to all political knowledge, rules and regulations, peace could be preserved. Some of us saw long since that Democracy, if it hoped to survive, would have to take active steps to defend itself. My own activity began in 1937, in Spain, when the politicians were still busy cooking up hotpots and stews of one variety or another to prevent a war that was already raging all around, but which was still invisible to many people sitting in comfortable chairs and offices, attempting by crossing *t*'s and dotting *i*'s to hide the stark reality of Truth. In fact it needed real live bombs to blast them out of that frame of mind and their comfortable seclusion. For the trouble with the professional politician, when it comes to European affairs, seems to be that he has seen too narrowly. He has got entangled in minute and intricate detail, and failed to see either the darkness round one corner or the brilliant sun round another, but kept on counting and labelling the bricks at the same spot in the wall.

To me, the fact that this book is not by an expert or a professional politician seems an actual advantage. I have no past pronouncements round my neck with which I must be consistent. I have no dogmas, and so no fear of heresy. I

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can afford to give the problems a fresh mind. Being a man in the street, I know what we men in the street want, and I mean to go all-out to discover how it may be got. Orthodoxy will not stop me, nor the warning of those who tell me things cannot be done in this way or that. I reply to them — “ You had your chances ; now give us ours. After all, we do the fighting — we also want the responsibility of finishing the job, properly. We are not satisfied with winning the battle alone — we want to win the peace as well.” I hope our soldiers have no intention of letting “ armchair strategists ” lose on paper the peace for which so much of their blood has been shed.

Accordingly I offer no apology for writing this book ; whether it gives you what you want or not is for you to judge.

### *Conviction, not Conversion*

But one thing I want to make clear at the outset. I do not wish to convert you. I only want to present facts, to discuss them, analyse them, look at them from this side and that, from above and below, and if necessary turn them upside-down. The real object of this book is to stimulate you to start your own discussions and to reach your own conclusions. If you arrive at any other conclusions than your own, they will be of value neither to you nor to your country. Men only work wholeheartedly for what they believe in. The only beliefs that will stand the test of time are those a man arrives at by himself, which have roots within himself and do not depend upon a daily dose of propaganda, whether on the radio, the poster or a newspaper. Beliefs so based are sooner or later bound to crash. And since peace in Europe will only be stable if based on principles in which men believe, you can see the importance of finding out what you do believe in, and doing your best to see that peace should be based upon it.

Only one thing more needs to be said, and that is about

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the *mood* of this book. War is an emotional affair. It is a time of great suffering, hardship and extreme trial to many. It begets not only violent acts but violent thoughts, which in later times one is apt to regret. Especially do we *say* things in war-time which in the future years of peace we would be glad to forget. I wish to guard against emotionalism in this book. Not that I do not believe in emotionalism. It has kept us going through this war and it will shepherd us to peace. But the topics of this book have no concern with war, even though we discuss them in the midst of it. They belong to the peace that follows. Any conclusions we may come to would be useless, therefore, if we have to repudiate them in the future merely because our emotional state has changed or because we can no longer hide the truth from ourselves. I shall try therefore to write nothing of which in later years I will be either ashamed or about which I am likely to change my views. The touchstone, to the best of my endeavours, shall be the truth.

What I propose to do is to break up the whole subject into single small debatable points, on each of which the man in the street should be capable of arriving at a decision. By decision I mean making up his mind as to the action he would like his government to take in the case concerned. At the end of the book the reader should have arrived at a series of decisions. Add the debating points together, and you have the main problems of Europe. Add your decisions together, and you have your answers to them. Apply your decisions to the problems, and you have a peace settlement in embryo.

There is an obvious advantage in taking the debating points — the sticks in the faggot — one by one. Too often in everyday discussion the ordinary man gets into trouble through over-simplifying the problem. He tries to put forward a short cut to a good peace, and is discomfited when he discovers that any solution he suggests can be effectively countered and his arguments torn to shreds. Because naturally there can be no single solution to a pro-

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blem which is in reality a thousand problems interwoven. So he says to himself "This is too difficult" or "This is beyond me", and is only too glad to accept any proposal that discussion of it should be left to the years after the war when things have "cooled off". (Cooled off indeed! If the problem is not settled soon after the war, there will be no cooling off. On the contrary, things will be sizzling!) If, however, we succeed in serving up the problem point by point, he will be in a position to discuss one point at a time and not try to cure the whole world of its pains after dinner. This method should help him to take a topic, stick to it and see that other people stick to it as well.

And although it may take him a long time to come to the peace problems as a whole, yet each discussion should take him a definite step forward — provided, of course, he reaches a conclusion he can accept.

To officers in the Forces also this "point by point" system should prove useful in organising debates. A series of debates could deal each week with a fresh point, and when the whole field has been covered, with an attempt to combine all the separate conclusions arrived at in one comprehensive solution of the main problem.

## CHAPTER II

### THE PROBLEM OF GERMANY

THE first main topic, then, is "Germany". Germany naturally comes first, because if we can make up our mind about Germany, we shall be a decided step nearer to solving the other no less pressing problems of Europe. And the first point which springs to mind in any discussion about Germany is her "War-guilt". War-guilt in turn raises the question of Punishment, of Reparations and of how to prevent her starting another war. And under Punishment again, we shall have to consider whether to punish the whole German nation or only those individuals whose guilt is proven.

#### *War-Guilt*

Enough has been written about German war-guilt, and the subject is so fresh in everyone's mind that no further ink need be wasted in recapitulating the bestial means by which Hitler dragged Europe into war once more.

What we have to consider is whether and how Germany can be made to pay for her crime and by what means she can be prevented from again setting the world by the ears. It is certain that no peace in Europe is possible, no matter what systems of security we adopt, unless the "German menace" is wiped clean off the face of the earth.

#### *Punishment : (a) The German Nation as a Whole*

Let us first consider the problem of punishing the whole German nation.

Burke said "you cannot indict a nation", and even after the last war the Allies were satisfied with a confession of guilt embodied in the Peace Treaty. (But is there really

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much point in asking your adversary to sign his name on the dotted line after you have beaten him to his knees? It does nothing to strengthen your case, because it is signed under duress. When millions of men by shedding their blood and giving up their lives have proved their belief in the righteousness of our cause, isn't it making a mockery of all the blood spilled to ask some cowering German politician to acknowledge it in writing? After all, we have no doubts about our case. But to make the Germans see it you've got to teach them an entirely new scale of moral values. Signing such clauses won't teach them. On the contrary, it might lead to the belief that Germany, having publicly confessed her guilt, no longer needed re-education on this particular question.)

However, in case you don't agree with Burke, let us briefly consider some of the proposals often canvassed, beginning with the bright idea we met on the first page of this book — "Kill them all." I have heard this repeated in one form or another on so many occasions that it cannot be put aside as just harmless chatter.

On the surface there is nothing much wrong with the suggestion, if it were practicable. The Germans themselves have, directly or indirectly, killed more people than we have been able to count. By bombing, shooting, bayoneting and hanging; by the spread of disease, by starvation, by the lowering of the birth rate, by driving men and women to wholesale suicide. They have been responsible for incalculable human misery by unprecedented mass transportations of populations. They have knocked down, burnt, blown to pieces, sunk or stolen more things than can ever be fully repaired or restored, even if the Germans were to spend the next hundred years in attempting it. Add to this the gigantic losses due to the diversion of human effort into war-making from the constructive and profitable pursuits of peace, and you get a sum of crimes for which no punishment could possibly be adequate. An individual guilty of a millionth



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part of what the Germans have done would be immediately sentenced to death. Why not the whole nation ? It would be a neat and final solution. When there were no more Germans, there could be no more German problems. If we can only succeed in sinking our tiresome humanitarian instincts until the job is finished, we shall have gone a long way towards solving our peace problems as a whole. But can it be done ?

Firstly, what about exemptions ? (No special order has ever been issued in England without a schedule of exemptions.) Who exactly are "all the Germans" ? Does it include the Austrians ? Many of them are deeply insulted if you call them Germans. If the name German is also going to mean a death sentence, it will be something more than an insult. Is it to include all those Germans outside the Reich whom Hitler has incorporated before or during the war ? Is it going to include all Germans abroad, or all those of German parentage ? Should we perhaps adopt the same test as the Germans adopted in the case of the Jews, five generations ? If so, it will include General Eisenhower, Allied Commander-in-Chief in North Africa, who is of German stock. What about all those Germans who escaped from Germany to evade Hitlerism ? Many Germans in Germany will claim that they too would have liked to escape, but were unable to make their get-away. Are women and children to be exempted ? What about pregnant women ? Personally I think that, with the best will in the world, you will find that the idea is a pure chimera, "buzzing in a vacuum". You may even arrive at this conclusion before you consider who is to do the killing and how : police or military, machine-gun, firing squad, hanging, poison gas, morphia, etc. etc. ? Where do you start ? Village by village or alphabetically ?

The decision is yours. And remember how long it will take you. Even if you are capable of arranging to butcher three hundred thousand people a day, the killing will take

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the best part of a year to complete. Mightn't you get a revulsion of feeling before the end, and be forced to abandon the scheme in the middle, thus getting nothing for your pains except the certainty that hatred in Europe will not die for generations to come? And do we want our children to grow up with the slogan "Kill all Germans", much as all German children have grown up with the slogan "Herren-volk"? It will hardly fit them to reach stable or impartial decisions where Germany is concerned. But remember that whichever decision you adopt, you ought to stick to it. These things are too vital to change your mind about every few months, or to talk "big" about because you are too lazy to talk seriously.

You may nevertheless decide that if we cannot shoot all, we could at any rate shoot some of them. Say anything between ten to fifteen millions. But who are to choose the individuals to undergo the punishment? The last scheme at any rate had the advantage that, as everyone was to be killed, nobody had to decide on particular names. It is difficult to believe that you could get together a panel of individuals who would be willing to proscribe many millions of men on the sole ground of their being Germans. If you decide in the negative, then stop talking as if it were possible. For one thing, loose talk about such policies only helps one person, and that is Dr. Goebbels, who needs all he can get of this type of propaganda to flog the weary German nation to ever greater efforts, and to keep them running the Nazis' war out of pure funk of what will happen to them if they lose it. Nor will it be forgotten when the time comes to find a *modus vivendi* between Germany and the rest of Europe. For another, you are only weakening your own case and making no real progress towards solving the problem of punishment. Rather the contrary — many people, when they have talked enough about a subject, however foolishly, come to feel that they have *done* something about it, when in reality all they have done is to make it more difficult of solution.

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### *Sterilisation*

I have heard this proposal put forward on many occasions. Since, it is said, the Germans are no longer fit to inhabit Europe, why not sterilise the lot and so guarantee, without the necessity of killing them all, that within a generation there will be no Germans left or at any rate too few to matter. Apart from the moral aspect, the operation itself is easy enough, but can only be performed by a doctor. It doesn't take very long, but the number that could be performed in a day is strictly limited. Could you get enough doctors to agree to perform this operation upon the whole male population of Germany (and to do the job properly it should include females too) within a reasonably short time? Perhaps to-day you might, but when peace came and the doctors were required at home you might have difficulty in finding them. You may say that the doctors should be compelled to do it : might you not change your mind if your own child's life were in danger because all the doctors were away, busy sterilising the Germans ?

### *Why not make the Germans work for Us ?*

The Germans have deported hundreds of thousands of citizens of the conquered countries as slave labour. They have moved them at will from country to country, from ghetto to ghetto. Why should we not deport all able-bodied Germans and use them as slave labour to help repair the devastation they have caused ? At any rate it would be poetic justice. They devised such ingenious schemes of destruction ; they produced the pilots who gloried in the bombing of open defenceless towns ; they practised it and tested it with fiendish pleasure in 1937 at Guernica in Spain — a country with which they were not even at war but used purely as a handy area for military manœuvres. Why not make them rebuild all those areas and cities they have laid waste ? If practicable, clearly this will be a humane and just punish-

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ment, if indeed you can call it punishment, to ask someone to reconstruct what he wilfully destroyed. But is it practicable? Presumably the Germans will not volunteer for the job. It will be a question of forced labour. People won't like having them in the neighbourhood. Trade Unions will complain that the bread is being taken out of the mouths of honest bricklayers and masons. The unemployed — if there are any — will kick up a row. Then again, if the Germans are to work like convict gangs, military supervision would be necessary. Incidents are bound to occur. Public opinion will on the one hand be inflamed against the sullen slave, whilst on the other hand many intelligent people will agitate against any policy of enforced slavery, even where the Germans are concerned. And there will be the question of how their women and children, left behind in Germany, are going to support themselves. Nor would it be a very efficient form of labour. None the less, in spite of all these considerations, the task of re-building, especially in Russia, will be so gigantic that it may well be these risks must be taken.

### *Blockade*

Why not maintain the blockade of Germany? And not merely deny her raw materials and food, but send her to Coventry (or to what she has left standing of it) socially and politically? This would bring home to her with what abhorrence the rest of Europe regards her acts of wanton aggression.

Well, an economic blockade may not affect Germany as much as you think. She is highly industrialised, and has got along pretty well during the war without imports from abroad. An Allied blockade was kept up for a short time at the end of the last war. It had to be stopped, when the British soldiers began sharing their rations with the Germans. But it made a lasting impression on the Germans, who believe to this day that the Allies tried to starve them, even after the war was finished. Many Germans who are here as

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refugees from Nazi oppression and wholeheartedly on the Allied side still remember the food blockade with deep feelings of injustice. Starvation there would be again ; not perhaps to a degree that would mean depopulation, but the greatest sufferers would be young children and adolescents, that is, the very people whom we might hope some day to turn into decent citizens of Europe. A political or social blockade, on the other hand, means the end of any attempt to re-educate the Germans. If you are content to leave them as they are, well and good, but can we afford to do so ? Germany, after all, is part of the European body politic. Failing complete amputation, dare we risk starving that part, even morally and culturally ? Will not gangrene set in, and once again poison the rest of us ? If you want to inoculate the rising generation against the Nazi virus, you must be prepared to go in and mix with them. Perhaps a blood transfusion is a better simile for what the Germans need ; but however you put it, a boycott can lead nowhere.

*Leave it to the Poles, Czechs, Russians, etc.*

This is a solution which is much canvassed in the Forces. " Do not let us repeat the mistake of the last war and baulk the other nations of their revenge. Let us close our eyes and leave it to them. Let the liberated peoples of Europe march into Germany ; they will soon make short work of the Germans." This sounds sensible. There is no doubt that for a time the Poles and the Czechs and anybody else that wants to join in the " fun " would make short work of the Germans. I have equally no doubt in my own mind that the real villains, the guilty men, will have taken good care not to be there. They know what to expect. The man who will " get it in the neck " is the ordinary German citizen, who, for all his guilt as an accessory, is nevertheless a better citizen than the Nazi leaders and their butchers who organised the whole Fascist show. We may thus find that we have only decreased the proportion of so-called " good " Germans to

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the proportion of wicked Germans. Meanwhile the wicked Germans, from their hiding-holes abroad, will be using every trick to make capital out of this bloodshed, including the plausible cry of "Just what we said would happen". Moreover, a revulsion of feeling is possible; even Polish or Czech soldiers may tire of the butchery and prefer to go home to their families and rebuild their homes. There will be a public clamour to stop this outpouring of blood, and all we shall have done is to destroy the relatively decent German citizen while the guilty may well escape scot-free. Which is the very last thing you or anybody wants.

### *The Real Trouble with the Germans*

The real trouble is, when you talk of punishing the German people as a whole, not merely the impracticability of this method or that, but something much more fundamental. It is that we have to do with a people who, in the main, no longer share our basic views as to what is right or wrong. The lamentable truth is that the Nazi philosophy has perverted and inverted, not only Christian, but what may be called "natural" standards of behaviour. Morally, the younger generation of Nazis are standing on their heads. They don't merely scoff at what we call virtue, as a bad man does — they call it vice. Compassion is weakness; freedom of speech treachery; liberty is licence. Law no longer exists; the Führer's will takes its place. Even scientific truths cease to be valid unless crossed, in some mystic way, with "Nazi" principles. All arrant nonsense, of course; so much so that we have been inclined to underrate the effect on the German people. Unfortunately young Germans have an almost unlimited capacity for swallowing nonsense. And when this nonsense leads to crime, we are up against the disconcerting fact that, so far from recognising it as such, the Germans are prepared to suffer and die for their criminal nonsense as if it were the loftiest spiritual truth. Now the essence of rational punishment is that the person punished

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should know that he has done wrong, — a common ethic shared by the whipper and the whipped. And this is just what is lacking between ourselves and the Germans. Castigation now, in their present state of perversion, will seem to them like the consequence, not of any crime, but solely and simply of their military defeat. To them the moral of it will be not “ don’t do it again ”, but “ next time be stronger ”.

This is not to say that sophisticated gangsters like Hitler, Mussolini, Goering, Goebbels, Ribbentrop and the rest are not perfectly aware that they are criminals. They are just bad men, not converts to a new faith. True, they are its apostles, with their tongues very much in their cheeks. For what they saw in Alfred Rosenberg’s mystical bosh was not a new truth but a handy means of fooling the people into abandoning some awkward old truths which stood in the way of their little game. In fact they have always paid tribute to the innate moral sense of humanity — even in some Germans we must suppose — by their attempts to justify their very common vulgar crimes of aggression, falsehood, murder, torture and robbery by means of a high-falutin philosophy.

The trouble is they have got away with it, and while we can cheerfully hang the gangsters at the top, knowing well that they will have the necessary comprehension, if not the guts, to return the hangman’s wink, we are in a really embarrassing position vis-à-vis the corrupted mass of the German people. Because they believe, what their leaders never believed, that their leaders were *right* in the moral sense of the word. Now if we admit this — and there is plenty of evidence for it — our dilemma is that we must either drop the idea of punishing the German people altogether, or postpone the punishment until we have re-educated them in the common standards of right and wrong. One could, of course, punish them at once, and then spend years in explaining to them the reason why. But a sore behind makes a restive scholar. Nor could we expect great enthusiasm for learning

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if it began to leak out that prize-giving day would be celebrated with the birch-rod.

The conclusion seems to be that, if we are to retain our own respect for the first principles of punishment, we must confine it to the gangsters — the Nazi bosses — and let the victims, however willing, of their false doctrines go free. There will be, no doubt, in the everyday conditions of post-war Germany, plenty of that rigour and asceticism in which, traditionally, a man can most profitably re-examine the state of his soul.

### *They are being Punished*

And even if wholesale punishment were applicable, the magnitude of the German crime is such that no retribution known to law or equity could possibly be adequate. But after all, the Germans as a whole *are* being taught that war is a frightful business, and that they were the mugs for starting it. It is difficult to balance human suffering on any scale, but there is no doubt that before the Germans are finished in this war they will suffer. If the R.A.F. were to bomb every town of over 100,000 inhabitants, more than sixty-five million people are going to get a good idea of war. They may decide it is "bad". Add to these all those that are receiving this lesson on the Russian front and are going to be taught it in occupied countries. According to the 1939 census the population of Germany was 69,622,483 and of Greater Germany 79,570,758. The great majority of these people are going to learn during this war what they never learnt during the last. German casualties so far have been terrific. They will be heavier still. The effects of bombing have been great. They will be even greater. No — the Germans will know that war does not pay. But see to it that the lesson they learn is that war does not pay, not merely it does not pay to lose a war. (It will be even better if we can teach them — and the whole of Europe — that peace pays, — but that is another story.)



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### *(b) Punishment of Picked Individuals*

The proposal to punish picked individuals after trial and conviction by an Allied Court of some kind has been widely publicised by most of the members of our government. We must therefore expect, on analysis, to find it certain, just and practicable. We shall not, however, because of its august sponsors, refrain from analysing it. On the contrary, just because it is an official policy, let us examine it in even greater detail, to make quite certain that it is a policy that the majority of people will really believe in and want to see carried out.

If we are able to bring to justice all those guilty of beginning this war and all those guilty of atrocities, nothing could be more satisfactory. But are there any catches in it? And first, let us see what happened in the last war. It was a war to end war; "Hang the Kaiser" was the popular cry, and it was generally believed that hanged he would be. Learned judges may have had different ideas on the subject, but the public and the Army — and Mr. Lloyd George — merely said "Hang the Kaiser". In the Penalty chapter of the peace treaty William II of Hohenzollern was "publicly arraigned as former German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties". (Just alter the name to Hitler and the office to Führer.) On the strength of this the Allies officially asked the Dutch Government to hand over the ex-Kaiser. The Dutch Government replied that there was no international law or custom which allowed them to surrender a political refugee. The legal position was unassailable; the Allies did not press the case, and the whole problem was soon forgotten. Germany was also required to hand over any German accused by the Allies of war-guilt, the list including all the prominent war leaders on the German side. The demand caused such an uproar that this too was promptly dropped.

Instead, twelve persons accused of atrocities towards

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prisoners of war were brought to trial before the German Supreme Court at Leipzig. The Allies furnished the prosecutors. Six of the accused were convicted and condemned to serve short terms of imprisonment (none longer than six months to one year) and one was acquitted. The German Government on evidence presented decided to charge the remaining five themselves, but as the trial was held *in camera* the results are not known. The British had as prisoners of war certain submarine commanders whom the British press was particularly anxious to see brought to trial. They were, however, released and no more was heard of them. So much for the war-guilt trials of the last war.

Remembering the case of the Kaiser, have the Allies so far made any attempt to get general agreement to a series of international treaties conceding the surrender on demand of political refugees accused by another government of war-guilt? The Germans have been careful to leave Switzerland and Sweden open as back doors. (An aeroplane can quickly land in either.) Are we merely going to ask the Swiss politely to give up the refugees who reach there? What if the Swiss refuse? Those are points on which you need to be clear before you inflame public feeling or incorporate clauses in the peace treaty only to forget them a week later. If thought of in time, international agreements providing for the surrender of refugees could no doubt be made. But before you make such agreements, remember some of the possible consequences. Suppose there had been such treaties after the last war. Under them the Nazis might have made a formal application to, let us say, the United States Government to surrender such eminent refugees as Thomas Mann or Professor Einstein. A charge would have been trumped up against these venerable authors and scientists for complicity in some anti-national offence or other. The right of political asylum is not to be lightly withdrawn. It guarantees not only valuable lives, but the rights of free thought and speech, denied in one country, have so far always found

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another where they could be exercised. I do not say the thing cannot be done, but I am pointing out some of the difficulties and problems it will raise.

Then there is the question of proof. British justice prides itself on assuming innocence till guilt is proved. It is proposed to bring to trial many who are guilty, *inter alia*, of the crime of extermination. Isn't this rather an invitation to them to try to get rid of the witnesses by exterminating them? Is it likely they will permit some poor Trade Unionist, say, whom they have locked in a concentration camp and ill-treated to come forward and accuse them? He is in their power; won't they get rid of him altogether? These points need watching, so that in our zeal to punish the criminals who have been ill-treating decent and honest people in the concentration camps, we do not in fact make certain of even greater cruelty to the very people we are trying to save. They might say "Thank you very much, but we shall be better off without your kind help."

The next point to consider is whether it is really so easy to distinguish between guilty and non-guilty Germans. One can naturally think of quite a few hundred Germans who without any doubt are flagrantly guilty. But will the punishment of a few hundred or even a thousand or so individual Germans expiate the crimes which the German State, or its citizens in its name, have committed? Many Germans must be deeply ashamed of these crimes. Very many no doubt are actively resisting the State. (Witness the frequent beheadings of Germans.) No doubt at this stage of the war, and with the hand of the Gestapo everywhere, it is more than difficult for a German to attempt to do anything; moreover, after all these years of unceasing Goebbels propaganda, faked news, faked pictures, the falsification of history, it is easy to imagine that many Germans must by now have difficulty in distinguishing truth from lies, good from bad. None the less it is the plain truth that the majority of the Germans at any rate have stood by and allowed all this to happen

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without having the moral or physical courage to stand up against Nazi policy or ideology to any practical extent. It follows that the majority of Germans are to some extent guilty of, or accessories to, the Nazi crimes. Will the punishment of a few (and it could at best be only an infinitesimal percentage, in the last war six individuals out of seventy millions) be a just or adequate punishment?

Again, trials aren't usually conducted over-night. Look at the government statement following the clamour for the trial of Hess, the German Deputy Führer and a real Nazi boss, probably a bigger fish than we are likely to catch again. His trial must wait till after the war "when *full* evidence can be obtained". How long will it take us to get *full* evidence? The defendants can be depended upon to put up a spirited and complicated defence, dragging in history, international documents, expert witnesses, etc. etc. The trials may well drag on until the public are sick of them and the whole scheme gradually peter out as it did in the last war. In which case once again national murder, that is war, will have evaded just retribution.

On top of all this, do we want to prolong the feelings of hatred after the war by an endless series of trials just at a time when we should be concentrating on how to achieve peace and how to adjust differences? The feelings aroused by trials like these are bound to make the calm discussion of necessary post-war adjustments well-nigh impossible.

There are further difficulties to be got over, both legal and practical. For instance, the traditional practice is first to make a law and then bring to trial anyone found breaking it. It is something new, first to catch someone doing something, and afterwards make a law under which to punish him for it, that is to say, a law with retrogressive sanctions. And even if you do make such a law, you may find it extremely difficult to apply it.

Supposing, for instance, that you charge a German with ill-treating national minorities. He may well put up the

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following defence. " Whatever I did, I did it in my own country (Germany). There is no international criminal code. Germany never signed a minority agreement, or pledged herself to treat minorities fairly. In fact Poland did sign a minority agreement which was administered by the League of Nations. She has been systematically ill-treating the Jews for many years. Jews and other minorities have frequently complained to the League of Nations about this treatment without very much effect. In fact these minority complaints were the most common things on the League of Nations agenda. How is it that the International Court, with Polish judges on its bench, is trying me, a German, for the persecution of Jews, when the Poles who were legally required to treat minorities fairly did not in fact do so ? " Plenty of actual proof (most of which is now in possession of the League) could be brought forward to prove this contention of his. What is the Court going to do ? Bring to trial the former Polish Government and many Polish officials still alive who were associated with this policy ? Or must the whole matter be allowed to drop because the results are not what we bargained for ? The same embarrassment will have to be faced up to when the German leaders are charged with starting wars of aggression, or without prior declaration, etc. There were fully six aggressions after the last war on which the League of Nations took no action. In some cases the governments may have had a certain justification, but very little. They just didn't like the frontiers, and instead of asking for a frontier commission calmly marched in. This is not the place to revive old bitterness by naming names, but a German defendant would name them soon enough, and, after all, it is common knowledge. England recognised and still recognises Franco's régime, which got to power mainly by German and Italian force. How can you explain to the Court in legal language that what is sauce for the gander is not sauce for the goose ?

International courts are an excellent idea. But establish

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them first, be clear as to what they are to administer, to whom the law applies and what penalties it carries, and after that apply it to *anyone* who breaks the law without discrimination of any kind. But to make and apply retrogressive laws is extraordinarily difficult. The German was right, unfortunately, in claiming that there is no international code of criminal law, and while the Nazi crimes would all come under our national laws against murder, violence and so on, they were not committed within the national jurisdictions of the Allies. To charge them under the general "laws of humanity", assuming it to be an *a priori* punishable offence to start a war or to ill-treat minorities, may well lead us into some very embarrassing and awkward corners, with the same result as before; that is, nothing at all. And so another clause of the future peace treaty will have gone up in smoke, and people who ought to have been punished got away scot-free.

By this time I feel sure you are getting restive, and want to shout out "Stop! We have been discussing ways and means of punishing the German gangsters for many pages now, and most of them seem to be so full of difficulty that it is questionable whether they can be carried out. Are you telling us once again that murder must go unpunished? Are we to be satisfied a second time with nothing but moral indignation on the part of the United Nations?"

No — I do not think it means that.

We have seen the practical and legal difficulties in the way of any trial by the Allied Nations of the Nazi gangsters — by which term I include every adult member of the Nazi party who has been involved in the political or social crimes of the last ten years in Germany or outside it.

There is, however, another solution. It is not to be supposed that there will not be found after the Armistice plenty of Germans who have genuinely and consistently detested the Nazis and all their works. There are still men of light and leading in exile or in hiding, even if the best of them are, at the eleventh hour, butchered in concentration camps. (It

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would be more characteristic of the Germans to go whining to his imprisoned victims for a certificate of good conduct, after the white flag has been raised, than to cut their throats with the Allies thundering at the door.)

Some civil government we must set up : and it is obvious that the only men we can place and support in authority will be men who have proved by their acts their opposition to the Hitler régime. We should make it a condition of our support — a part of our first interim treaty with the new authority — that it will bring the gangsters to trial. There need be little fear of the repetition of Leipzig. At Leipzig the judges were not trying men who had committed outrages on their fellow Germans. They were trying, under Allied orders, men who had offended the Allies. This time there will be no need to frame charges of crimes against the nationals of other countries (let us hope the Court will have the courage and decency to do so), but the crimes against Germans, and German Jews, will be enough in themselves. A German court, administering the German Code, should have no legal or other difficulty in hanging or beheading or imprisoning according to justice tempered with gusto. Moreover, instead of making martyrs of them in the eyes of the German people, they would merely be branded as what the world rightly considers them — the lowest type of common criminal.

There remains the question of catching the criminals. Those who escape the fury of local mobs will no doubt be found in Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, Portugal and the Argentine.

We have seen the legal difficulties in the way of demanding their extradition. But there are occasions when the moral indignation of all civilised peoples must be allowed to override all legal quibbles. Laws were made for men, not men for laws ; and when an occasion arrives when the laws, framed for normal times, prove an obstacle to natural justice as universally recognised, overridden they must be. The crimes of these wicked men stink to Heaven. It would be

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an outrage if any law or custom gave them sanctuary. And the neutral nations must be told, quite firmly, that if they receive these men, and fail to hand them over, the Allied Nations will come and fetch them. The Allies will have the strength to do it ; all that is needed is the moral courage to announce that there are occasions when Might is Right, or at any rate, means to see Right done.

Nor, when the punishment of individuals is being considered, is it possible to leave out of account what may be termed " unofficial " punishment. We have already given reasons against letting loose the Poles, Czechs and other deeply injured peoples to wreak vengeance in Germany itself. But the arguments hardly apply to " unofficial " revenge taken inside the occupied countries. (One might perhaps better call it " natural " retribution ; — the Poles, the Czechs, the Serbs, the Greeks, the Jews and the French will no doubt have a name for it.) In the occupied countries the actual guilty men are known by sight and by name. The chances of mistakes being made are negligible. If the peoples care to observe due forms of law, their own criminal codes will be adequate. In any case we are unlikely to be able to prevent it, except by a use of force which might appear to put us on the wrong side. Indeed if you have a conscience about this natural retribution and feel that it should be stopped, you can't do better than plan official war-guilt trials by the Allies with the inevitable consequence that the occupying troops will be made responsible for arresting the criminals, thus saving them from the fury of the populations. It might even turn out that the occupying army, by maintaining order and stopping revolutions and riots in order to preserve the criminals for our own hanging, will find that it has in effect preserved and kept in power whole regiments of Quisling or Fascist civil servants whose names are not on our list but whom the population know only too well.

That revolution will in fact break out is probable. Don't let us be frightened by this word " revolution ". It may well



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be the best method to rid Germany of the men who made a mockery of law. Let lawlessness make a mockery of them. Unless a period of revolution occurs, even though we may get rid of the ringleaders, we are unlikely ever to get rid of the firmly enthroned Nazi civil service, which might well survive under another and more democratic label. A social upheaval and revolution might achieve a complete breakdown of everything that the Nazis have built.

The stage could then be set for the construction of a real peace, for the re-education of Fascists and Fascist-minded countries, and the carrying into effect of measures to prevent the recurrence of war.

### *Reparations*

We have seen that, while there should be no obstacle to the due punishment of the Nazi bosses and gangsters, the punishment of the German nation as a whole would be as futile in their present state of mind as it would be impracticable.

Retributive punishment, however, even if it could be made effective, is at best a negative thing. Nothing that punishment can do to Germany, or that the Germans can do, will make up for the loss of life and general misery for which they are responsible. What people have suffered cannot be wiped out. All we can do on that score is to make certain that they will not suffer again, and how to do that will be discussed later. But there are some things for which the Germans, one would think, could at least make reparation (and if in making it they incidentally do suffer some hardships, and learn that aggression, destruction and looting have to be paid for, who will quarrel with that ?) The colossal destruction and damage they have caused falls under two main headings, Material and Spiritual. Material damage includes all the buildings destroyed by bombing or fire ; industries wrecked or removed ; libraries and picture galleries ransacked ; crops, cattle, stores of all sorts, ships,

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rolling-stock, stolen or requisitioned, there is no end to it. And what about the cost of the war? You may well ask why you should be paying 10s. in the £1 income tax and be saddled with an immense war debt. Cannot the Germans be made to bear the whole cost of the war they began? (And let Mussolini add his twopence farthing to it as well.) Under the broad heading of Spiritual damage fall such matters as the loss to science and progress through the execution or exile or imprisonment of scientists, university professors and savants, the suppression of a free press, the destruction of books, the breaking of treaties, and the spreading of false doctrines, racial and moral. Add to all these the stoppage of education in the occupied countries and the consequent loss that this will mean to the countries concerned. But the list could be multiplied tenfold and still be incomplete. Nor must we forget that the greatest spiritual damage has been done by the Nazis in Germany itself. Whatever they have made other countries suffer, in no country have they caused even a tithe of the spiritual destruction they have wrought in their own. In considering the question of repairing it all, it is well to bear in mind that the need for mental, educational, scientific and moral reconstruction is far greater in Germany than anywhere else. First let us see what exactly we want, and then how far we may expect to get it. We want to compensate the peoples and governments (which ought to, but does not always, mean one and the same thing) for the destruction of their belongings. We want, if possible, to find a method of doing this which will not hurt the victors more than the vanquished, which will not give rise to any economic disequilibrium, and which will not afford pretexts to future Hitlers to call for wars of revenge.

### *(a) Reparation for Material Damages*

The questions for consideration, then, are: *Can* we, subject to the above proviso, make Germany pay for or

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restore what she has broken ? If yes, how ? Fully, or in part ? In money or in kind ? By rebuilding the destroyed property ? Or by transferring industries from Germany to other countries ? Or how else ?

Clearly an immense subject, demanding a high degree of knowledge, not only of economics, industry and banking, but of the probable post-war conditions of the world at large. You and I are not going to pretend to that knowledge and I have no intention of attempting a detailed discussion in a book of this size and scope. But there are certain broad principles involved which are a matter of common sense, the consideration of which may help us to arrive at some conclusions on broad lines.

And here I think it would be useful to the lay reader to give very briefly the salient facts of Reparations after the last war. No war indemnity was asked for ; only compensation for damage done to the civilian populations of the Allied Nations. A Reparation Commission was set up, to decide on the amount to be paid and the method of payment. Not until April 1921, two and a half years after the Armistice, was the figure of total reparations fixed. The figure was £6600 millions. As this figure frightened everybody, except M. Poincaré, almost as much as it frightened the Germans, it was decided that £4000 millions of it, or nearly two-thirds, should be represented by pieces of paper called " C " bonds, which the Reparation Commissioners put into a box. Until Germany's capacity to pay had been established, the " C " bonds would stay in the box and nobody would be the worse for them. Meanwhile Germany was to pay £100 millions a year, plus a quarter of the value of her exports.

By August, Germany had paid £50 millions. Soon after that the mark began to fall, and went on falling until by the end of 1923 it cost a German 50 billion marks to buy one pound. Even when it only cost him 35,000 marks, at the end of 1922, the British felt it was too expensive for him, and suggested letting the Germans off cash payments

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for two years. But M. Poincaré, like the old lady who thought it "worth trying" to beat an ace with her king, thought the Germans ought to try, and as they did not try hard enough, occupied the Ruhr in January 1923. The occupation of the Ruhr, passively resisted by the Germans, did not bring in enough coal and iron to pay the expenses of the occupying forces. But it did bring things to such a pass that even the French agreed to the appointment of the Committee of Allied experts, known as the Dawes Committee, to see if Germany's finances, hopelessly involved through the inflation, could be restored to some sort of order.

The Dawes Committee, having given Germany a new mark called the Reichsmark, which was to be controlled by a Bank of Issue independent of the German Government, again tackled the question of Reparations. It decided that Germany could pay £50 millions a year, rising, after five years, to £125 millions a year. She was to give security for these payments by handing over bonds of her State Railways and of certain industrial enterprises, and she was to begin by receiving £40 millions from the Allies by way of a loan. The Ruhr was to be evacuated. So by the autumn of 1924, six years after the Armistice, Germany had paid £50 millions and received £40 millions. Apart from certain deliveries in kind, mainly coal, we were £10 millions up, and Germany only owed us £6590 millions. The Dawes Plan did not alter the total figure. Even M. Herriot must have felt M. Poincaré's cold, relentless eye upon him, for while no member of the Dawes Committee could ever have believed we should receive that fantastic amount, they took care not to mention a total figure at all. It was left "in the air".

But the fashion of lending money to Germany had been set, and it soon became the rage, particularly in America. So Germany suddenly became flush, and for some years paid her annuities gaily with American money, which, as it turned out, she had no serious intention of repaying.

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It has been calculated that when the world-wide economic and financial crash of 1929 arrived, Germany had paid about £500 millions in reparations, and received about £900 millions in loans and credits.

But early in that year, Stresemann, anxious to see the still occupied Rhineland and Saar redeemed, proposed that an attempt should be made to come to a definite settlement of the Reparations problem. The result was the "Young Plan", which finally fixed Germany's liability at £3700 millions. This sum was to be paid in 37 annual payments averaging £100 millions a year. But if there were difficulties in transferring this amount in any year, two-thirds of it could be postponed for two years.

In the autumn of 1929 came the crash. In under three years Germany's exports fell by nearly two-thirds, and her unemployed rose from two millions in 1929 to over six millions in March 1932. In 1931 the Hoover moratorium suspended all reparation and inter-Allied payments for one year, and before it expired, in January 1932, the German Chancellor Dr. Brüning, not to be outdone in patriotism by the growing National Socialist party, roundly declared that Germany neither could nor would in any circumstances resume payment of reparations. And she never did.<sup>1</sup> So ended the story of Reparations. Apart from deliveries in kind, what was paid, was paid with Allied money which has never been repaid: and the Germans were left with a huge balance over with which to re-equip their factories for rearming. The Allies naturally felt cheated. The Germans, wrongly, but perhaps not altogether unnaturally, considering the way the whole matter was handled, especially by the French, felt that they in turn had been hardly treated. In the end, little was achieved but bad feeling, and the gift to Hitler of some valuable screaming-points for his orations.

<sup>1</sup> My authority for this summary of the story of Reparations is Professor E. H. Carr's *International Relations since the Peace Treaties* (Macmillan & Co.).

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And did he use them ! The lesson of it might perhaps be summed up as follows :

“ If you want money and you think you can get it, devise a plan by which you *can* get it, don't make a plan by which you not only don't get a penny, but manage to create a mass of ill-feeling and hatred, such as any government might well spend a million pounds in propaganda to achieve. That, after all, is not business.”

Our governments are not likely, a second time, to make the mistake of trying to extract from the beaten countries an enormous sum in cash. We know now that in the absence of an international currency, and while States retain sovereign rights over their own currencies — to inflate or deflate as they please — major cash payments from one country to another, other than in gold, are impossible without proportionate disturbances in the whole commercial and industrial sphere. After all, marks are no good except to be spent in Germany, and if there is inflation there as happened last time they are no good even in Germany itself. So that if we demand from the Germans large sums in dollars or sterling, they certainly cannot expect to obtain these currencies by offering marks in exchange for them. What they can offer in exchange is goods and services. When, after the last war, this was realised — very late in the day — Germany's creditors themselves took to lending Germany large sums to enable her to re-equip herself for making these goods. True, she spent the bulk of this money on secretly re-equipping herself for war instead — but even where she used it to make goods, the creditors found it wasn't so good after all. Because they discovered that, the world's trade and industry being founded on a national and not an international basis, goods coming from Germany began to compete with the goods they made themselves, and, regarding themselves always as producers first and consumers afterwards, they arrived at the final conclusion that while they couldn't get her money, they didn't want her goods. (The same position exactly

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arose over the Anglo-American War Debt — the Americans, who for the reasons already mentioned, could only take it out in gold or goods, put every obstacle in the way of taking goods, *e.g.* high tariffs, and found themselves accumulating vast masses of gold which they buried underground, and when Britain could get no more gold she had to default.)

Now here you will probably say, "But this is madness. We Allied nations have vast populations, millions of whom are at, or even below, bare subsistence level. Surely to goodness the Germans could be made to work, for their keep but with a minimum of luxuries, at increasing the quantity of necessities, let alone luxuries, of which the Allied populations (and just think of China) are short."

I agree. It is madness. It was madness in the last post-war period, when wheat was burnt in America and coffee in Brazil while millions starved elsewhere.

And of course it could be done. But it means "planning" on a gigantic scale — nothing less than world-wide control (a) of the production of food, raw materials and manufactured goods, and (b) of the flow of all these things from the places where they can be most economically grown, mined or made, to the places where they are needed. The best brains in many Allied countries are already working on the plan. But the nigger in the fence is this — that it can only be achieved if all countries are prepared to surrender their sovereign rights over a very wide field, and, what is much more difficult, if large sections of populations are prepared to lose their life-employment, often their homes, and begin again, perhaps in middle or later life, to learn a new trade in a new district. For let there be no mistake: the governments of this world, with the best will in the world, will be helpless to implement such a plan if their peoples refuse to accept the grave and painful, if temporary, dislocations it will cause. To take one example: the plan must insist that industries should be situated where they can best flourish, without regard to "national" considerations. That is, questions of raw

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material, coal, power, transport, climate, skilled workers, etc. should be paramount. We have a flagrant case of bad siting of industry — for purely nationalistic reasons — in Turkey's steel-works. Turkey has no ore, coal or skilled workers, yet insists on making highly expensive steel for herself, rather than buy it from the countries with the ore, the coal and the skilled workers in exchange for the raisins, figs, tobacco, Turkish Delight and what-not which are her national products.

The planners will put an end to this. We may feel indifferent to the personal embarrassments of the Turkish steel-workers, but what if the Planners decided that Lancashire is no longer the right place to make cotton? That now that the Lancashire climate can be artificially produced anywhere, India and Japan are the most economical countries for cotton-spinning? Will any British government dare to break this to Manchester? Will the cotton-spinners be quite as keen on world-planning when it means leaving an hereditary and skilled employment to begin life again, somewhere, somehow, with all to learn and possibly far from home? And what will the Trade Unions say? Or the great American labour organisations? Because it is not to be thought that the evils of economic Nationalism are everywhere recognised; far from it. Many of the most determined enemies of chauvinism and jingoism, who sincerely believe in the "solidarity of international labour" and so on, have never got further than opposing political nationalism. Can you image a union of steel-workers, in any country in the world, parading with banners demanding that their steel-works should be pulled down because the coal and the ore are too remote, and the cost of the steel too high, and asking to be put to dairy farming or fruit-growing or to whatever the national economic industry of their home district ought to be under a world plan? Well, can you? And yet, until people are ready to submit to, if not to demand, such sacrifices as that, there will be no world plan worth the name.



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I am not suggesting that nothing can be done to mitigate the evils of present-day Nationalism short of such a plan. With good-will, governments should be able to exercise quite a lot of control over the *flow* of products, long before they can do much about the actual producing of them. The rearrangement of tariffs and customs, for example, to protect economic rather than national areas will be a big step in the right direction. But when the above question is posed as to why the Germans could not be made to work at supplying the needier subjects of the Allied nations with necessities of which they are now going short, the answer to-day has to be: "They could, but it won't be done. The world is not yet educated up to the point of working so sensible a plan."

One suggestion has been widely canvassed which, if adopted (and not turned down, as I hope it will be, for quite other reasons, as we shall see later), might have a most useful educative effect on the Allies. It is that the Ruhr industries should be internationalised under the Peace Treaty. The chief motive no doubt, and an excellent one, is to clip the wings of an evil bird of prey. But joint ownership of such productive — and ideally sited — industries would throw upon the Allies the onus of distributing the products. Well, there's nothing like going into business on your own account to learn the ropes. When it comes to sending the Ruhr steel to market, and fixing the price of it, the Allied governments will, no doubt, begin to discover what "economic nationalism" really means. Let us hope the job will fall to Labour governments. Because while it is the workers everywhere who would, in the end, most benefit by world planning, it is on them that the first sacrifices, dislocations and uprooting will fall.

But to return to our muttons. Reluctantly agreeing that a large-scale payment of reparations in kind could be made, but won't, let us see what, short of a break-down of Nationalism, can nevertheless be done about it.

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Well, undoubtedly, there are some things which could be transferred from the beaten to the victorious countries, without injury to our own industrial or commercial economics. They do not amount to much, but so far as they go, would be all to the good. Here are some of the chief ones :

(1) *Gold*.—(It has to be mentioned, but the chances of finding any but a negligible amount are poor.)

(2) *Raw Materials plentiful in Germany, but scarce elsewhere*.—Potash is a good example of these. The world needs all the potash it can get, and the sources are none too many. (It is found in America, in Spain, and is being extracted from the waters of the Dead Sea.) Germany has large deposits, and the export of these without payment for a term of years would be a real gain to the recipients. Germany's surplus coal is another case in point, and possibly her lignite, if the latest process for getting petroleum out of it turns out trumps, as appears likely.

(3) *Inventions and Patents*.—The Germans are great inventors, and their secret processes for synthetic rubber, coal-into-oil, dyes, plastics, alloys and so on, may well have enormous value. Throwing these open to the world would be a real benefit, and no corns that need be considered would be trodden on. The actual inventors, of course, would have to get their royalties, and have the same inducement to use their brains as before. It would not be unfair to stipulate that not only existing patents and processes, but all inventions by German nationals for the next fifty years, should be made available to the world at large. The export of brains can injure nobody, and here is one way to it.

(4) *Manufactured Goods not made elsewhere of the same quality*.—Optical glass, for instance, and scientific instruments. Even in a world run on National lines, nobody objects to getting free what they cannot make themselves.

(5) *Works of Art*.—The Germans have shown so little susceptibility to the civilising influences of beauty that perhaps it would be legitimate to pick the eyes out of their

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museums. (They had no scruples about looting in the occupied countries.) To do this would incidentally enable the Allies, in the far future, to make a gesture of recognition of a reformed Germany — if reformed she ever is to be — by returning to her these insignia of an adult civilisation.

(6) *Labour*.—The export of labour to places where it is short, and where reconstruction is to be done, is another possibility. We do not yet know the extent to which the Russians, for instance, will be handicapped by lack of manpower, in their job of rebuilding the towns and villages and re-tilling the fields in the devastated areas. It may well be that for some years the employment of an army of German workers would be of immense benefit to them. If so, it must be given serious consideration, in spite of the difficulties in such a plan already pointed out in our discussions on punishment. In a choice of evils, the balance may after all be in favour of taking the risks and using such “reparation” labour.

Here, then, are some of the ways in which “innocuous” reparations could be made. No doubt there are others — the test in each case being whether, in a nationalistic world, the transfer helps more than it hurts. As has been said, the sum of these won’t amount to much, but the psychological effect, on victors and vanquished alike, of something having been done in the way of material reparation, is perhaps worth taking into account.

And if you object that the moral effect on the Germans will be nil, because the actual getters of the potash and the coal, the inventors of the processes, will be paid as before in marks by their own government — here is a further suggestion which may fill the bill. Why not devise a system of fines, to be levied on all Germans known to have supported the Nazi régime, for a fixed term of years? The money so collected might be used (*a*) in so far as Germany’s ordinary balance of trade permits cash transfers, in making a token

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payment to the Allies for the relief of Allied nationals hardest hit by the war — the blind, the permanently disabled and so on ; (b) in making the necessary payments in marks to the producers of the goods, or the inventors of the processes which, as we have shown above, could and should be transferred free to the Allied governments (the payment for these goods and services from a special “reparation fine” instead of from the general tax fund, would have the salutary psychological effect mentioned already) ; and (c) in constituting an internal fund, in marks, to be spent, under joint Allied-German control, on the re-education of German youth (there is a precedent for this in the treatment of the Boxer Indemnities, which are administered for the benefit of the Chinese). The exact methods of re-education are a matter for much thought, but the aim of the fund would be to prepare a soil in which the peculiar and odious Nazi doctrines could never again take root. In short, to teach young Germans common decency. No money could be better spent from the victors’ point of view ; it would be good business rather than magnanimity. Even so, the fact that the “pluto-democracies” were capable of making such a gesture would in itself be an object lesson to the Germans.

As to the method of raising the tax there are several — and I have no doubt that our Chancellor of the Exchequer would be only too capable of devising means. It should be made to hit the well-to-do harder than the poor. Having had better chances of education, they ought presumably to have known better, and are therefore more guilty. It must not be so onerous as to affect the spirit of thrift or initiative, or be unduly hard on those that can least afford to pay it, so that the health and nourishment of their children would be affected. Perhaps an income-tax or poll-tax will be the most practicable. The selection of the “Hitlerites” could safely be left to the new German post-war authorities. Possibly they will take the view that the tax should be universally applied except where positive proof can be given of opposi-

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tion to, or persecution by, the Nazis. The Allies would fix the amount and the term of the tax, and the German Government could be left to raise it as seemed to them best.

And now to digress for a moment. Some of you may say that I am unduly impressed by the lessons of history, that because a policy failed in the past it does not follow that it will fail a second time ; and that a stricter enforcement of the policies of the last war, in the height of experience, may this time do the trick.

That depends upon whether they were reasonable policies in themselves. Stricter enforcement of a bad policy will lead nowhere. And, in fact, it was not (as the French thought for a long time, misled by M. Poincaré's Sunday orations) because they were not strictly enforced that the reparation clauses of the Treaty of Versailles broke down. It was because they were, in a nationalistic world, economically unsound and unworkable in themselves. No, this time it is up to the Allies to try to draft a treaty which is *prima facie* reasonable and workable, testing it by reference to the lessons and experience of the last one. But once your policy is decided upon, it should be enforced as strictly as possible. Do not let us again make a peace treaty and ten years later discover that whole chunks of it must be dropped. And if you do find that a clause won't work, say so publicly ; repeal it, and don't just let it go by default. That was what happened last time ; unworkable clauses were quietly dropped, with the awkward result that we were left with the stigma of having attempted measures which could not, or ought not to be carried out, while the policy itself, never disowned, was left hanging over our heads to be used at some later date by an unscrupulous party or government as a political weapon. Just look how Hitler used all the harsher provisions of the Versailles Treaty as an excuse for the rotten state of Germany, when in reality none of those clauses had in fact been applied at all !

See to it that this doesn't happen again. If a clause is

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bad, insist that the Allied governments should amend it on their own initiative. If it does not work, cannot be made to work, and you no longer wish to make it work, let the Allied governments announce the fact publicly, and take their own people into their confidence as to the reasons why. A generous gesture may do much to improve relations, whereas an unrepealed clause will hang like a sharp sword, precariously suspended from the roof of international politics by the thin thread of empty legality, ready to break loose and cut off the heads of yourselves, your friends and your enemies alike with one clean sweep. When your head is off it will be too late to wonder what it was that hit you. A peace treaty is a vast and comprehensive document. You will find that it needs enforcing not only on your enemies but on many of your friends too. And it requires a great deal of self-discipline not to deviate from some of its more idealistic passages, passed in a time of great relief at the conclusion of war, when emotional enthusiasm tends to lead the peace-makers into framing clauses which may well lose sight of political reality. You may well find that it makes demands on you and your Allies, the original injured parties, which you would both be glad to escape. So don't let us bite off more than we can chew.

### *(b) Reparation for Spiritual Damages*

Under this heading we included the destruction of books, the suppression of a free press, the murder and incarceration and enforced exile of scientists and professors, the inculcation of nonsensical but none the less poisonous doctrines, and the concentration of all scientific and intellectual effort on war. The total damage, even if assessable, would be terrific. Perhaps the Germans will claim that, paradoxical as it may seem, the ultimate value of their war discoveries in engineering science, medicine and the like will be of a very high order and of great benefit to the world at large. It may be

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so, but it is hardly a valid excuse. So once again we pose the question, "Do we want to make the Germans pay for this, and if yes — how?" How indeed? Can one bring back to life a dead professor? Can one make up for the loss of so many years of learning? I think the answer is both yes and no. Professors cannot be raised from the dead; and as far as the Allies are concerned, we have seen that not more than a token payment could be transferred as cash reparation. So that not much could be contributed by Germany towards making good the years lost by our own young people. (Incidentally, it may be that some of the new ideas for adult education tried out in the war may prove to be the seeds of a system which would in fact allow some of them at any rate to make up, and even more than make up, for lost time. Plans have already been made by our government for giving grants to soldiers and others whose studies were broken off by the war. The same is true of Russia and of the U.S.A., Canada, etc.)

But, as has already been said, the biggest destruction of all in the spiritual sphere was wreaked on the Germans and in Germany itself. This they can and must be made to repair (in so far as it is repairable), and the point to remember is that the type and quality of what they rebuild is quite as much our affair as theirs. For as Hitler has shown us, it is largely in the type of education given to young people that the foundations of war are laid. The present German youth was brought up to believe that the most glorious thing in the world is to die in your boots in battle; to believe in war and to believe that the Germans had a just grievance which would and ought to be settled by war. It is unthinkable that we should trust the education of a generation so steeped in false doctrine, bad morals and worse history, to a new Goebbels or other perverter of truth. Whether we like it or not, the Allies will be obliged, for a time at least, if not to undertake full responsibility for, at any rate to supervise, the education of the new Germany. There is, unfortunately, nothing to

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which it is so easy to offer silent opposition — “ dumb insolence ”, as the sergeant-major would say — as an attempt to enforce an alien culture (look at the way the Poles resisted it for 150 years), so that it will be a most delicate affair to handle ; and the way of approach will be all-important. If, for instance, Allied supervision is provided for in the Peace Treaty as a quasi-punishment, and made a matter of military or bureaucratic control, it will be damned in German eyes even before it is begun. Think, on the contrary, what an effect it might have on Germany if the Allies were to approach the matter as follows. Let them begin by declaring that they feel themselves to have been partly responsible for the advent of Hitlerism (Eh ? All German ears are pricked). Yes, in so far as after refusing in 1918 to deal with the Kaiser’s government, and insisting on the formation of a new democratic government, they gave that new government so little support and encouragement, and treated it so harshly, that they laid it open to ridicule and attack by the very war parties they refused to deal with, thus paving the way for Fascist propaganda. (If Mr. Lloyd George writes to *The Times* to point out that this is not true, because he and M. Briand were just getting together with Herr Stresemann when—— your answer must be : When what ?) Let them then say : “ We are going to back you or any government in Germany which stands for decency, law, liberty and self-government. And the best way to back you will be to share in the responsibility of seeing that the younger generation is brought up to believe in those things. Because in the long run, political support of any government by outsiders is not only useless but fatal ; it is your own people who must be taught to like the things you stand for, and hate the things you oppose. And as a first step we propose to use a large part of the ‘ reparation ’ tax which you have undertaken to raise, for teaching these very things.” If cleverly done, and if the actual task of re-education is not left entirely to government departments, but made an open field for all educa-



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tionalists genuinely devoted to the pursuit of truth, the effects of such a policy might go a long way towards building the foundations of lasting peace.

### *Prevention of War*

The last war was waged under the banner of "The War to end War". To-day, after the rude shattering of these high aspirations and the difficulties experienced in the post-war years of controlling even small and relatively weak countries from committing aggression, the slogan "War to end War" is not so often heard. None the less the man in the street is determined, and convinced, that war to stop German world-domination shall not and will not again be necessary. He trusts the Allied governments to see to it that, no matter what the cost or method, Germany shall never be in a position to commit another aggression. It will of course be obvious to anyone that preventing Germany from committing aggression does not necessarily stop another country from committing an aggression. To the average man in this island, however, it is the German threat that counts. Other wars may come and go, but it is in Germany that he sees the one threat to his national security. Other wars may be fought far enough away to make him feel they are none of his business; they even seem on occasion to be fought with at least some regard to the decencies of gentlemanly warfare; but in a war with the Germans everything seems at stake, life, property, freedom, honour and the very dignity of man. This, at least, must not happen again.

I propose to discuss the subject under four headings: Smoking-room, Plausible, Conventional and a New Method. It may not be a scientific classification, but it is convenient as a popular approach to the subject.

### *Smoking-room*

Although we have already dealt with these, they may be shortly recapitulated here, because if you think that either

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of these methods is feasible, you can skip the rest of the discussion.

- (i) Killing all Germans — about eighty million people. There could then be no doubt that Germany would no longer be able to declare war on anybody.
- (ii) Sterilisation of all Germans. See remarks on (i).

### *Plausible*

DESTROYING HEAVY INDUSTRIES.—You may say that whilst we cannot prevent incorrigible German militarists from planning, we could destroy the Ruhr industries and other heavy industries needed to manufacture tanks, aeroplanes, lorries, guns, etc. But this would only guarantee that for the time being Germany would lack the capacity to manufacture armaments. It has no bearing on what her capacity for armaments will be in fifty years' time. Methods of war are constantly changing. We have seen the development of radiolocation in this war; where other new inventions are going to lead to is impossible to foresee. To-day you may require thousands of aeroplanes in order to drop large quantities of high explosives on the industrial centres of your enemies. But what if the "rocket" method enables even larger quantities to be dropped without the need of a single aeroplane? To make "rocket" high explosives you will not need heavy industries; it can be done by the light industries engaged in supplying the ordinary goods of civilian consumption. With the remarkable development of modern science, the country that possesses scientific energy may quickly make up for the loss of essential industries, and with only light industries in her possession, might easily become a threat to your security. So that to stop such a threat you would have not only to destroy her heavy industries now, but to forbid her the construction of new industries essential to ordinary civilian existence. And if such reconstruction of light industries did take place, you would have to go in and

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again destroy them. Whether you think that your children will be willing to keep the population of Germany down indefinitely and prevent her from having any industrial capacity of any kind, I leave to you to decide. But even if they were so willing, they might well find that unless they wanted to have a starving Germany in the midst of plenty, or a population for whom they themselves would have to work and supply with goods, they would after all have to agree to the construction of enough industries to provide Germany with the main necessities of everyday life. Remember, moreover, that if such a policy is embarked upon, the new German generation growing up will hold the rest of Europe and the democracies in such detestation that the moment this policy is relaxed you can be certain that it will concentrate the whole national effort upon the one idea of revenge.

### *Conventional*

DISARMAMENT.—One of the major items in the last peace treaty and again on the agenda for the coming peace treaty is total German disarmament. Let us see whether total disarmament alone is in the least likely to prevent a fresh German military threat. All that you do when you disarm a country is to take away or destroy all her weapons of warfare. What you cannot do is to stop people from thinking.

Whether it be the nucleus of the German General Staffs, former Generals, Admirals, Air Marshals or merely self-styled German patriots, even if they lack all military equipment, they can still think out ways and means of once more attacking their neighbours. Having no military equipment of any kind may even be a positive advantage, as we saw last time. It will enable them to devote their time to inventing the latest and newest forms of armaments and developing the latest types of tactics and strategy. We, on the other hand, with a mass of military equipment left over from this war, will naturally tend to think of a future war in terms of present weapons. It is only human, and common thrift, not to want

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to scrap all this valuable equipment in order to design new. The same thing may happen again as happened after the last war. The Germans, having no vested interests in old-type military equipment and old-type military doctrines, were free to plan new equipment and methods, and once their factories were turned on to manufacturing this new equipment Germany became speedily rearmed with the most modern and efficient weapons. We meantime were still thinking of how to utilise our old equipment according to established tactical rules, and, in fact, were manufacturing equipment that was of little value in this new war.

Disarmament may postpone but itself cannot prevent the threat of war. It only means that the disarmed country, provided it has the industrial capacity, will in the long run have better and newer equipment than the country that has not disarmed.

Whether the real answer is to suppress all scientific education and research in Germany, and whether even if desirable it would be possible, is up to you to decide.

**SPLITTING GERMANY INTO SMALL STATES.**—This policy has been widely canvassed as the ideal one for preventing any new threat to the security of Europe. The assumption is that if Germany were split into a number of small States, none of these would in itself be capable of aggression, and that being freed from the so-called dominance of Prussian militarism, they might be expected to develop along their own lines and become the decent, peaceable, music-loving, beer-drinking German tribes of the days before the Reich.

It is, however, almost universally accepted to-day that a prosperous world economy demands ever larger economic units. The splitting-up of Europe into an even greater number of small States (to-day there are thirty-three) would run directly counter to this accepted doctrine and would increase rather than diminish economic chaos. So that if part of your Peace programme is a Europe not only free from war, but enjoying a decent economic life, you may quite

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likely prejudice the very thing you want to see by such a dividing of Europe into still smaller units.

But putting the economic aspect aside for a moment, let us consider it solely from the point of view of whether it is going to avert a threat to Europe's security. It may well be that if you arbitrarily and by main force split an economic unit into many separate parts, it will naturally become the subconscious desire of all the peoples concerned to try and unify themselves once more. Unfortunately you cannot split Germany physically with, let us say, wide strips of sea-water. All you can do is to fix arbitrary frontiers, and only the constant threat of war or military force will prevent the artificial sub-units from reuniting by common consent. We know now how these things are done. The reunification of all those separate German States may take place suddenly some Sunday afternoon. Will your children be prepared to pay for the constant upkeep of large armies of occupation, prepared to act any, or every week-end, in order to stop the natural wish of the German people to be united in one economic unit? And what guarantee is there that all these separate German nations will not put their heads together and prepare secretly for a future war?

You may only be fooled into thinking that the threat to your security is smaller, because the States are smaller. Once they become united, possibly over-night, unless you do something about it quickly, you may once again be confronted by a powerful nation with a formidable war potential.

ENCIRCLEMENT.—Alternatively, you may decide, through a system of alliances, to surround Germany with military powers bound together to resist any German aggression. But how are you going to define this aggression? Must you wait until Germany actually declares or begins a war, or should it be deemed aggression whenever Germany starts planning, educating and preparing its people for war, in however secret and unofficial a manner? That is, are you going to war with Germany as soon as you feel that her

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leaders have become once again war-minded ? If not, you may well find that as soon as Germany recovers her strength she will begin to play off one member of the alliance against another, using her usual methods of intimidation here, cajolery there, fifth-column propaganda and mischief-making everywhere, until you wake up to find your anti-German alliance no better than a soap-bubble which bursts upon the slightest contact. We all know only too well that treaties and alliances only last as long as the spirit of the governments or peoples concerned is active in maintaining them. The post-war moods of peoples are, unfortunately, a fickle foundation on which to build a sure barrier against German aggression.

Moreover, the strongest alliance would be no absolute guarantee that the Germans might not discover, or think they had discovered, such novel and " safe-sure " methods and weapons of war as would make them feel able to strike single-handed against the full strength of the encircling alliance.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.—But you will say, " Will not a new and better League of Nations, and the stricter application of sanctions, be capable of preventing fresh German aggression ? " But if you cannot depend on an alliance of four or five Great Powers, immediately encircling Germany, to stop the threat of war, what do you gain by adding another forty or so smaller and more distant Powers to their number ? You merely multiply the chances of disagreement and disintegration, as we have already learned to our cost. Don't forget that if the map of Europe is not drastically revised after this war, there will be even more unsatisfied Powers than there were after the last war. It is physically impossible to satisfy, from the territorial point of view, all these countries with territorial ambitions to-day. The dissatisfied Powers will be constantly trying to obtain revision of frontiers, either by so-called peaceful methods or by threats. If the new League is to be a declared instrument for keeping Germany

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down, you can hardly expect much co-operation from Germany herself in your plans for the new Europe. If it is to be an instrument for keeping the dissatisfied countries down as well, you won't get co-operation from them either. Having their own axes to grind, and their own petty aggressions to make (if they could), they are hardly likely to strengthen the League's powers of defining aggression, taking prompt action, or imposing sanctions. They are, in fact, far more likely to form smaller alliances and combinations to work against the principles of the League. The subject is a big one and merits wider discussion, but I think one can definitely reach the conclusion here, that any new League will have to be built on such totally different foundations from the last, if it is to prevent a new German threat of war, that the less we think in terms of the old League the better.

GENERAL DISARMAMENT.—It is an old cry that "freedom from fear" would remove the threat of war. But how is it to be achieved? By general disarmament? But who dares disarm until he *is* free from fear? There is a vicious circle here. The countries with small armies say to those that have bigger ones, "You reduce your armies and I shall feel more secure". The countries that have bigger armies say to the countries with smaller ones, "As your armies are so small anyway, why don't you disband them entirely, then I shall feel more secure, and may feel able to disarm myself?" Nobody — quite sensibly — likes to take the first step.

ARMIES OF OCCUPATION.—Should the Allies maintain armies of occupation in Germany itself, to see to it that she does not rearm? Without a doubt, while the re-education of Germany is going on, some military or police control will be needed. But to prevent her rearmament for all time, you will have to keep a permanent foreign garrison in Germany. What effect this may have upon the Germans, upon the relations between the Germans and the countries from which this garrison is recruited, and upon the foreign garrisons themselves, I leave to you to guess.

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Would there ever be an end to "incidents"? Poland was partitioned three times. But partitioning never killed her national will or her fight for national freedom. It did establish a bitter hatred between the occupiers and the occupied. You may, by means of foreign garrisons, achieve temporary security, but will the game be worth the candle? What sort of Europe will you get as the result? Hardly, I think you will agree, the Europe we are all hoping for.

### *A New Method*<sup>1</sup>

So much for the old methods. Some have already been tried and found wanting. The rest would seem to have defects likely to prove fatal. But there is a way which has not yet been tried, although often discussed. Since, however, circumstances have decreed that it must be here set out by a fresh hand, it had better have a fresh chapter as well.

<sup>1</sup> In fairness to Captain Shirlaw's views, it must here be said that he would have laid less emphasis on the next two chapters, and more on new social and political structures which I am not competent to expound.—L. E. J.



## CHAPTER III

### A WORLD POLICE FORCE

IF we want a world made secure from the threat of war, there would seem to be only three courses open to us :

(1) Universal disarmament, based on the trust that in future all men will behave like sheep, and that wolves are extinct. This has only to be mentioned to be dismissed as absurd.

(2) The old system of national armaments. This will mean that once again world security will depend upon a balance of strength, and the accident of whether the aggressively-inclined peoples are stronger or weaker than the peace-loving peoples. Well, we have seen what comes of that.

(3) An international Police Force. The League of Nations vaguely recognised that this was the real solution, and tried to provide for such a Police Force by binding all its members to make war on an aggressor. The plan failed, and was bound to fail. To ask nations to enter into such an obligation, but to leave it to each nation to decide whether it should have big or little, well or ill-trained forces ; obsolete or up-to-date weapons ; ships or aircraft or tanks or all or none of these, was patently futile. The plan broke down at the first test. You cannot band together for any purpose requiring force, unless you first lay down how each member of the band is to be armed. If some members turn up with hay-forks and muzzle-loaders while others have tommy-guns, you will soon find out the truth of that elementary principle.

Now however tempting it may be, at the moment of victory, to rely for the future security of the world upon a permanent alliance of the United Nations — each command-

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ing, at the moment, gigantic armaments — it is yet easy to see how little stability there could be in such an alliance. Without any quarrel about other matters, even with perfect mutual trust and the best will in the world, what would be the position when the Great Powers began to consider demobilisation and a return to a peace footing? If exhausted Russia decided to go back to scythes, or isolationist America to shot-guns, relying on British fleets and air forces? or vice versa? The paradox would be, that the greater the mutual confidence between the Allies, the greater the temptation to some of them to give up pulling their weight.

The truth is, that so soon as the primary purpose of banded forces becomes, not national defence — for which each country judges (or under a Baldwin or a Chamberlain misjudges) its own requirements — but international security, it becomes impossible to leave the size and equipment of each national force to be decided by the nation concerned. Because it is not to be expected that any country will be content to maintain a first-class fighting machine to protect its allies and neighbours who have allowed their own weapons to rust.

So that, if we really mean to keep the peace this time by pooling resources, we are up at once against the necessity of a revolutionary change in all our traditional ideas, and the acceptance of the hitherto unheard-of proposition that the size and armaments of our navy, army and air force will be prescribed for us.

Yet so it must be. The choice is perfectly clear-cut. Either we must rely, as hitherto, on the chances and changes of the policies and armed strengths of a few Great Powers, or we must have a World Police. And when you come to consider closely the conditions for creating and maintaining a World Police Force, you will find, I think, that the following requirements are fundamental :

(1) It must be the sole armed force anywhere (with the exception of such domestic police forces as each country may

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require for preserving internal law and order). This, at first blush, seems a pretty tall order. But there is no two ways about it. Because a national force strong enough to take on the W.P.F. could obviously not be tolerated, while a national force too weak to do so would be a sheer waste of money. However, as we shall see in a moment, the total abolition of national armies, navies and air forces will, in practice, hardly be noticed.

(2) Its political direction must be international, but based on the principle that who pays the piper calls the tune. However much we may hate and despise committees, they are sometimes indispensable, and in this case control must necessarily be in the hands of a committee — we might call it the World Commission of the Peace — representing the constituent nations. Whether *all* nations will eventually be represented, big or small, is a matter for discussion. What is all-important is that voting powers should be not equal, but strictly proportionate to the strength of the various national contingents. Because—

(3) The Police Force must be composed of national contingents, raised, trained, paid, armed and commanded nationally. The world may conceivably, at a far-distant date, become so international-minded that the W.P.F. can recruit, arm and train its services with the world as recruiting-ground. We are still a long way from that time. Apart from questions of language, race and living standards, few men are yet morally adult enough to owe conscious allegiance to an international authority, or to stand being ordered about — except in times of supreme crisis — by “foreigners”. We must be practical, and the practical thing is to keep a British navy, army and air force as before (only its size and armament being prescribed for us) with all the ancient service, corps and regimental traditions and loyalties, with the one outstanding difference, that if ever it fights it will fight not for the Empire only but the world. (And since that is what we are in effect doing in this war, and did in the last, it is

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not such an overwhelming difference after all.) But to keep in tradition, it will be necessary—

(4) That the Political Heads of nations should be *ex officio* Commanders-in-Chief of the contingents. The President of the United States is already in that position; it must be assumed by our King and other national Presidents or Sovereigns. In our own case, the “forces of the Crown” have so long looked up to the Sovereign as their head, and fountain of all commissions, promotions and honours, that the change of ultimate allegiance from the national Sovereign to a World Commission of the Peace—a soulless, unromantic sort of entity, call it what you will—must be covered up, and can be covered up, by the King’s assumption of supreme command. Obedience will be due to him, not as Sovereign, but as Commander-in-Chief of the combined services, but his prestige and traditional function in that field will be quite unaffected.

(5) The size and strength of each national contingent must be determined by the World Commission. This is the crucial point, as has been already pointed out. No combination in arms, for any purpose, could tolerate individual decisions as to the number and kind of weapons to be pooled. On the one hand governments are under constant pressure, in periods of prolonged peace, to stint and save on armaments. On the other hand, no contingent could be allowed to achieve disproportionate strength. The W.P.F. must at all times have absolute superiority over any national contingent.

The prescription of armaments to each nation obviously raises difficult and thorny questions. All-round equality is patently absurd. Even Powers of about equal world standing could not sensibly be allotted the same kinds of armaments. Great Britain and the U.S.A., for example, must always have bigger navies and smaller armies than Russia or China. Traditional skill and experience must be taken into account. A battleship or a submarine (only let us hope these will be abolished) could be made the equivalent of so many aircraft,

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tanks or infantry. On what basis are national quotas to be calculated? Population won't do. It would fall too hardly on China, and too favourably on Great Britain with her far greater wealth per head.

It looks as if statisticians will have to be called in to estimate what each country can afford. The calculation won't be easy. Some nations who are poor could be rich if they had the energy to make the most of their natural resources. Some who are rich to-day might, by a scientific discovery or two, find themselves suddenly poor. But, by and large, economists have their methods for estimating national incomes. If they began with the average national incomes for the last five years before the war, and if the figures arrived at were revised, say, quinquennially, a tolerably fair basis for assessing what a nation must be asked to spend on armaments might be arrived at.

I am not suggesting that the size of contingents would be regulated solely by national incomes; that America, for example, who might well come out top of the income rating, should contribute a more powerful contingent than Russia or ourselves. The income rating would only be used to determine into what *class* each nation would fall. Class I nations—whose incomes exceeded a given minimum figure—would be called upon for equal contingents. Class II nations, in turn, would contribute equal contingents, but smaller than those allotted to Class I, and so on. Defining classes would, of course, be only the first step. Having told a country how much money it must spend, the World Commission of the Peace would next have to say how much was to be spent on ships, guns, aircraft, men, etc. It would have to fix a standard of obsolescence, and see that antiquated ships and weapons were scrapped. It would even have to set standards of training.

All this sounds very formidable. But, after all, it is only what peace-time governments and staffs have to do all the time. And it would be these same men, sitting on a larger,

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but still a professional staff at Geneva (or wherever the W.P.F. will have its headquarters, preferably anywhere *but* Geneva), who will have to plan these things. The difference would be that instead of having an eye to one or more potential enemies, their task would be to plan for the suppression of attempts at peace-breaking in any part of the world. And having made their plan, and decided how many men, ships, aircraft, tanks, etc., they needed to carry it out, they would proceed to pull out the "quota" list and allot to each nation such armaments as suited it geographically, technically and from the point of view of national skill and tradition, but always within the "money cost" noted against that nation's name.

The above five points would seem to cover the basic conditions without which a W.P.F. would not work. There are, of course, a hundred and one other problems — some quite big ones — to be solved. Here are a few of them :

(1) Remembering Hitler's dodges for rearming under our noses, there would have to be drastic provisions as to the numbers and armaments allowed in domestic police forces.

(2) The Political Direction of the W.P.F. will be vested in a World Commission of the Peace. Who should be the members of that Commission ? Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of the day — who flourish and are cut down like the grass — or outstanding non-political figures (like the judges of the Hague Court) who would have more permanency and less party bias ? In my humble opinion, most decidedly the former. The Commission must be the most alive, realistic, forcible body possible, enjoying the maximum of prestige. In democratic politics only the day-to-day leaders have the power and prestige to fill the bill. Grave elderly statesmen get lip-service and no more. If nations are foolish enough to make a Laval Prime Minister, then a Laval must sit on the Commission — if he doesn't, he will certainly sabotage the good and great men who do.

But who pays the piper calls the tune, and if ever a vote

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is necessary, each member of the Commission must cast votes proportionate to the strength of the contingent contributed by his own country.

(3) The Command of the W.P.F. — as distinct from the Political control which sets it in motion — will be another thorny question. Could you trust a majority vote to appoint the foremost soldier of the day — or should it be a sailor or an airman? And in peace-time, who knows the true ranking of senior officers? Probably, to avoid log-rolling and jealousies, it would have to be turn-and-turn-about between the countries in Class I.

The W.P.F. staffs, of all services, would of course be international. They should be open to young men as well as to senior officers, and appointments should be for long enough to allow the staff to develop its own traditions and *esprit de corps*. One would hope, indeed, that this *esprit de corps* would in time be developed to a point where the W.P.F. would function of itself — like the Metropolitan Police Force. The police of this country, like every other public service, is in the last resort obedient to the sovereign power, which is Parliament. But in day-to-day affairs it functions on its own. It is largely governed by its own traditions and its own internal discipline. If a Prime Minister or a Home Secretary rang up the Chief Commissioner and asked him to release a scapegrace nephew from Vine Street, he would be politely told to go to the devil. No politician, however powerful, dare meddle with the police — the Chiefs are strong enough in their own right to tell the world if he did, and it is the politician who would be broken. That is the position which must be built up for the World Police. It must become in all day-to-day matters independent of the World Commission to whom it owes obedience. If a Laval on that Commission tries to tamper with it, it must be in a position to break him for it. It must have a pride in itself as a force strong enough to resist any attempt at making trouble between the various national contingents.

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Fortunately, one can say with confidence that a body built up of professional sailors, soldiers and airmen will be from the word "go" disciplined, loyal and incorruptible.

(4) An important part of the staff's duty would be training and inspection. To prescribe the numbers and armament for a contingent is not enough — standards of training and proficiency must also be laid down, and, if possible, lived up to. This will mean constant supervision.

(5) Who is to manufacture armaments? Not, it is to be hoped, private firms. With a W.P.F. strong enough to keep the peace, the only argument for private enterprise in the armament trade, *i.e.* capacity for rapid expansion in war, disappears. Should all weapons be standardised? For a force made up of contingents who, if they ever fought at all, would fight on the same side, there is much to be said for standardisation. But this would have to be done slowly; at first, to avoid expensive "scrapping", a variety of weapons would have to be put up with.

(6) Should service in the W.P.F. be for long or short terms, voluntary or compulsory? Undoubtedly a long-service force of volunteers would be the most efficient. But it might well be stipulated that all constituent countries should give their young men (and women) some form of military training. Apart from the physical and moral benefits of a little healthy drill and discipline, it would enable the professional force to be kept down to a minimum, in the knowledge that rapid expansion would be possible in an emergency. Every professional police force likes to feel it can call out the Special Constables on occasion.

(7) What is the strength of the W.P.F. to be? That would largely depend upon its success in ferreting out any underground attempts at secret rearmament, such as caught us all napping last time. The W.P.F. will have to organise a highly-skilled C.I.D. and Secret Service. If this Service proved efficient, the armed strength required might be very moderate indeed — only sufficient to nip in the bud incipient



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peace-breaking. The cost to each nation, at worst, should be infinitely less than that of pre-war armaments.

(8) Should such a force be set up by the Peace Treaties (as was the League of Nations) or by the United Nations, or by some wider world agreement? Will Germany, Italy and Japan at once, some day, or never be asked, or allowed, to contribute contingents?

To the first of these questions I think we must say, most decidedly, that the setting-up of the W.P.F., at least in principle, must not be allowed to wait upon the final conclusion of Peace. Many sensible persons have already suggested that we ought not to make final Peace for a term of years — to get right away from war emotions and see how many new arrangements work before finally embodying them in a treaty. There is a great deal to be said for this view. But whether we make a Peace Treaty sooner or later, one thing is certain, that we shall be able to make it with far greater comfort and assurance if the overriding question of security has been settled first. To take only one case, consider the difference it would make if the statesmen at the Peace Conference no longer have to consider strategic frontiers. With a real W.P.F. in being, there would be no need to take strategy or military or naval questions into account at all. Mountain ranges, passes, rivers, ports, access to seas, "buffer States" — none of these hitherto embarrassing factors need worry the men with the blue and green pencils as they pore over the map of Europe. The Baltic States, the Balkan nations, Poland, Finland — just think how the position would be eased for these weaker Powers if the question of their security could be left once and for all (like yours and mine in everyday life) to "the Police". This consideration alone seems to me to make it not only desirable, but essential, that the W.P.F. should be set up from the very day of the Armistice. Give the world security, and half the problems of Peace-making disappear.

This being so, it follows that the United Nations should

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set it up themselves. The most practical method would be for the Big Four (Britain, U.S.A., Russia, China) to declare that their existing armies, navies and air forces at the date of the Armistice *are* a World Police; co-opt themselves to the World Commission of the Peace; create a joint staff of the Generals, Admirals and airmen to hand; and notify the world at large that the Police are there and all ready to crack down on anybody anywhere who makes trouble while Peacemaking is going on. Later on, they could no doubt broaden the basis of the World Commission and give it a truly "world" status. And this enlarged Commission could work out the permanent organisation of the Police at leisure.

The second question, as to if and when the defeated Fascist States should be allowed to contribute to the W.P.F., can hardly be settled yet. It will depend largely upon the personalities, past records and political strength of the governments set up in the beaten countries after the war. At no price must a risk of sabotage within the W.P.F. be taken. But it is worth bearing in mind that if genuine democratic and anti-Fascist régimes are set up in those countries, it might greatly strengthen the hands and uphold the prestige of those régimes if they were permitted to contribute to the W.P.F. immediately. The concession would induce them to work for, and not against, the W.P.F., and the existence of a legitimate military career for a limited number of their younger men might provide an outlet for some of the exuberance which Hitler and Mussolini knew so well how to use for their base ends.

But these and many other questions are — apart from that of setting up the W.P.F. *quickly*, the importance of which cannot be over-emphasised — really subsidiary; the main thing to make up your mind about is whether you want the W.P.F. at all. What, after all, are the objections to it?

It will be said that it means the surrender of a cherished part of national sovereignty — control over one's own armed forces. But to what, in practice, does such control amount?

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Certainly not the choice of what size they should be, or even of whether to fight or not. Twice in our generation the Germans, not we, have decided both points for us.

It will be said — perhaps especially in America — that we can't allow our boys to be sent away to be killed by a Committee on which we have only a minority voice. But the same answer applies : we are sending our boys to-day to be killed, not at our own choosing, but at Hitler's.

It will be said that, while agreements binding us in certain cases to take military action may be unavoidable, we cannot allow ourselves to be dictated to as to how much we are to spend — “ Power of the purse most cherished tradition of House of Commons since Hampden ”, and so on. Yet again, the same answer applies. It is not the House of Commons that is voluntarily voting twenty millions a day for this war. It is doing so under stress of *force majeure*.

Next, someone will object that we could never tolerate putting our armed forces under command of a foreign Commander-in-Chief, however distinguished. Well, we have swallowed General Eisenhower — most cheerfully — and in the last war we positively demanded Foch.

Again, it may be said that you cannot ask British sailors and soldiers to swear allegiance to any but the King. But how can any man serve his King and country better than by preserving the peace ? To what, in this war, is our real allegiance given ? Surely to certain principles of right and honour, principles which transcend any narrow national loyalties. Ask any British officer or man where his allegiance would be if a King Boris, a King Carol, a Foxy Ferdinand, a Hitler or a Mussolini were on the throne ? We settled that question years ago in this country. King George VI, God bless him, need have nothing to fear. The Services at whose head he will still stand, will owe their duty to an Authority which, even if International, will have been set over them at the will and with the consent of the British Parliament.

The final objection may well be that the suggestion is,

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though revolutionary, so simple and sensible that one cannot imagine our sophisticated statesmen adopting it. Well, don't let us be too cynical. Statesmen, like other people, are not all fools, and can be taught. This second war in their lifetimes may have taught them a very great deal.

## CHAPTER IV

### A WORLD CRIMINAL CODE

HAVING set up a World Police Force, acting under the orders of a World Commission of the Peace, enjoying the maximum of prestige, it would be very pleasant if we could leave it at that, and set about making a Peace Treaty in an atmosphere of absolute security.

Unfortunately a Police Force set up "in the air", as it were, with no rules to guide it except the orders given to it from time to time by its political directors, would soon be in trouble. Police forces, after all, are there to maintain law and order, but not their own private ideas of law and order. A Police Force existing only to impose the will of the victorious nations upon the rest of the world would, in principle, differ little from a Gestapo. Its orders might have to be obeyed, but with resentment, and the beaten and neutral peoples might be excused for thinking that they had exchanged one tyranny for another.

No, the law and order to be maintained by our W.P.F. must be based on rules. The question is, Where are these rules to come from? You would have thought that by the year A.D. 1944 the world would have provided itself with an international code of good behaviour, complete with penalties for breaches of the same. One would be quite ashamed to have to explain to a visitor from Mars that in fact we have no such thing. Yet that is the sorry truth of the matter. There is, of course, a thing called "International Law". But International Law is really nothing more than a convenient name for the customary rules of behaviour as between nation and nation which civilised peoples generally observe in times of peace and so long as it suits them to do so. It is based partly on so-called "natural" justice, but mainly on

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custom, and it may be compared to what in ordinary private life we call "good manners" or "good form", — these conventional courtesies and politenesses by which we recognise other people's rights and restrain our own egoisms. In some directions it approaches more nearly to real law — as when America and Great Britain decide to arbitrate questions of fishing off Newfoundland or the boundaries of Alaska. But it never *is* law in the sense that it can be enforced upon a recalcitrant party by an outside authority. When nations get their backs up, International Law vanishes into thin air ; out come the guns and where is the sheriff ?

The reason, of course, why the world has never managed to set up a Code of International Law, either Civil or Criminal, is that nations have never so far been willing to make the sacrifice of sovereignty entailed by submission to an over-riding authority, or to pool their armed forces in support of such an authority. Let us assume that at last we have come to our senses and turned our armed forces into police. How should we go about making the rules ?

The ideal method, no doubt, would be to call a Convention of representatives of all the nations of the world, and let it hammer out a Code by common consent.

But, with the League of Nations fresh in memory, can you imagine any method less likely to be immediately acceptable ? or more likely to lead to interminable delay, speechifyings, wrangles, lobbyings and general futility ? And all this at a time when Europe will be starving, the lesser European States quarrelling and jockeying for the crumbs from the Peace table, the great victorious Powers longing to demobilise and get back to their own problems, the vanquished sullen and despairing ? That is not the atmosphere for world conventions or attempts to frame lasting codes for a distracted humanity.

No, the practical thing is to forget, for the time being, ideal methods and to work from things as they are with the tools to hand.

## *A World Criminal Code*

By "things as they are" I mean the temporary supremacy of the United Nations: by "the tools to hand", their gigantic military forces. From these forces, as we have seen, an irresistible World Police could be set up almost at a stroke of the pen. It should be done before, not after, the Allied Governments have surrendered the emergency powers granted them for the war, and long before the formal conclusion of peace. And the Allied Nations — or rather the Big Four — must have the courage and common sense to promulgate an interim Criminal Code for the Police Force to administer. They must not mind the charge of high-handedness or the taunt that they have knocked out the Dictators only to step into their shoes. Let them remind their accusers that the word "Dictator" — as well as the thing — was invented by the Romans at a time when their consuming passion was jealousy of individual authority. Like sensible men, the Romans saw that emergencies often demand the exact reversal of everyday procedure. (You strip your most maidenly maiden aunt in public if her clothes catch fire.) It will be time enough to submit the Code to world opinion, to allow the nations at large to confirm, revise or even repeal it, at a later date. The first need is for a "try-out", and a breathing space for the world to settle down and see what it wants.

A World Criminal Code will, of course, differ from other codes in two important respects: (1) it will establish a new set of offences and (2) it will deal exclusively — with one possible exception — only with the misdeeds of governments, not with those of individuals.

What, in the main, will be the "crimes" to be dealt with under a World Criminal Code? They should, I think, all fall into one of two classes: making or possessing illegal weapons, and acts likely to cause a breach of the peace. That we can make our Code exhaustive at the first attempt is hardly to be hoped for. Human nature is such that it is hardly practicable to catalogue all the acts which are likely to

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make nations lose their tempers and go to war. But we can cover a good deal of ground. And in making our list of "crimes" let us never forget that the main function of our Police will be the prevention, not the punishment, of crime. There is a famous principle of British criminal justice — which foreigners are supposed to find so quaint — that a man is deemed innocent until he is proved guilty. But we are a practical people, and have no scruples about going back on our own principles if common sense demands it. There is a crime generally known by its short name of "loitering with intent". When a man is charged with this, the general principle is reversed, and the onus is on him of explaining what he was doing in your back yard at midnight with a dark lantern and a jemmy. If he can prove that you had invited him there to open some packing-cases for you in the middle of the night, well and good, otherwise he is jugged. Now the main function of our World Police will be to see that nations do not "loiter with intent" — intent to make war, that is, and any nation found with a jemmy in its pocket will be dealt with first, and can explain afterwards.

So while number one crime in our Criminal Code will obviously be an act of aggression itself, the remainder of the list will cover every form of "loitering with intent" — and indeed if any nation is able to commit the actual crime of aggression, it will be the Police themselves who ought to be put in the dock. For their powers to "arrest" nations found "loitering" must be made so wide that only a first-class "police scandal" should make it possible for an overt act of war to be perpetrated. Now let us try our hands at listing some of the acts which will amount to crimes under our World Criminal Code.

(1) *Aggression*.—As we have seen, if this happens, it will be the Police themselves who will be "for it".

(2) *Being in possession of unauthorised weapons*.—The Treaty of Versailles made this a breach of treaty by the Germans, and set up Allied Commissions to watch them.



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But the commissions were ineffective ; the perambulator factories made machine-guns under their noses, and the last feeble commission was withdrawn in 1927. The trouble was, some of the Allies no longer meant business. The commissions were not formidable policemen but the embarrassed servants of governments who had ceased to see eye to eye ; there was no single-minded drive behind them, and the Germans no doubt had a lot of fun in inventing eyewashes for these half-hearted snoopers. Do not be persuaded by those persons who will tell you that what happened before must happen again. Once bit is twice shy, and it would be the height of feebleness to assume that because we failed last time, it is impracticable to search a nation for illegal weapons. Searched they must be, including, of course, ourselves and the rest of the Allied Nations, whose armaments must be limited to the amounts allotted to their respective police contingents, and this search for arms must be one of the first and constant preoccupations of the Police Force. If any are found, there will be no need of a summons or a trial. Permitted quantities will be known ; all others will be confiscated on the spot. It will be up to the Police to organise a detective service — including no doubt plain-clothes men with false moustaches — to ferret out every illegal weapon down to the smallest revolver.

(3) *Permitting the manufacture of War Material without a licence.*—As not even Sherlock Holmes could tell, by looking at it, whether an explosive was intended for civil engineering purposes or for war, and since a great number of peace products have their war uses, it would be impracticable to leave it to the Police, or even to a Court, to decide whether any given product was “war material”. But there are certain obvious things in common use, such as explosives, aircraft, lorries, etc., which, while not necessarily “war material”, can be so quickly adapted to warlike uses that some super-national control over their manufacture would seem to be required. The simplest method of exercising

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such control would seem to be through a system of World Police licences — applied for by the individual manufacturer through his own Board of Trade. The Police — and remember the Police are to be ultimately under the political direction of a Commission of Prime Ministers — should be in a position to judge whether the application is *bona fide* or suspect. The actual “crime” would then be the act of permitting the manufacture of any of the scheduled products without a licence.

“Permitting the manufacture”, please note; not “manufacturing”; because the responsible party must be the government who permits, not the individual who manufactures. It will be up to each national government to see to it that its citizens don’t get it into trouble with the police, because the World Police should deal, wherever practicable, with States, not persons.

(4) *Concealment of Birth — of warlike Inventions.*—The licensing of manufacturers might easily become futile if the schedule of “war materials” became out of date. Who knows what new means of killing our fellow creatures wholesale may not be invented in the next ten, twenty or fifty years? Non-disclosure by a State of any new invention capable of destructive use must be made a serious offence. It will be no excuse that the individual inventor himself kept it secret. As a rule inventors, to protect their own pockets, do in fact disclose their secrets in order to get the protection of the Patent Laws. But a fanatical would-be destroyer might forgo this. For the concealment of a lethal invention, whether by a State or an individual citizen of that State, the State would be held responsible. It might even be desirable to give to the World Authority the power, in certain cases, to confiscate a particularly dangerous invention and suppress it for good and all as contrary to public policy. Or, at least, to confine its use to the W.P.F. itself. The uglier its weapons the more formidable will it be.

(5) *Interference with the W.P.F. in the execution of its*

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*duty*.—This would have to include all attempts at throwing dust in the eyes of inspecting persons and commissions, all forms of camouflage, eyewash, delays, pretences and wriggling. (If there are any survivors of the Allied Commissions of 1919-27 they will no doubt be able to give the authorities some valuable hints on this point.)

(6) *Uttering slanders likely to cause a Breach of the Peace*.—One of the absurdities of the modern world is that while we do not allow Mr. Brown to libel Mr. Jones—if it looks like causing Mr. Jones to retaliate by giving Mr. Brown a black eye—we have never taken any steps to prevent one nation, whether through its leading statesmen, its newspapers or its authors, from slandering and libelling another nation to its heart's content, although the result is far more likely to be a bloody war for millions than a bloody nose for one. The reason is, of course, that, having no World Police Force, there were no steps we could take. But on the assumption that in future we shall be sensible enough to provide the police, it will be important to include this question of libel and slander in our criminal code.

In the ordinary way in this country, of course, the criminal law is very rarely invoked by Mr. Jones when Mr. Brown has been writing nasty things about him. That is because Mr. Jones' wounded feelings can normally only be soothed by a money payment, and while a criminal prosecution may land his enemy safely in jug, it does not allow for any solatium to be paid to Mr. Jones. But for the purposes of a World Code, the British criminal law on the subject might well be taken, in some respects, as a guide. For it is founded on the principle that Mr. Brown's crime is not that he injures Mr. Jones (let Mr. Jones sue him in the civil courts for that) but that he injures the community by risking a breach of the peace. And hence the famous saying, "The greater the truth the greater the libel". In a civil cause the truth isn't libellous at all; but when it comes to starting a fight by calling another man names, the more nearly you hit

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the nail on the head in your choice of epithets the more certain is the fight to be started.

So that our World Code, being concerned only with the preservation of peace, would not have to trouble itself with the question whether provocative speeches, books or press articles were true in substance or in fact, but only with the question whether they were so offensive and irritating in tone that no self-respecting nation could be expected to put up with them. Now it is a serious matter to make the expression of truth, in whatever form, a police offence. How, it will be said, are serious historians, philosophers, political writers and so on, to do their duty by their subject if a World Policeman can come down on them any day and say, in effect : " I must arrest you ; your book is perfectly true, but the French (or the British, or the Poles, or the Hottentots) won't like it " ?

I think the answer is found in the charlady's " It ain't the things she sez, but the narsty way she sez 'em ". Only popular irritation on a big scale can lead to war, and serious, *bona-fide* speeches or writings on any subject are likely neither to be brought to the attention of the masses nor to arouse their resentment if they are. (Mr. Bernard Shaw is no doubt an exception, but then G. B. S. always attacks his own countrymen to the delight of the foreigner, which, from the point of view of world peace, is all to the good.) After all, the test of any particular libel will be the public reaction to it ; and it is fairly safe to assume that no well-intentioned writer or speaker will have anything to fear. The law will be intended to catch the mischievous, chauvinistic mob orator or journalist — whether malignant or merely irresponsible. And it is in regard to offences under this part of the Code that it may be the general rule of making nations, not individuals, responsible if it should be departed from ; and that in flagrant cases of provocative language the World Police should be empowered to arrest, and the Court (we are coming to that later) to punish some firebrand of a xenophobe politician or some irresponsible press lord with a bee in his

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bonnet. (Think how beneficial it would have been if Dr. Goebbels or Mr. William Randolph Hearst could have been locked up by a World Policeman any time in the last decade!) But even so, the primary responsibility for muzzling its mischief-makers would be on each State.

From the point of view of a police and a tribunal the offence of criminal libel has considerable charm. For instead of having to enquire "What did he say? Was it offensive? Was it true? Was it malicious?" and so on, police and court have only to satisfy themselves that one party said something and another party took off his coat and rolled up his sleeves; a situation which in international relationships should be equally simple to diagnose.

The offences we have listed so far have all to do with the maintenance of public order and the relations of one State with another. Some of them are what, in a domestic setting, we should call "statutory" offences — not necessarily carrying any moral stigma, apart from being a breach of the rules. They are not put forward as an exhaustive catalogue, but as sample "crimes" which must, at any rate, be punishable under a World Code. We now come to a much more difficult and delicate matter — the question of whether the World Code and the W.P.F. are to be empowered to meddle with the relations between a State and its own citizens.

The Atlantic Charter can be read as saying "No": "Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live". What if they choose a Fascist or Nazi form? Well, common sense tells us that all freedoms, in a social world, must have their limitations. It is commonly believed that an Englishman's home is his castle, in which he may do as he pleases, but an Englishman who locks up his wife, beats his children or even turns on the loud-speaking wireless to the annoyance of his neighbours, very soon finds that the "castle" talk is moonshine. And what valid distinction can be made between the limits of freedom allowable to a citizen in his own house and

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to a nation within its own frontiers? If a nation will not tolerate a ruffianly citizen, must the world tolerate ruffianly States? Hasn't the last twenty-five years amply proved that the government who beats and locks up its citizens — or sections of them — and turns on its loud-speaking Goebbels or Gayda to the annoyance of its neighbours, will sooner or later show its ruffianism out of doors? If there is one outstanding lesson to be learnt from the era of the Dictators, it is surely that the world cannot again afford to be indifferent to the existence of national blackguardism, even when, to begin with, it is confined to the blackguards' domestic circle. It breeds misery at home and detestation abroad, and misery and hate are fecund parents of war.

But, granting that a World Code drafted on common-sense lines should tackle the question of domestic tyrannies, what kind of goings-on should it prohibit? It is often suggested that if a democratic form of government were insisted on for all peoples, the rest would take care of itself. This would appear to be too optimistic. Autocracy was conferred on Napoleon III by a plebiscite. It is by no means certain that Hitler and Mussolini could not, at one moment in their careers, have obtained a genuine majority for their régimes by a free vote of their people. "The people" can be stampeded sometimes, and the direct access to millions which broadcasting gives to a spell-binding orator increases the danger. While insistence on democratic institutions may well be a safeguard, it is no guarantee. A more effective method would seem to be to leave peoples free to choose their political institutions, but to prohibit absolutely the violation of certain fundamental human rights, *e.g.* personal liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of religion, rights of citizenship, racial equality, an independent judiciary. Had Napoleon III been prevented by a World Criminal Code, backed by an all-powerful police force, from violating these rights, his dictatorship in other matters would have been comparatively innocuous. If a new

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Marcus Aurelius should arise, by all means let him have his head. A beneficent autocrat might be an almost ideal form of government. But the World Code (to continue our list) should include the following offences :

(7) *Imprisonment of any person without fair trial.*—What constitutes fair trial must be left to the World Court to judge. The Anglo-Saxon races pin their faith to the jury system. In countries where juries can be bought and sold — we name no names — fair trials would have to be otherwise conducted. But at least it might be stipulated — on the lines of our own writ of Habeas Corpus — that no person should be kept in prison more than twenty-four hours without being produced in a public court and the charges against him publicly stated.

(8) *Suppression of free speech or a free press (except on grounds of sedition).*

(9) *Suppression of any free association, Trade Union, etc.*

(10) *Racial or religious persecution or discrimination.*

(11) *Interference with the Courts of Justice.*

(12) *Denial of political rights to any citizen.*—The formulation of this offence will be difficult, but one is loath to leave it out. It would be absurd to stipulate for universal suffrage at the age, say, of twenty-one. As we grow wiser, the more mature democracies may well consider that full rights of citizenship should be earned, or that the voting age should be raised, or that some proof of responsibility should be asked for before the vote is given. And there are backward races, at all stages of political apprenticeship, to be taken into account. But at least it might be laid down that there must be no discrimination within any system — if the rule is that only red-headed men get the vote, then no one called Ginger must be deprived of it.

Well, there is an outline of a World Criminal Code. The list of offences is no doubt far from complete. Each of you no doubt will have additions to make to it. Some of us would like, perhaps, to see the erection of trade barriers made a

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criminal offence. Stupidity often amounts to criminality — at any rate in its effects. Breach of treaties should no doubt be a crime — but would this include wilful default on loans? The test in all cases should be: “Does the behaviour we are out to prohibit tend to lead to international ill-feeling, quarrelling and eventually war?” The World Police Court will not be a court of morals. Its job, like that of our own police courts, will be to keep the peace and no more.

It will be said, no doubt, that to go so far as this in limiting the sovereign powers of States over their own citizens, we are asking for the impossible. If a Code of this far-reaching kind is in the first instance to be promulgated by the Big Four, what, it will be asked, about Russia? Russia locks up her citizens without trial; she does not allow freedom of speech or association; her citizens enjoy no effective political power. The only answer to this is that what a State does when she feels her security threatened is no valid indication of what she may choose to do when that security is guaranteed. Russia as the unpopular revolutionary, with formidable sworn foes across her borders joined in an Anti-Comintern Pact, may be a very different Russia from the victorious and admired ally of the democracies, with nothing to fear from any outside power. It is well to remember that tyranny has never been part of the Russian doctrine — or ideology, as one has to call everything nowadays to be understood by the masses — but only the Russian practice, whereas in Germany and Italy the suppression of freedom has been one of the fundamental political dogmas. It's easier to change one's practice than one's principles, and the Russian Government may well think that its people, by their outstanding devotion in this war, have now qualified for freedom.

### *The World Court*

Having set up our Police, having drafted our Code, we come next to what is undoubtedly the thorniest problem of all. How are we going to enforce the rules we have made?



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The idea of a World Code, with a Police Force behind it, is so simple and sensible that even highly educated and intelligent people, even experienced members of the governing classes (who know enough to see a hundred difficulties where simple souls like you and me only see ten), can be brought to say that "Of course, it's quite a good *idea*." But they then ask how it is proposed to arrest, try and punish a criminal nation. What would your World Police have done, for instance, when Germany was known to be rearming, or when Mussolini assaulted Abyssinia? Who would you have arrested? Before what court would you have tried the arrested person or persons? What punishment would you have imposed? Well, our assumptions are that the nations, apart from the contingents they contribute to the Police pool, will be totally disarmed and therefore incapable of putting up any resistance. Our concern, therefore, over questions of court, trial and punishment is not so much with the question of what we can get away with, but of what will satisfy our own sense of fair dealing. The World Police, being the only armed force in the world, *could* of course arrest the whole British Parliament and lock them up without trial; or it could seize a popular Prime Minister like Mr. Churchill; or knock down a capital city; or starve out a people by blockade, and so on. But a Police Force controlled (in the first instance) by the governments of the Big Four will do no such things, because the Big Four are politically, if not yet grown up, at least adolescent. It is just because we have traditions of fair dealing and of giving the accused a chance, that the subject is so thorny. We have a feeling that there ought to be a jury; that we must call evidence; that prisoners must have the benefit of the doubt, and so on; and who the devil, after all, is to stand in the dock?

Well, it's a fine and civilised thing to see an all-powerful body — as the Big Four of the Allied Nations will be on Armistice Day — worrying themselves to death as to how they are going to exercise their irresistible power without

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upsetting their own sense of fairness. But it will be a tragedy if they allow scruples about procedure to stay their hand when a breach of the peace is, or seems likely to be, committed. Let us get back for a moment to our own domestic policeman and the gentleman in the back yard with the jemmy, "loitering with intent". Just as British justice has no scruples about assuming the gentleman to be a burglar until he can prove he isn't, so the World Police must act first and let the suspected criminal explain afterwards.

A Court there must be, of course, before whom the accused can tell his story. The present International Court at the Hague will probably be the suitable body to sit, if need be, as Court of Criminal Appeal. For that is what it will come to; the accused having been assumed guilty and cracked down on by the Police, he will appear before the Court as an *appellant* — to explain why the Police were wrong in cracking down on him. If he can satisfy the Court that in fact the Police were wrong, no doubt he will get his costs and an apology.

This procedure has the added charm that in many cases it will save the Police the trouble of deciding who is in fact the guilty party. They find a nest of hidden arms, or a type-writer factory making machine-gun parts; they confiscate the arms and lock up — or even blow up — the factory, and the Criminal Court at the Hague gives notice that it will sit on Monday week to see if anybody turns up to appeal against this high-handedness. If the Police know their business, it is unlikely that anybody will turn up. So, in a case of criminal libel — the paper will be confiscated by the Police — perhaps the printing-press destroyed. Who is coming forward to appeal? The author? the printer? The government in whose jurisdiction the offence took place? Let them decide. But there will be a class of offences where the above methods would not apply. Suppose, for instance, a government takes to locking up its citizens without trial, or dissolving the Trade Unions, or disfranchising the Jews?

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Confiscation and dynamite will be of no use here. What then ?

If it was a case of an unpopular Dictator who had seized power, no doubt the Police would descend in their bombing planes and seize his person. But, with the abolition of national armies, it is unlikely that unpopular Dictators will be able to assert themselves. Rubber truncheons and castor-oil alone will hardly be able to make successful *coups d'état*, if there are no bullets or bayonets in the offing.

But it is, alas, so easy to stir up racial prejudice, or class feeling, that one cannot put it past a spell-binding mob orator to induce even a popular assembly to deprive some section of a community of its basic rights or freedom. Arrest him, and his angry supporters will at once fill up his place. A conflict between the World Police and a democracy insistent on its rights to do as it likes within its own borders, will not be so easily solved by a series of arrests. They would be more likely to aggravate the position and increase recalcitrance.

In such cases pressure will have to be brought upon the country at large. But here again, it is suggested, the procedure need not be by summons, trial and verdict. Let the political Police Direction — the Commission of the Peace of Prime Ministers — direct the Police to enforce an economic blockade. Harbour, frontier stations, communications of all sorts could be seized. There would be no humming and hawing in a League of Nations assembly. The action taken would be sharp, short and decisive, with an aerial display over the capital and chief cities. Is there any doubt that the withdrawal of the offending measures could quickly be enforced ? Afterwards, the government of the people concerned could appear before the Hague Court (if it so desired) and explain, if it could, that the whole thing had been a mistake — that no Jews had been locked up, that the Trade Unions had asked to be dissolved and so on. And it would be up to the Police then to satisfy the Court that it acted

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*bona fide* and on good and sufficient grounds. If the Court upholds the appellant, then the heads of the Police must go, and the Prime Ministers who set the Police on will have to return to their respective parliaments to explain that they have made fools of themselves and that next year's budget will include a contribution towards indemnifying the blockaded country for the losses it has sustained. All of which is most unlikely to happen.

The main things to bear in mind when you are discussing this whole question of International Police, crime and punishment, is that the sole test of international "crime" is whether it threatens world security; that the function of the Police is to prevent such crimes rather than to punish them; and that preventive action by any police must always go ahead of legal trial. If this is firmly grasped, many difficulties arising from our traditional British attitude towards criminal justice will disappear. We always come back to the man with the jemmy; and while a criminal court sitting as a court of first instance, before whom the accused will almost invariably appear not to be accused by the Police, but to appeal against what the Police have already done to him, may seem a strange kind of court according to our preconceived ideas, yet that is how it will naturally and logically work. The Police won't care who it is who comes to Court, or whether he comes or not. But if anybody feels aggrieved there is the Court to do him right.

To foreign criminal jurists the system will probably appear quite natural. As to who the judges should be, and whether any sort of international jury should be empanelled, this is hardly the place to discuss. Probably most defendants would prefer to be in the hands of the type of independent-minded judges who sat at the Hague before the war than in the hands of any jury. These things are details.

And now before we leave this subject of the World Police Force and the Code it will administer, a word of warning: You may be "sold" to the idea. You will put it up, as I

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have, to some highly educated and intelligent friend, with far greater knowledge of international and public affairs than you yourself possess. And he will say something of this sort : " My dear man, that's all very fine on paper. But how little you know the world ! do you seriously suppose that with nationalism rampant as it is to-day, governments will dare to tell their peoples that they are going to surrender their sovereignties to the extent of handing over their armed forces to a common pool ? or to relinquish the right to deal with their own citizens as they please ? Can you see Mr. Churchill putting the British navy at the disposal of a World Commission on which Great Britain might be out-voted ? or Marshal Stalin allowing a lot of snooping C.I.D. men hanging round his factories ? or a Republican President and Senate of the U.S.A. accepting orders to maintain and equip armed forces to help to police Europe ? Why, only a few years since a British Prime Minister referred to the Czechs as a ' distant people of whom we know little ', and now you expect us to be so internationally-minded all at once as to pocket our pride, unbutton our purses, submit to police inspection, totally disarm and generally reduce our Might, Majesty and Power to the level of that possessed by an inoffensive individual living peaceably between the fire and police stations ! These things just don't happen."

Well, you must answer him something in this fashion : " As regards Mr. Churchill, he is a great man, and it is a bold thing to be sure what a great man will or will not do. A statesman who had the courage and imagination to offer mutual citizenship to the French at Bordeaux in 1940 is capable of bold and revolutionary conceptions. Marshal Stalin is a shrewd man ; and a shrewd man, when he sees a way to security, may think twice before he turns it down. And when you tell me ' I expect ' this and that, I reply that I expect nothing. I am not saying that I believe a World Police Force will be set up — I am merely pointing out that if it is *not* set up, you will have war again in twenty-five years

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or so. People can take their choice. The chances in favour of recurrent wars are much the greater. No doubt we shall have them. But it will be our own fault. Because, having lived disarmed and in peace inside our own national borders for hundreds of years, thanks to the police, we know exactly what is needed to enable us to live disarmed and in peace in the world at large."

Upon which your intelligent friend will re-light his pipe and change his ground. "But after all," he will say, "don't you see that war, bad as it is, is not the disease itself from which the world is suffering, but only the symptom? It's the causes of war which we have got to discover and eradicate — then the symptom will disappear. Surely the thing to do is to search out the root of the disease and scotch it at its source. All this Police stuff is a confession of weakness. A civilised world ought not to need a Police to keep it from such madness and folly as war."

As to that, you can hardly fail heartily to agree with him. But getting rid of the cause of war is a long and uphill job — the human heart being what it is — and a Police Force, while not an end in itself, is the means to enable us to work out our cure in peace and quietness. War may be only a symptom, but it is a highly painful one, and every doctor knows that pain alone works against recovery. The world will be an easier patient to treat when it is not writhing and roaring in agony every few decades.

So write to your M.P., write to your local paper, bore your friends, talk, agitate, organise and generally make a nuisance of yourself over this question of the World Police, and when you have shot your bolt, sit down and read the next chapter.

## CHAPTER V

### THE CAUSE OF WAR

It is, perhaps, rather a bold thing to head a chapter "The Cause" rather than "The Causes" of War, especially in the middle of a war of which the main cause is recognisable at a glance by his forelock and comic moustache. But, if we find, let us say, that certain specific diseases only occur in a body already suffering from some morbid condition, it would be fair to call that morbid condition the ultimate cause of these diseases. A wasp stings me, who am well, and it is nothing; it stings another man, who is sick, and he dies of the sting. Was it the wasp or the sickness that killed him? Surely the sickness was the cause, the wasp the occasion.

Now if I am right in my diagnosis even Hitler is only the wasp in the case; Napoleon was a wasp; so was Frederick the Great, and all the great "aggressors" of history. The morbid condition which made their stings so lethal is the root of the mischief.

Can we find a name for it? I think we can. It's an ugly, modern, hybrid word, but a useful one for our purpose — Nationalism.

Now let us see. What do nations quarrel about? They quarrel about frontiers, about territory, about minorities, about religion, about slavery, about trade, about raw materials, about political institutions, about royal marriages, about Jenkins' ear, about security, about power, about honour, about domination, and I don't know what else. Some people believe that at the bottom of all these bones of contention is the economic struggle — the struggle to live. But this hardly accounts for the wars of religion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Others lay more stress on "ideological" quarrels. But there wasn't much

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“ ideology ” in our own opium war with China, or Mussolini's leap upon the back of Abyssinia.

But what I want you to observe is this. You and I and the rest of the inhabitants of this country of ours are constantly quarrelling about most of these very same things, with this difference — that we don't go to war about them. We become extremely heated over religion. If we have given up shouting “ Down with the Pope ” when we see a procession, or refusing to pay church rates, we still write indignant letters to *The Times* when the Archbishop of Canterbury dares to poke his Christian nose into our secular affairs. We have furious rows over economic questions, going to the length of strikes and lock-outs. We get very angry over social questions, calling each other rude names like “ Blimp ” and “ Bolshie ”. We positively forbid a royal marriage, preferring an abdication. We overrule minorities ruthlessly everywhere, from Parliament to a vestry meeting. We seize the territories of our landed gentry — through the operation of the death duties. We refer to the bulk of our own people as “ wage slaves ”. We get angry about raw materials like coal, and highly excited about all our political institutions. In fact there is not a thing in the list which we don't quarrel over except frontiers and Jenkins' ear, and a hundred things we do quarrel over which are not in the list.

And yet — we do not go to war with each other. Why is this ? It is not enough to say, “ because of the police ”. The truth surely is, that, behind all our quarrels, there is an underlying sense that we are all members of one family. It is proved by the way we sink our differences in the face of danger from outside. We bicker, but we have strong family feeling, deep-rooted in the past. We are bound together by our history, our propinquity, our language, our customs. The ties which bind are infinitely stronger than the passions which divide us. In short, we are a nation. Now, from the domestic point of view, Nationalism — this family feeling — is an excellent thing, if only because it enables us to put out



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our tongues at one another when we feel like it without coming to blows. And it produces a whole crop of loyalties, compromises, give and take, sympathies and suppressions of those natural fighting-cocks, our old Adams, which taken together are the basis of a civilised existence. It is no wonder that peoples have struggled to achieve it, fought and died for it, romanticised it, symbolised it, and not seldom made it an end in itself. "Patriot" is an honoured term. The cities of the world are garish with statues — equestrian and otherwise — of patriots. (How many are there of Christians ?)

Unfortunately, there is another side to all this. If there were only one nation in the world, Nationalism would be above reproach, just as on Robinson Crusoe's island egoism was a positive virtue (at least until Man Friday arrived). But as it happens there are a great number of nations, and just as egoism spoils a party, so, in a crowd, nationalism spoils a world. In fact, the more intense the nationalism, the more uncomfortable the world. We of this generation have had our eyes opened. The old-fashioned nineteenth-century jingo or Chauvinist was a positive international pacifist compared with the patriots of Hitlerite Germany. However frantically they waved their union jacks or their tricolours, they still believed a State existed for the sake of the citizens, and not the citizens for the sake of the State. Because that belief is the logical result of over-much romanticising and symbolising your own family. You begin as a patriot (loud cheers) and end as an Alfred Rosenberg (louder boos). You begin by thanking God you're a German, and end by thanking Hitler for being God. Nazi nationalism, the ugliest and most dangerous thing in the world, is not just a "sport", a freak of nature. It is the perfectly natural consequence of idealising the State at the expense of the citizen, until only the State counts. The citizen surrenders self wholly in order to erect a monster of selfishness.

The trouble is, there is something rather fine about this disastrous process. We acknowledge it by sending our boys

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to public schools to learn the "team spirit". In all our public services, we teach the individual to put "the service" first and himself second. The scarlet thread of self-effacement runs through all our "combined operations", from family life to public affairs. It is, in fact, the very basis of an organised, civilised, human society. And yet when a young Nazi has so successfully absorbed the doctrine of self-sacrifice, without reserve, for his State, that he has become the selfless instrument of that non-existent chimaera, well — there is the devil and all to pay !

It would undoubtedly be easier to deal with this kind of mad-dog nationalism if there was not this streak of fineness in it. Nothing is more provoking than to be forced to acknowledge a certain amount of good in something you detest. But if you shut your eyes to it, it may some day trip you up.

Nor is the problem concerned only with these silly, beastly, provokingly self-sacrificing Nazi and Fascist State-worshippers. The most individualistic peoples can also make the world uncomfortable sometimes. Nobody would accuse the British — still less the citizens of that country of the free, the United States — of idolising the State. If they ever think of "the State" at all, it is with the gravest suspicion. But they are quite capable of putting other people's backs up and of treading on no end of corns when they come, as a family, to any international party. Charming and civilised at home, they can be devilish brusque out of doors. So we must beware of blaming the general bad manners which lead to war only on the State-crazy peoples, or of looking for the cure in political individualism. The Nazis have opened our eyes to what an exaggerated nationalism can lead to ; but the lessons should be to have a second long look at other forms of Nationalism, and at our own in particular.

It certainly does seem absurd that when an ardent young Socialist like yourself can play a perfectly friendly round of

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golf with that ridiculous old Blimp of an uncle of yours — whose every opinion you detest — that you and Uncle Blimp together (with the other forty-five millions or so of your relations) can't be equally tolerant as a family when you meet those other national families. No doubt they are foreigners, poor things. But it is conceivable that, in their benightedness, they also regard you as foreigners.

Let us look at this Nationalism a bit more closely, and see if we can find out why it is we can be such decent, kindly, tolerant folk at home, and such snarling curmudgeons abroad. Some people like to think that the fault lies in our social structures. They hold that it is not the vertical fences between country and country, but the horizontal floors and ceilings between the upstairs and below-stair dwellers in each country which are at the bottom of the mischief. The workers, they say, are all blood-brothers everywhere and bursting with feelings of "solidarity" and fellowship, but the selfish capitalists upstairs keep themselves to themselves, and, if they look over the garden fence at all, it is with a baleful and covetous eye. Unfortunately, experience by no means bears out this theory. There was a time in the Middle Ages when, as Mr. Bernard Shaw has pointed out, the floors did count for more in Europe than the walls. Then it was the barons upstairs who were the blood-brothers. United by the customs of chivalry and feudalism, and by the respect felt for the death-bed injunctions of Europe's venerable grandparents, the Holy Roman Empire and the Catholic Church (when Catholic meant Catholic), Sir Reginald Front-de-Bœuf and the Constable of France met, even when fighting, on quite a lot of common ground. They played the game of war according to the rules, not caring particularly whether the enemy was a Norman, English or Burgundian baron — his capacity to pay a fat ransom was the main thing, and all spoke much the same language. But the English archer and yeoman felt himself an Englishman, and "Oh Lord how hot they were On the false Frenchmen!"

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But that the converse is true, to-day, cannot be supported by the facts. If our Tommies honestly felt their blood-brotherhood with the Jerries the war couldn't go on. The munition factories would come to a stand-still, and the Eighth Army would turn on General Montgomery and refuse to march. Actually, in the last two great wars the workers everywhere have put the last ounce into the fight.

No, if a sense of "internationalism" is to be found anywhere to-day, you must look for it among the "intelligentsia" or "highbrows" of all countries — among the cultured, educated, thinking classes. These people speak each other's languages, read each other's books, admire each other's arts. For them national frontiers really have no meaning, except to enhance the pleasures of mental travel. But it is not a very encouraging sign that you and I have invented the slightly disparaging names of "intelligentsia" and "highbrow" for them. We are a little suspicious of them; not quite sure that they are entirely sound patriots, with their love of Russian art and French literature and German music. (The greatest War Minister this country ever had, who by his foresight saved us from disaster in the first six weeks of the war of 1914, was thrown out of office for being a highbrow — the man read German philosophy, dammit.) At all events we manage to keep highbrows, like Archbishops, in their place and out of politics, and the existence of liberal thinkers in all countries is not going to stop wars yet awhile.

Besides, even if it were true that the workers everywhere are already blood-brothers and only the people on the top floors are not, that would not explain why these top-floor people go to war and engage in mutual destruction. Let us call them, for argument's sake, greedy, blood-sucking capitalists (any abusive name you like — only remember they include Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden). Let's even call them bankers. (Do you remember the American story of 1929 — "Of course my mother doesn't know I'm a banker." "What does she think you are?" "Oh, she thinks I play the piano

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in a gambling hell.”) Well, these bankers — *quorum pars parva fuit* — were the very people who after the last war wanted to put Germany on her feet again ; to encourage her industry and promote her trade. The dirty dogs saw more profit in peaceful trading than in destruction — and they and their like always will. Even the industrialists (loud boos), who, according to one theory, are at the bottom of war-mongering through their competition for markets, were busy “ getting together ” with their opposite numbers in Germany right up to the last days of the peace. It would not be difficult to justify a charge against them of blindness and of being the naïve tools of Hitler’s ambition, but we can hardly accuse them of war-mongering. Moreover, as has already been pointed out, these same people compete with one another just as ferociously inside the family circle ; they corner and squeeze and monopolise and cut prices and bankrupt one another to their hearts’ content, if they are that kind of fool ; but they do not resort to force. It is not just fear of the police. It is the commonplace, the accepted basis of everyday life inside a nation that you compete, but you don’t fight. You put old Smith into court with a chuckle, but your son goes and marries his pretty daughter — and a very nice girl too. The long and the short of it is, that Nationalism — on its ugly war-provoking side — is not the product of any particular social or economic structure of nations. You find it in the democracies, in savage tribes, in tyrannies, in plutocracies. The sinister fact remains that the happiest and best-regulated families are quite capable, in certain circumstances, of being exceedingly offensive to the people next door.

Is this ugly side of Nationalism, then, just one manifestation of the sad old truth that the morals of a crowd are always lower than the morals of the individuals comprising it ? (A hundred men, each of whom would never dream of nailing your ears to the pump, will nail ’em there in no time when acting as a mob.) I do not think so. On the contrary,

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popular enthusiasm for a war usually comes after, not before the occasion of its outbreak. No, the melancholy truth seems to be that governments, in their dealings with other nations, follow an altogether different code of behaviour from that which governs the everyday commerce of individuals, and the people at large condone this habit. Egoism and selfishness, the worst social sins, become "sacred egoism" and "patriotism" when international dealings are concerned. Take the slogan "My country right or wrong". It has quite a noble ring about it. Many excellent persons would think nothing of having it carved on their chimney-pieces. Whereas in fact, of course, it is a most disgraceful sentiment. It means in effect "myself right or wrong". Forty-five million selves — there you have "My country". But forty-five million selves have no more business to be "wrong" than one self.

This illusion of there being a separate entity called "my country", which somehow stands above and outside the forty-five million individuals who make up the nation, is at the root of the whole trouble, and it is a most difficult illusion to shake off. Partly because, as we have seen, it does us good to have it. It eggs us on daily — and not only in war-time — to highly unselfish and disinterested action. The idea of "My country" embraces so much — not only one's own people, but the countryside itself — the hills and fields and streams — and to those of us with a sense of history, it embraces more still — the moving and stirring story of one's own kindred in a dear and familiar land. Don't misunderstand me when I speak of illusion. The people, the homes, the fields, the beauty, the history, are all solid facts. The illusion only begins when we lump all these solid facts together into a single abstract idea on whom we confer a personality which in fact does not exist. And even that would not matter if we endowed that personality with the highest moral qualities known to us.

Unfortunately, we do just the opposite. Misled, perhaps, by the fact that this Person calls out from *us* our best qualities

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— service, devotion, sacrifice — we seem to lose our critical faculties where the Person's own morals are concerned, so much so that we get quite ratty when those few individuals who retain their critical sense — Mr. G. B. Shaw for instance — take a cool detached view of the Person's goings-on. And when a foreigner ventures to criticise — well, you must be a very superior sort of person indeed if you don't begin to wriggle in your chair. Actually, this Person's morals, by and large, can be summed up as "Self first — the rest nowhere". Nations are the supreme egoists.

They have discovered, of course, by this time that they are not Robinson Crusoes in a desert world. They have learnt quite a lot about good manners, and even about compromise and co-operation. But it is extremely rare to find a nation acting in a certain way not because it is expedient, but because it *ought*. The best people we know are constantly doing or not doing things because they ought or they ought not. Even the worst of us have some good impulses, an occasional capacity to act from other motives than self-love. But with nations it is rare indeed. So rare that when it does happen, the world never for one moment believes it, or gives that nation any credit for it. Have you ever met a foreigner who believed that Britain entered the war of 1914 because of her promise to Belgium, or the war of 1939 because of her promise to Poland? How many Englishmen believe it? Plenty of us, as individuals, would have gladly entered these wars for those reasons — and in our own hearts in fact did so. But did Mr. Asquith's and Mr. Chamberlain's Cabinets? Or was it, as the world thinks, solely because the alternative was destruction? Again, have you ever met an American or a continental European who believed we have ever taken a single step in India or in our colonial empire except for what we could get out of it? Actually, of course, we have, for many years past, governed India and the Crown Colonies through a body of men in whom, whatever their mistakes, the will to serve the native peoples has become

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traditional. Do we not ourselves forget Lyautey when we are inclined to criticise the French colonial system ? or the work of the Americans in the Pacific through the Rockefeller Foundation when we become acid over the negro question ? The sad fact is that unselfregarding behaviour in any nation appears so unnatural that we neither give nor get credit for it even where it is deserved.

Well, all this is very discouraging. On the one hand we find " patriotism " imputing to the Person all the virtues, and on the other hand the cold truth that the Person habitually behaves like a monster of egoism, and that even when It tries to be human, nobody gives It a kind word.

What is to be done about it ?

It is clear, I think, that two things must be done. The first is for us all to give up being a lot of Sairey Gamps, and to rid our minds of the illusion that this Mrs. Harris of a Person exists. The second is to insist — (and what are our votes for ?) — that our statesmen should behave towards other nations as they do towards their neighbours at home. A pretty large order, you will say. I agree. So large, indeed, as to be revolutionary. But if we can fight and defeat a real Hitler, surely we can fight and defeat a non-existent Mrs. Harris. It's largely a question of how much we care. What practical steps can we take ?

There was a small boy in one of Mrs. Ewing's books (does anyone read Mrs. Ewing nowadays ?) who had a saying : " Doings first, feelings afterwards ". Are there any " doings " open to the nations to-day by which they could escape their own notice in going behind the Person's back, and possibly end up with quite a new set of " feelings " ? I believe there are. I believe they could be done without arousing the Person's suspicions, and well ahead of feelings. And I believe their successful achievement might work wonders and give birth to feelings which would make international co-operation positively fashionable. And as we all know, fashion counts for more than either logic or sentiment.



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But since these doings are for governments, not individuals, and more especially for the Peace-makers to initiate, I propose to leave their discussion to the next chapter.

But apart from such major steps as I shall there discuss, — steps which can only be taken with the authority of governments themselves, and are more in the nature of dodging the Illusion than exploding it, — what else can we do to get rid of the idea that there is some splendid, awe-inspiring, glorious creature called “My country” to whom we owe infinite loyalty and homage, and set up in its place the truth that there is yourself and myself and forty-seven and a half million other selves, not particularly splendid, or awe-inspiring or glorious, but capable, as that bright creature is only rarely, of daily acts of unselfishness and consideration?

Well, we might make a beginning in our schools and in our school books. So long as children from their earliest years are taught to personify nations, and grow up in the belief that the world is inhabited by a race of giants called Britain, France, Russia and so on, Britain being a good giant, and the others good or bad giants according to whether they march with or against the good old Britain, you can hardly wonder if the illusion persists. But if history could be re-written, and especially history for boys and girls, and still more especially history for Nazi and Fascist boys and girls, a very great deal could be done. It is not a question so much of facts as of emphasis. At present in school text-books the emphasis is on bad King John and good Queen Bess and the battle of Agincourt and how the British always won in the end. It should be switched to peoples and great men of all countries and how human beings, although they have never won yet, have struggled to win. Why must all children know about Napoleon III and the Crimean war, and never about Pasteur and his war on disease? Not only was Pasteur's war a more important one, but properly told, it is far more exciting and dramatic. Children love to hear of courage, conflict and victory; there are tales and enough of these in

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the voyages, explorations, inventions and discoveries of the human race at large to match any stories of Poitiers and Crécy and Waterloo. But if national histories must be taught at all, at any rate let a Frenchman, say, write the school histories of England (perhaps M. Maurois will oblige), and an American those of France, and so on.

No need to fear that children's patriotism will be undermined. In creatures who live largely by the belief that my Pudding Lane is better than your Pie Alley, my St. Etheldred's than your St. Ethelbert's, my Tottenham Hotspur than your Arsenal, even my A team than your B team, you will never have the slightest difficulty about whipping up patriotism when you need it. Their egos — even more than our adult ones, if possible — feed on everything which flatters them, especially the cheap and unearned gratification of belonging to a team, a school, a nation. You couldn't break down patriotism in a child, even if you wanted to : the old Adam is too strong.

And that goes for all of us. We can attack the bad side of Nationalism without the slightest fear that we shall harm the good side, or whittle away any cherished ideal. However hard we struggle against this Person — this Britannia on the penny — we shall never, fortunately, get rid of her altogether. She is far too popular. Because in loving her we love ourselves ; in honouring her we honour ourselves ; and as most of us get little enough of public love and honour we shall continue to lavish both upon this delightful " Britannia — me ".

So, without fear of any ill-effects, let's see if there are any other ways of breaking down national egoism. Some people attach great importance to bringing the peoples face to face — " getting to know each other better ". They believe in travel, organised visits, international gatherings for sport, discussion and so on. Peoples, they say, are like dogs — they love those they know and bark at strangers — so they must be introduced to the strangers. Well, here a little

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caution is needed. Experience goes to show that sometimes the more nations see of each other, the less they like each other. There's little doubt that the British Army came back from summering and wintering with the French during the last war with a good deal less affection for that great people than they had when they first embarked at Dover. It needs a certain liberality of outlook and freedom from prejudice to take to people who eat different foods, work harder than you do, play less, and value money more highly. To appreciate the French it is not enough to meet the French: you must speak their language, have read their books, know their history — in fact, be in some degree “educated”.

The Olympic Games are another case in point. This is the last place to revive old bad memories, but no one who knows anything of the inside happenings at those games — instituted with such high hopes — will wish to see them revived. National standards are still too widely apart, and the Cockney boxer who returns home with a piece bitten out of his chest in a boxing match is a poor missionary of international brotherhood. In fact, competitive international meetings should be avoided: we are still too uncivilised to risk engaging in any kind of “image of war”.

Propaganda is a more promising field. Those of us old enough to remember the days of the “Entente Cordiale” will recollect the wave of kindly feeling which swept over the British and French peoples. It was all due to the lead given by statesmen and the press. Only the actual meeting of the peoples — and that as Allies in a great cause — could damp down that friendliness. Sad, but true.

There is another way of breaking down illusion — a little clear thinking. But it's of little use thinking clearly if you don't express your thoughts clearly, and a good deal could be done if we would take the trouble to use words in a less slipshod manner.

To take but one example. When we open our *Times* — only in most cases it's the *Daily Express* — and learn that

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"Italy" has done this and "Spain" has done that, whereas in fact it was Benito Mussolini and the Christian gentleman Franco who had in fact committed that morning's bad deed, the slipshod use of words continues to addle our brains. It may seem a small point when one is out for a revolution in thought, but if every leader-writer, broadcaster, public speaker and school teacher would sacrifice convenience and say "Mussolini" or "the present government in Italy" or "the majority of the Italian people" or "the Italian Foreign Office" according to the facts, instead of merely saying "Italy", they would be helping on a very good work. We are all impressionable to phrases, and when we hear and read, day in and day out, that "America this" or "Russia that", when for all we know the real person or persons described may be, and generally are, only the temporary, and perhaps unrepresentative, holders of power in those nations, we unconsciously absorb a deal of falsity. Nothing dispels illusion like habitually calling things by their real names. But we are desperately lazy about doing it. It means trouble — perhaps using half a dozen words instead of one — besides the moment's thought required to disentangle say, a government hanging on against the wishes of a parliamentary majority, or an American President on the eve of a doubtful election, from an autocrat or a Prime Minister fresh from a triumphant poll. The degree in which any government represents its people at large varies indefinitely, but it is safe to say that no government that ever was or will be can claim to be called by the name given to its nation as a whole. And for a like reason, it would be a real advantage if even the people of a country could be habitually called "the people of ——" and not by that country's geographical name. Anything which helps to an immediate conception of so many million separate selves, instead of one non-existent self, should be encouraged. Even that old cliché "the toiling millions of India" is preferable to the short word "India". It requires a mental discipline of which you and

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I are quite incapable to ensure that the word " Germany " should conjure up, as well as a vast and varied geographical area, a picture of peasants, of professors, of junkers, of musicians, of blond beasts, of unhappy not-so-blond Jews, and all the infinite variety of men and women who together make up the German nation. We haven't the knack ; and the moral is to avoid short cuts and when we mean a blond beast, say so, and when we mean Einstein, say so too.

If I have laboured this point, it is because it is a practical step which could be taken now — which our schoolmasters, politicians, editors and publicists generally could see to at once. It is not just a good thing one vaguely hopes for, it is a good thing which is there to be done. And if done thoroughly, it would go quite a way towards breaking down the " Person " myth, and winning a general acceptance of the plain fact that a nation is nothing more or less than a crowd of individuals bound together in a special way. A faggot is a faggot, with its own shape and size — but it is the sticks which make the faggot. How to get such a practical step taken is another matter. As Dr. L. P. Jacks has pointed out, the force of habit is so much stronger than the force of argument, that most of us will agree that this, that or the other is a good thing to do and yet go on doing the opposite till the cows come home. Perhaps something could be done if a Betting Association could be formed with a reasonable capital, to bet editors and others £100 (or even £1000 if it's *The Times*) that they won't be able to keep this mischievous misuse of the geographical names of countries out of their newspapers for twelve months. If the editor wins, the Association will have lost its money but achieved its object ; if the Association wins, it will have failed in its object but doubled its capital. Not an unattractive prospectus.

The more one searches round for ways of breaking down the narrow, egoistic side of Nationalism, the more one comes up against the hard fact that only broad and educated minds seem to be capable of not barking at " foreigners ". A great

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deal is made nowadays of the fact that this is a " People's " war, and that it has got to be a " People's " peace. We are told that the common man has never wanted war and is only too ready to be friends with the common man everywhere else ; that it is governments, ruling classes, over-educated diplomatists who are at fault.

Unfortunately, there is no evidence to support this theory. As we have seen, there are people in every country who are educated, liberal and international-minded. But they are, for this very reason, slightly suspect, and apt to be dubbed " highbrows ". Even when, like Mr. Priestley, they have the imaginative sympathy to identify themselves with the common man, they rarely achieve political leadership. A jolly old John Bull of a Trade Unionist, English to the marrow and barking at every foreign dog he meets, is far more likely to be sent to Parliament and entrusted with political power than a man who, for all his heart, has a head which could write *The Good Companions* or *Dangerous Corner*.

One has to face up to the hard fact that the common man, being uneducated himself, is still a bit suspicious of education and of the liberal outlook it gives. It is easier to rouse him with slogans than with argument, and the slogan habit, unfortunately, must be counted among the causes of war.

There is no reason for long-term discouragement on this score. For all his present suspicion of education, the common man likes the sound of the word, and would be glad to have it. If ever we have the common sense to give it to him — in full measure, without stinting the expenditure of either money or brainwork it will entail — one of our rewards might well be an international-minded common man. That would be a great day for the world.

But for the moment we are taking a shorter-term view. We are looking for immediate ways of breaking down Nationalism, to the degree required for preserving the peace. It's the next twenty years with which we are concerned, and

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nobody expects the common man to blossom into a Mr. Priestley in twenty years.

It has been said above that two things were necessary : for peoples to rid themselves of the illusion that their nation was a Person ; and for statesmen to behave towards other nations as they would, as private individuals, towards their neighbours.

When I said that " the Person's " morals could be summed up as " Self first — the rest nowhere ", you no doubt mentally objected that a Person who doesn't exist can hardly be said to have any morals.

Well, you are right, of course. And if you will drive me into a corner like this, I shall have to come straight out with it. What I meant — but didn't like to say — was that the morals of Mr. Baldwin, Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Cordell Hull, Lord Halifax, Mr. Eden, Lord Curzon — but why pillory these unfortunate gentlemen ? Let us say simply that the international morals of all statesmen can be summed up as " Self first — the rest nowhere ".

Now, please do not misunderstand me. Nobody accuses these civilised, decent, god-fearing men of what is known as Machiavellianism — (that, rather, is what they have been up against). Nor is the " Selfishness " they practise of that criminal brand which disregards all obligations. The average, modern Western democratic statesman has high standards in many ways. For instance, he keeps faith. He honours his pledges. He does not steal or grab. He will make concessions, compromises, even sacrifices to preserve peace and amity. He has international good manners.

But — and this is the root of the trouble — he serves not himself but a Mistress — the non-existent Person we have been talking about — and the more single-minded his service, the more rigidly does he play up to that Person's sublime egoism. That, after all, is why he has been placed where he is — to put " his country " first. Now he himself as an individual — and the forty-seven and a half million indi-

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viduals he represents — are certainly capable, on many occasions, of kindly and even unselfish behaviour. Who ever had kinder hearts than Mr. Baldwin, say, or Lord Halifax ? Can you imagine a hard-up friend coming to either of them, with a story of poverty and a much too big family, and failing to receive help and counsel ? But on the other hand can you imagine either of them, as Prime Minister or Foreign Secretary, receiving the Ruritanian Ambassador, hearing a tale of over-population and insufficient resources, and scratching their heads as to how to find a suitable colony for the surplus Ruritanians to go to — even perhaps offering a little hospitality in some corner of the Empire ? It's unthinkable ; they would lose their jobs next morning. So Ruritania, at her wit's end for food and house-room, turns aggressor and grabs a desert here or there from some backward race unable to defend itself, and Mr. Baldwin or Lord Halifax are deeply shocked, and if the desert is anywhere near our own boundary fences, or Ruritania has broken a pledge, begin to think in terms of war.

But ought it to be unthinkable ? Why must the Person be assumed by her servants to be less capable of ordinary, decent, neighbourly behaviour than you and I and the rest of us ?

Consider what a change would come over the face of the world if the Foreign Secretaries of the Great Powers met from time to time to debate what could be done for their smaller and poorer neighbours. Lord Halifax is President of the Governesses' Benevolent Institution, and spends time and thought over assisting needy governesses. But are not needy peoples worth an equal expenditure of time and thought ? Just imagine a world where Russia got so worried over the problems and anxieties of the Baltic States that she started a Baltic Benevolent Institution and asked all the Foreign Ministers of Europe to serve on the Committee. Or where the Serbs felt so deeply for the sorrows of the Croats, or the Czechs for those of the Poles, that they sent



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out appeals to all the chanceries of Europe on their behalf ? Why do you snort at the very idea ? Well, why do you ? You snort because the idea of lifting international civilisation onto the same level as our domestic civilisation seems to you " Utopian ". " Utopian " is the handy word for downing people who have secret hopes for the human race. And it is, no doubt, quite in order to use it when people expect the human race to do something entirely new, something it has never done before. But to ask that statesmen should look at the " other fellow's " point of view in international affairs is only to ask them to behave out of doors as they behave in the home. Is that so very absurd ? Don't imagine, however, that to effect such a change in the face of the world only a change of heart in the statesmen themselves is required. It's not Mr. Eden who is the egoist ; it's the Person he serves. Put Mr. Priestley in his place to-morrow ; kick out the staff of the Foreign Office and substitute the staff of, say, the *New Statesman* — it will make no difference. Mr. Priestley and his intelligentsia will soon find that either they must serve John Bull or Britannia (or whatever you prefer to call that Person) or go. No, the change of heart must come in the common man, and not only in the British common man but the French, Russian, Polish, Turkish and all the rest of the world's common men as well. Which is a pretty tall order. But still not Utopian, because you will be hard put to it to find a people — even the most backward — who haven't learnt to rub along among themselves without fighting, and what can be done in the family can be done at a party. But what Mr. Eden (and the rest) could do, is to give a lead. He could be careful to call things by their right names, and not say " Spain " when he means Franco. That is, he could, like the early Romans, mind his *p*'s and *q*'s (they didn't speak of " Rome "). They talked of " *Senatus Populusque Romanus* " (S.P.Q.R.) — the Roman Senate and People). He could tell the House of Commons and the people of this country to what extent the government of another nation was

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representative or otherwise of that nation at large. (If he doesn't know, he should say so.) He could give all his attention to the size and shape of other nations' shoes, and try to persuade us now and then to stand in them. He could make of his Foreign Office, not a priesthood guarding mysteries, but a preaching fraternity — making the clever young men there come out and write or broadcast, and share their specialist knowledge with the rest of us. He could put cases clearly before us, as for example: "Now that we have a World Police, which has taken over Gibraltar on a perpetual lease, the Spanish people are asking me what point there is in this country retaining the freehold. For sentimental reasons they would much like to see the nominal ownership restored to them. As an individual, I see their point and would be prepared to do so. But as John Bull, I also — although I no longer have any strategic reasons — have the strongest sentimental reasons for wishing to retain it — "The Rock" seems to me to be part of our history. What shall I tell the Spanish Government — who in this case certainly have the people behind them?" only he would expand the part about the Rock, and the Spanish Ambassador in the Gallery of the House of Commons would be much moved, and would manage to convey his emotion to his own government, and the Spanish Prime Minister rising to the height of Spanish chivalry and generosity would persuade the Spanish House of Commons that the British people's sentimental interest in the Rock was greater than their own, and would carry a resolution by acclamation to drop the matter once and for all. That is how Mr. Eden would conduct negotiations with a neighbour over, let us say, an historic monument — on property once his neighbour's. And that is civilised diplomacy. The other way is for the Spanish Government to send a note to Mr. Eden asking for Gibraltar back; and Mr. Eden replies by the next bag that John Bull wouldn't hear of it, and the Spanish Government feels snubbed. And indeed the chances are that John Bull

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would in very fact not hear of it — unless some nosy M.P. asks a question in the House. Which would mean some courage on his part, because where John Bull is concerned it is rather bad form not “all to pull together”. Which too often means backing up the F.O. on some subject about which they have been exceedingly cagy.

So here is another thing Mr. Eden could do — he could keep his mouth open, on occasion, instead of shut.

But nobody knows better than Mr. Eden himself the things he could do, and the lead he could give. Only you cannot expect statesmen, overdriven with each day's perplexities, to turn schoolmasters as well. However much in their hearts they would like to abolish the John Bull they serve, and be free to act according to common sense and their consciences — they have not the time nor opportunity to set about it. Because abolishing John Bull can't be done in a day; it will take a prodigious amount of conscious effort, most of it by the common man. (Of course if the popular press would make a slogan of it, “Down with John Bull! Up with the British People”, it might help; but it is better to remain unregenerate than to be converted by a slogan.) The real strength of John Bull's position is that you cannot grapple with him; if you try to lay rough hands on him he changes his shape, and becomes your Mother, full of majesty and power and beauty, and you feel yourself drawn with love and devotion towards the very Person you set out to destroy. And when you see men serving that Mother with selflessness, dedicating their lives to her and dying deaths for her, it is almost superhumanly difficult to realise her non-existence. Actually we British are a bit shy about that Mother of ours. We prefer to call her names like “Blighty” or, more formally, “King and Country”. But other nations are less shy, and “La Patrie”, “The Fatherland”, “Holy Russia”, “Old Glory” are words of power. And, like charity, although good in themselves, they cover a multitude of sins.

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Many people — perhaps some of the best of us — will sincerely hold that to de-bunk these glorious Persons will be to throw away more good than can be gained. Let us cling at all costs, they will say, to anything, even a fiction, which has proved its power to lift us above ourselves. But is it so certain that the feelings we have towards the fiction could not be switched to the Reality? Are forty-seven millions of our own countrymen so much less worthy of our regard, affection and service than the bright phantom we have set up in their place? Might we not, by our teaching of history, and the habit of precision in thought and speech, educate ourselves to look upon "my country" as "my people", and other "countries" as other "people"? And credit these people with the civilised, unselfregarding capacity for putting themselves in other people's shoes which they often evince in their family circle?

I should not like to put it past us. At any rate, one thing is certain: until we and other peoples achieve something of the sort, international society will be run on a level well below that of national societies. Self-regard will continue to be the whole duty of statesmen, and the clash of national egoisms will go on. And in the end that means war.

One word of warning: if you agree with me, and go about saying so, you will be abused in some quarters like a pickpocket. The Archbishop of Canterbury has lately got into hot water for suggesting that Christianity was concerned with politics. You will get into hot water for suggesting that Foreign Policy is concerned with the other nations' point of view. But any amount of hot water can't drown the plain truth that the one key that unlocks all the various occasions of war is Nationalism. To-day, in Europe and in Asia, Nationalism is flourishing as rarely before. To rid the world of it will be a long, uphill job. (That is why we must have a Police Force, to keep the peace while the slow work goes on.) But this at least can be said, that the grotesque, poisonous and stinking fruits produced by the rank flowering of Nazi,

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Fascist and Japanese "nationalisms" have given us a fair warning of what our own favourite flowers might come to. And if it's Utopian to hope that we shall have the sense to pull them up in time, and plant something better, then I for one am à Utopian after all.

## CHAPTER VI

### PEACE-MAKING

AND now let us turn from Utopia to the business in hand, or rather the business which will be in hand on the day the Axis surrenders. The business, of course, will be to make peace. You may well ask what you and I have got to do with it.

Well, we shall have a very great deal to do with the consequences of that Peace, whether it is a good or a bad one, or at any rate our children and our grandchildren will. And it depends upon ourselves whether we have a hand in the making of it or not. Because although the actual details will have to be left to the statesmen who will bustle off to Berlin and, after riding through the Unter den Linden on white horses, settle down with their army of secretaries and expert advisers to dictate the Treaties, the broad principles to be applied ought to be, and could be, largely settled by public opinion in the victorious countries.

Don't let's be too modest about the part we can play. Granted that we know nothing about the ins and outs of Balkan or Baltic races, languages, minorities, enclaves, frontiers and economics, yet we do know the kind of things which make for human contentment all the world over, and the kind of things which lead to human discontents. We do know right from wrong, justice from injustice — in fact we are a deal more clear-sighted about these distinctions when we are taking a bird's-eye view of Europe than when we are having a look at ourselves. Habit blinds us to a lot of things at home which we are nailers at spotting elsewhere, and as peace-making in Europe will consist largely in detecting and removing motes from the eyes of other nations, it ought to suit us down to the ground. Only we must get busy about it now, and if it turns out that we have anything sensible to

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say about peace-making, we must say it before it is too late. We must say it before the Big Four or the Big Some-other-number shut themselves up, as they did in Paris last time, with their ethnographical maps and their memoranda (giving the malarial parts of Asia Minor to the Greeks because Mr. Lloyd George thought green stood for Greeks, until a junior secretary arrived in the nick of time to explain it only meant marshy ground).

And I am inclined to think that we may have something sensible to say; that there are certain broad, common-sense principles to be applied even to the appallingly complicated problem of Europe — not to mention Asia and the Pacific. And in this chapter I propose to examine a few of them briefly, and if you think they should be applied, then it is up to you, before it is too late, to say so. Because only so can a public opinion be built up.

We need not fear that public opinion has no influence on the thoughts and acts of statesmen. It has; sometimes indeed too much. But it is well to remember that there is nothing an intelligent politician welcomes more than being given a lead by a strong and well-instructed public opinion. It strengthens his hands when it is with him, and is a capital excuse for not committing himself when it is against him. Only self-sufficient men of the type of the late President Wilson disregard public opinion and override it (and look where his disregard of it landed *him*).

### 1. CREATING THE RIGHT CLIMATE FOR PEACE-MAKING

One of the triumphs of modern science (or one of its disasters, if you are a Lancashire cotton-spinner) is the artificial creation of climates. To spin cotton you need a certain climate, and it can be made for you; to spin a Peace, you also need a given kind of atmosphere. That also can be made.

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Our first objective, from Armistice Day onwards, will be to induce a suitable atmosphere for the peace-making.

What are, broadly, the conditions required ?

### (a) *No Fighting*

During the last Peace Conference, the peace-makers were driven nearly crazy by the attempts of their clients, or victims, to take the law into their own hands. As an Armistice, it was a most untidy affair. We ourselves went on fighting for White Russians at Archangel and elsewhere. The Poles fought the Russians. The Czechs fought the Poles. The Rumanians invaded Hungary, we all but fought the Turks, and so on and so on. Everyone with a claim tried to jump it. The armies were there ready to be used ; " Nationalism " was rife (as it will be again) ; fighting had become a habit ; and the ruling passion in all the States of Europe was to present the Big Four in Paris with *un fait accompli*.

Now this must not be allowed a second time. There is not the slightest reason why it should be. The Big Four will have the power — enormously greater than in 1919 owing to the mobility and ubiquity of air power — to forbid absolutely all private wars. If necessary, our best friends must be disciplined. We may have to shut our eyes for a few weeks to the bloody vengeance of the oppressed peoples upon their Nazi oppressors. But the slightest attempt to anticipate the decisions of the Peace Conference by force of arms must be sternly nipped in the bud. As has been already pointed out, the ideal method would be to turn the armed forces of the United Nations over-night into a World Police Force, but the main thing is to use them ruthlessly to keep the peace everywhere.

### (b) *No empty Bellies*

The prestige of the Allies on Armistice Day will be prodigious. The maintenance of this prestige during the



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months, and possibly years, of Peace-making will be perhaps the most important thing of all, if the Peace they impose is to be generally acceptable. But military prestige soon fades, especially if people are hungry. Europe will be desperately hungry. The success or failure of the Allies' attempt to feed her may well be decisive in preserving or destroying their prestige. What can you and I do about that? Our best contribution will be cheerful acceptance of a prolonged period of rationing. For a few months, while the glow of victory still warms us, that will be easy enough. But there is bound to be a time of reaction, when queues and coupons and worn-out shoes and laid-up cars will begin to get on our nerves. Writers in the popular Sunday papers will ask what we have won the war for, and why Europe should be "pampered" (can't you hear them?) while our returning heroes have to come back to thinner fare than they enjoyed in the Army. The government will be bothered and bully-ragged, and we shall be told that the "controls" are being retained to please big business, or for the fun of the jacks-in-office, or as the thin edge of the wedge of socialism and so on. That will be the time to keep our heads and our tempers; to remember the sunk ships and the bombed factories; and to remind ourselves and the grumblers that Peace is quite as important as War, and that what we could put up with for winning the one can equally be endured for winning the other.

### (c) *Work*

Soup-kitchens alone will not induce the proper Peace-making mood in a distracted Europe. Once fed and clothed, the peoples will want to be up and doing. But when you can't get about for lack of rolling-stock and petrol and rubber; when your place of employment is a heap of rubble; when your farm has been stripped of its horses and ploughs, and you haven't seen a manure-heap for years, — well, to be up and doing is easier said than done. The rebuilding of Europe's transport and public utility systems with the pro-

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vision of locomotives and rolling-stock and electrical gear ; the re-stocking of its farms and fertilisation of its land ; all the thousand and one jobs of clearing up behind the plundering Nazi will offer plenty of scope for work, if the tools, the raw materials, the machinery, the live-stock, the 'fertilisers can first be got. But they can only come, in large part, from overseas ; some of the victorious countries — Russia to a gigantic, ourselves to a considerable, extent — will also need these very things ; and one of the most difficult jobs of the Allied governments will be to settle " priority " claims. The obvious solution is winners first, losers afterwards, but the French and the Greeks and the Serbs, the Belgians, the Norwegians, the Danes and the Dutch, will be neither winners nor losers. The queue outside the Big Four's conference room will be miles long ; everybody will be deserving, each will have a piteous story to tell.

Here again, every shipload of stuff sent to Europe to enable work to begin will mean that we shall have to go short of something we used to think was a necessity. So more rationing, more controls and the need for still more patience and good-humour will be the consequence for you and me.

But if the peoples of Europe can't work, and can only stand idle day by day, month after month, waiting for the United Nations' canteen to open, dreariness, irritation and finally despair will be the consequence for them. And that will be a very bad climate for the Peace-making, to put it no lower than that.

### *(d) No Quislings*

Once the modern man has been fed and watered and given a job, his next requirement is a newspaper, so that he can discover whom to blame for the poor food and the rotten job. In other words he is, as Aristotle, ever modern, remarked, a political animal.

Liberated Europe, once fed and clothed, can be depended upon to go back to politics with a bang (several bangs, in

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fact, if the Allied Police don't keep a sharp eye out). Well, liberated Europe has already been told, in the Atlantic Charter and elsewhere, that its internal politics will be its own affair. (Nobody really means that, of course. Wait till some country or other plumps for a Fascist dictatorship and see if that is held to be its own affair ! Only, failing a World Police and World Code, what exactly shall we do about it ?)

But the defeated peoples are also in some degree political animals, even if for many years past the sheep in them has been more in evidence than the politician. And with regard to them, it is not yet clear what kind of provisional administration the Allies mean to set up during the Peace-making period. So that if you and I have any views on the subject, it is not yet too late to air them, and to make our tiny contributions to a public opinion which might well, if strong and sensible, have a real say in the matter.

It need not, I think, be assumed that the organisation with the unfortunate Turkish name now functioning in Sicily and Italy will be a model for Germany and her Balkan satellites. But whatever temporary form of civil administration the Allies set up, one thing is certain, they will need a large measure of co-operation from the Germans and other defeated peoples. The size and numbers alone of the area and populations to be administered make this inevitable. And this will raise a delicate and difficult problem in psychology, which I will call the Quisling question. To illustrate it, imagine that Germany really had possessed an irresistible secret weapon, or that we had all shared Mr. Chamberlain's belief that Hitler was a good chap at bottom, or that for any other reason you like we had been successfully conquered and these islands occupied by the German armies. Imagine further that the Nazi Gauleiters set over us had invited co-operation in maintaining order and carrying on the public services ; and to complete the parallel, strain your imagination to bursting-point and pretend that by some miracle the conquering Germans had become enlightened

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and democratic and were treating us, the conquered people, with decency and fairness. Even so, can you conceive that those Englishmen who co-operated from the first, who in the hour of shame and defeat took service with the enemy, could ever after live it down? Somebody would have to do it, possibly. There are probably many Frenchmen collaborating to-day with the Germans, who came to the cool conclusion that it was the only thing left for them to do for their own people; to interpose, perhaps, some scrap of humanity between the oppressor and the oppressed. But, whether deserved or undeserved, the taint of the Quisling will be on these men, and if, to complete my illustration, the Germans finally withdrew and left us to ourselves, can you believe that the "collaborators" would not be politically and socially damned?

Now the very last thing we want, is that the Germans who help us to run the country during the period of occupation should be thrown out neck and crop by their own people on the day we finally withdraw. I have heard it said by persons with more knowledge of German psychology than I have, that the difficulty will not arise after all. Because, they say, it is so much the nature of the German to admire and bow down to military prowess, that once we have beaten them to a frazzle, they will not only lick our boots, but like licking them. We shall have the prestige, I am told, to lead them in any direction, and our only care need be to see that we lead them in the right direction.

Well, I hope this is true. If it is, many difficulties will disappear. But I cannot help doubting whether this would be a lasting mood, even if it prevailed at the moment of surrender. And it is always as well to expect the worst rather than the best, and be prepared for it.

The problem then, as I see it, is how to avoid making Quislings of the Germans we call upon to share in the administration. We should naturally like to work with men who have resisted Hitler from the first, men who to-day

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perhaps are in exile or concentration camps. But if by so doing we brand "Quisling" on these men's foreheads, we may forfeit the use of them during the first critical years after our withdrawal. Now consider the position as we shall find it. All the strings will have been in the hands of members of the Nazi party. The chances are that most of these men will be either dead or in hiding; at least they will have thrown away their party badges, torn up their papers and fled from their posts. There will be great disorganisation. Yet we must find a large army of officials, big and little, to administer the country.

To avoid the "Quisling" snag, it would seem that the right policy will be to nominate as few Germans as possible and to make the Germans do their own nominating. Herr Schmidt can hardly be called "Quisling" in times to come, if he can show that he served the Allies not at their bidding, but at the behest of his own people.

I am not suggesting that anything so neat and desirable as popular election of officials at all levels will be practicable. It is doubtful whether the Nazis have allowed any machinery to survive, even under dust-covers, by which any such thing could be done. There are probably no registers of voters, and if there were, the disruption of war, casualties, evacuations and so on will have rendered them useless. You cannot improvise a machinery of self-government. People, after ten years of Gauleiters and Gestapo, will have forgotten how the thing worked.

No, all you can do, as an occupying military power, is to make public in all localities, and on all levels of administrative business, the list of posts you want filled, and to insist that the Germans themselves find the men required. "No Nazi need apply" of course; but the chances are the Germans will see to that. Put the responsibility upon them from the word "go". If they can dig up a piece of rusty electoral machinery here and there, and make it work, so much the better. It will not be our concern how the man is chosen, provided he is

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competent for the job. If in Hamburg the roost is being ruled by a Soldiers' and Sailors' Council — very well, let the Council produce our man. If the Mayor of Apfelheim is the only person left with any personal authority, let him continue himself in office as Mayor and nominate the postman and the dustman. Presumably in time the Germans will work out a machinery of self-government. Meanwhile it will be up to them, not to us, to find enough reasonably competent officials to carry on the Allied administration.

It is worth risking certain delays and even confusion here and there, for the sake of escaping from Quisling troubles. If the Allies are content to copy the legendary sergeant of the Guards, and shout, "I want three volunteers — you and you and you" — they may be pointing at the three best men in the bunch, but at the same time destroying the usefulness of these very men. All I know is that, if I were a German, I would never forgive the men who helped the conqueror, unless I had myself asked them to do so.

The point is not a small one. I have included it among the "climatic" conditions, because even during the period of occupation we shall be spared many rubs if our German collaborators can walk about unprotected, and enter a café or a restaurant without the necessity for everybody else to get up and go. But we shall expect to reap the full reward of such a policy, or suffer the consequences of neglecting it, only when the time comes for us to withdraw. We are going to see, in due course, what happens to Quislings when their protectors quit. Whether it is boiling oil or only a pistol shot (and Monsieur Pierre Laval must often, like Bentley's Sir Alfred Beit, "suddenly scream in the night"), we do not want it to happen to the Germans we have trained to administer the country on decent democratic lines. As the history of the Weimar Republic shows, democratic institutions in Germany are tender plants in any case. Last time the Allies snubbed the Weimar Republic and have been greatly blamed for doing so. But let them beware this time

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of overdoing it in the other direction. Patronage can do the protégé as much harm as snubbing. Our objective should be to leave the shaping of the new government (under the sharp eye of the World Police) as much as possible to the Germans themselves, and to leave on no public man, big or small, the brand of a Quisling.

### *(e) No Protection for Nazis*

You may think this a most unnecessary point to make. How is it conceivable that, after fighting the bloodiest war in history to overthrow Nazism, there could be any question of "protection" for Nazis. Well, I am not so sure. One has to remember that Nazis will not be marked with a big N on their foreheads. They will not be swaggering about in black or brown shirts, hung with party badges. The "big noises" no doubt will have been destroyed before we march in. But there will be vast numbers of obscurer members of the party who will be in civilian clothes and loudly proclaiming their detestation of Hitler and all his works. And when a British officer, marching into a town or village at the head of a company of British Tommies, sees a mob preparing to hang or burn a bunch of civilians who scream for help, protesting that they hate Hitler and love the British, won't his natural instinct be to rescue them from the mob? Well, perhaps lynching cannot be allowed. But where we must have a care, is in seeing that our traditional British notions of criminal justice are not allowed to cheat a broader kind of justice. No doubt we ought to, and shall, insist on proper trials before proper courts and no mob violence. But there must be no attempt to prescribe rules for these courts. Membership of a political party could never be a crime according to British standards; we should demand full proof of overt acts of murder, brutality, plunder or corruption. But when all these things, and more, have been systematically done by the leaders of a party, you can't acquit the ordinary members of aiding and abetting. From their consent and connivance the

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leaders drew their strength. The overt acts could never have been done if the conscience of the rank and file had been shocked. No doubt there are thousands of young Nazis who never had a chance, victims of a perverted teaching. But by and large, if the Germans feel like making a wholesale purge of their oppressors it would be a mistake for us to interfere. An unsatisfied natural hankering after retribution would poison the "climate" we want to work in. We have announced, over and over again, that we are out to destroy "Hitlerism" root and branch — but when you get down to brass tacks, only the German people themselves can know where "Hitlerism" lurks, its scope and ramifications. We shall recognise fat Goering and the insect Goebbels (or shan't we? will they be just messes in the gutter?), but there will be an army of obscure rats scuttling into holes who will escape altogether if we begin to be too British and start assuming that everyone is innocent unless two reliable witnesses "seen him do it".

And remember this, the purge may well look like "revolution". That's where our uncles get scared. But the destruction by force of a system of government *is* revolution. In that sense our major war-aim is revolution. But names do frighten some of us into fits and you must be prepared to find old Uncle Bob (and perhaps half the Tory party), who have been half-killing themselves for four years and more to "destroy Hitlerism", getting scared stiff when they hear that "revolution has broken out in Hamburg, Bremen, Berlin, etc. etc." They may even clamour for our occupying armies to stop it. Well, like the Alderney cow in the poem you must just say "There, there" as soothingly as you can — "It's only a *word*, Uncle — these people are finishing off our work for us; they *are* destroying Hitlerism, and good luck to them." There will be excesses, no doubt. Starving wretches fresh from concentration camps do commit excesses. They have suffered for years from "excesses", and it's so long since we revolved ourselves and cut off our King's head



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and any number of people's ears, that we have forgotten that that was the path by which we reached our familiar liberties and law and order. You may admit all this, but feel that all the same it is going rather far to include revolution among the things conducing to a peace-making climate. To which I can only reply that there are few climates so benign as the one you get immediately after a thunderstorm has cleared the air. What could be worse than a lowering, sultry atmosphere and the peace-makers suffering from prickly heat ?

### (f) *No Hurry*

After the last war, the Allied statesmen undoubtedly worked under too great pressure. With no adequate Police Force, and guns going off all over the place, they felt that the main thing was to make peace, even if it wasn't the best possible peace. Everybody was tired ; the armies wanted to get home ; a settlement of any sort seemed the one thing needful. Perhaps, in retrospect, it was a mistake to let the men who had borne the heaviest burdens of the war be the men to make the peace. Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau — what incredible labours and responsibilities had been theirs : how dog-weary they must have been. There is a limit to the capacity of even the toughest human machine. And if ever there was a problem needing freshness, buoyancy, optimism and patience, it is world-scale peace-making. War throws up great men with a genius for war. Why should it be assumed that these same men have a genius for peace ? It will, no doubt, be too much to expect that the conduct of the coming Peace Conference will be entrusted to younger men, less bowed by the prodigious weight of the war years. (In any case, where are they ? In parliamentary and democratic systems of government, only professional politicians are available for these jobs. The field of choice is narrow, and sometimes there are lean years.) But at any rate, — and let's hope public opinion will be strong and vocal enough to insist on it, — there must be no working under pressure

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this time. The Peace-makers must not be allowed to "hear Time's wingèd chariot hurrying near" in the form of popular and press clamour to "get on with the job". Let them, if necessary, make provisional and experimental settlements, avowedly open to revision, wherever a final decision means taking chances. Let them proceed leisurely, by trial and error. "*Solvitur ambulando*" would not be a bad motto for them — "When you can't solve it, go for a walk". Three, four, five years are as nothing in the lives of nations. Give the peoples time to find out what they really want. The morning after a debauch is a bad moment to order dinner. You suggest a kipper and whisky and soda; by evening you feel like a steak and stout. Forgive me for harping on King Charles' head, but on this point of leisurely approach, the World Police Force has enormous bearing; because the negative peace, which means no fighting, is a pre-requisite of the positive peace, which means an amicable world. Last time, as has been said, shots were being fired out of doors. There is no necessity for that this time. The armistice — the "weapon-stand-still" — can be made absolute. That will be a very great advantage. The main excuse for hustle will be removed. The other excuse — the impatience of the public — depends upon you and me and the rest of us. These, then, are some of the conditions conducing to a favourable climate for Peace-making.

Let us now take a look at some of the teasers the Peace-makers will have to face up to. It is not a question here of finding a set of solutions, but of trying to clear our own minds as to the principles to be applied. And above all, of trying to look at each separate problem in such a way that when in clubs, trains, bars or bed (poor woman!) we assert that "the government ought to do so-and-so" we use *ought* in the sense that it would be *right* for the government to do it, and not merely expedient. And I use "right" in the ethical sense of the word, doing the Allied governments the honour of regarding them as decent, friendly, unselfish

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human beings, which is an honour not often paid to governments.

### 2. FRONTIERS

It is a solemn thought that some of the solemn thoughts of the late Lord Curzon are to-day hardly worth thinking. Thoughts, for instance, about strategic frontiers and "buffer" States. Modern aircraft and the speed and power of armoured fighting vehicles have turned buffer States into butter States. (Do you remember what a wonderful buffer Czechoslovakia was going to be ?) But mountains and rivers are still tank obstacles, as we have lately found out in North Africa and Sicily, and the Germans discovered when they reached the Volga. They have their value for imposing delays (although one of the lessons of the Russian campaigns has been the comparative speed with which a modern army can force the most formidable rivers). So that that supreme curse of peace conferences, the Strategic Frontier, has not yet been altogether wiped off the agenda through improved armaments.

When you sit down to discuss what everybody hopes, or pretends to hope, is perpetual peace, it is discouraging to find that one of the first things to be arranged is the terrain for the next war. "Well, gentlemen, here we are," says the Chairman, "and the first question is : How and where shall we fight next time ?" Which means that the fight begins then and there, across the green baize, for possession of the rivers, precipices, passes, ravines, marshes, salt pans, deserts and so on, which will ensure that next time the sun shall be in your enemy's eyes and not your own. In short, the fight for strategic frontiers.

Now although the coming Peace Conference will not be a conference of victors and vanquished, but a discussion between Allies as to what terms to dictate to the losers, there will be this same struggle over strategic frontiers, unless—

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Unless what? Unless, of course, the Allies have previously arranged to make war impossible. As we have seen in an earlier chapter, there is a way, a practicable way, of doing this through the World Police. The Big Four will have it in their own hands to make the words "Strategic Frontiers" meaningless for evermore. But if they prefer the old ways, then once again these mountains and rivers and the rest will have to be marked on the conference map in red chalk, and quarrelled over interminably, until the Peace-makers become so preoccupied with the next war that they will have small room in their thoughts for the present Peace.

The more one thinks about it, the more intolerable it appears that civilised statesmen, met to make peace, and in command of irresistible force, should feel compelled by a traditional superstition to begin their pow-wow by jockeying for positions in a future war. It ought not to be allowed; and if you and I and the rest of the peoples of the Allied Nations can't build up a public opinion which will refuse to allow it, we shall be regarded by our children's children as pretty poor fish. So I am going to make bold to assume that it will not be allowed, and that "strategic" frontiers will not be on the agenda. Just "Frontiers". (We can breathe again.)

"Well, gentlemen," says the Chairman, "our first business is to settle the new frontiers."

"Why?" asks the youthful Prime Minister for Balkania.

"Well, you must have frontiers, mustn't you?"

"Why?"

"Well — er — to collect the customs at, for one thing."

"I have a motion on the agenda — with the promise of substantial support — to make the erection of customs barriers an offence under our new World Code."

"Where are you going to examine passports?"

"Why do we need passports? The Police will look after suspicious characters."

"I'm not thinking of suspicious characters. I'm thinking

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of immigrants (hear, hear). You can't have aliens flooding in without a check, swamping your labour markets and overcrowding your cities."

"They won't flood in if we have a proper International Labour Bureau. The Bureau will know where there are jobs, and where there are none, and will advertise 'Situations Vacant'. People don't emigrate when they know there is nothing for them."

"Oh, don't they? What about getting away from persecution? Supposing you were a Jew from——"

"I am, as a matter of fact. But I thought our World Code was going to stop all that."

"But, my good man, there *are* frontiers. They're there already."

"Then why have we got to settle them?"

By this time the older members of the Conference are getting restive and shifting in their chairs, and the young Jewish statesman from Balkania loses his nerve and subsides. All the same, when the Conference gets down to its maps, it finds that in fact most of the frontiers have settled themselves. Race and language and history have drawn firm lines. Still there are awkward pockets here and there and the old trouble about Danzig and the Polish Corridor. Are there any broad principles by the application of which the Peacemakers can do better than last time?

Last time, in re-drawing the frontier of Europe, "Self-determination" was the watchword, although what size the "self" was to be, was never made very clear. Obviously individuals could not be allowed to determine themselves (what a silly phrase it is!) or villages. What about towns? Well, Danzig was told she might — to everybody's pain and grief.

Starting with self-determination, or as it was often called "the wishes of the inhabitants", the next considerations were race and language. This was quite natural in a society organised on "national" lines, and we are by no means ripe

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yet to be able to afford to disregard them this time. Economics came last. They were not forgotten ; there was plenty of head-scratching over the Silesian coal-mines, for instance. But the glaring case of a total disregard of economics was that of Austria. Austria was reconstituted with an enormous head, Vienna, much too big for her little body, and the history of this hydrocephalous infant has not been a happy one.

Can we do better this time ? Is there any advice we can give the Peace-makers as they sit over their ethnographic maps, feeling ready to burst into tears over the jig-saw confusion of races and languages ?

Well, once again, we can beseech them to go slow, to make everything provisional and subject to revision ; to set up a permanent Frontier Commission whose work must go on, not for months, but for years. Secondly, if they must again give first place to " the wishes of the inhabitants " (and it is very difficult, in a democratic world, to do anything else — nor could it last if you did), let us ask them to be very cautious and wary in their methods of discovering these wishes.

In Eastern Europe, where the peasants and work-people have for centuries been accustomed to being ruled by men of alien race and language, it is doubtful whether the bulk of the populations have, normally, any " wishes " at all about such things as State frontiers. Their conscious wishes are probably limited to such everyday matters as food, regular work and a peaceful life. " Nationalism " means little to them, and they are content to belong to any State which can give them these things.

Now if you suddenly descend on these people and ask them to vote in a plebiscite as to whether they want to be, say, " Boys or Girls ", never having thought about it in that way they will no doubt vote according to whether the best immediate propaganda has been made by a Boy or a Girl and, on the result of the plebiscite, a new frontier is drawn, and the State of Boyland set up, and in a matter of no time half

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the inhabitants wake up to the fact that, judging by certain well-known indications, they are Girls after all. Substitute "Czech" or "Magyar" or "Pole" or "Croat" for Boy and Girl, and that is not an unfair picture of the kind of thing which happened last time and may happen again.

How would it be if this time the Peace-makers, instead of beginning with plebiscites to ascertain the wishes of people who have no particular wishes (until ideas are put into their heads from outside), were to begin with some experimental groupings founded on economic and administrative considerations, even preferring these to ties of race or language? By "administrative considerations" I mean, for instance, the existence, as potential centre of the group, of some ancient capital, or other politically experienced entity, where civil servants are bred. Modern government, democratic or not, is impossible without civil servants, and for good civil servants some tradition seems indispensable. You don't find them growing in the countryside, but you frèquently do in the larger cities. Conversely, large cities must have the means of feeding themselves, and marriages of town and country are among the things the Peace-makers should have an eye for. Last time they tried, at Versailles, to arrange only love matches. This time, let them go on the other tack and see if *mariages de convenance*, where the parties can each contribute something which the other lacks, may not after all be more enduring. Or at least let us have some companionate unions and perhaps after ten or fifteen years a legal ceremony, complete with plebiscite, can make honest States of them.

After all, when people talk of the unbreakable ties of race and language, they forget Switzerland. It's quite remarkable how we all forget Switzerland. Yet for centuries now she has solved the problem of three races and three languages in one State. Dr. Benes remembered her when he told the Versailles peace-makers that, if he was allowed to retain the Sudeten Germans, he would make Czechoslovakia "*une*

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*espèce de Suisse* ". Unfortunately he later, like the rest of us, forgot her.

What people want, in parts of Europe where Nationalism is weak, is food, work, liberty and a quiet life. To create a group of regions which included an agricultural area to supply the food, an industrial area to supply the consumer goods, an administrative centre sufficiently experienced in democratic practice to give the liberty, and in civil administration to give the quiet life, would justify some drastic revision of frontiers. And it would be worth trying.

Where Nationalism is strong, I'm afraid nothing can be done short of compulsion. And if it turns ugly, as it did in Sudetenland, there are but two ways : wholesale migration of the population, or geographical excision. Both are bad, but running sores are worse.

The problem of Austria will be a hard nut to crack. It is difficult to believe that, after Hitler's foul treatment of her people, they will be inclined for some time to come for union with Germany. And yet from the economic — even to some degree from the racial and linguistic — point of view, such union would be the natural solution for her. Vienna has got to be fed. Vienna, as a cultural centre, cannot be allowed to decay. The Peace-makers might, and perhaps will, encourage some loose Federal Union of States to which Austria could contribute her urbanity and administrative traditions in return for the granaries of, say, Hungary. But they can only encourage, not compel. If she wants to look east for her food, it will be up to her to make the advances. But there is one thing the Peace-makers could do at once. They could treat the Austrian people as one of the liberated peoples of Europe, not as " ex-enemies ". This would mean for the Austrians practically a higher place on the " priority " list for relief ; and psychologically, an encouragement which they will badly need. To sum up, if public opinion feels called upon — as it should — to proffer advice to the Peace-makers on frontiers, it might do worse than say as follows :



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"Go slow, and work by trial and error. Avoid plebiscites and, where nationalism is naturally weak, do nothing to strengthen it. Have nothing to do with people who talk to you of "blood and soil", or of "sacred" ties of race or tongue. Listen to people who talk to you about food and drink and the quiet life. Remember that politically inexperienced peoples need trained civil servants. Remember Switzerland. Remember what Hitler did to Austria. And rather than a running sore, a surgical operation."

As for the Polish Corridor, when that is reached on the agenda, the young Balkanian again butts in.

"Mr. Chairman, may I tell you a story?"

"Well?"

"A man asks an old friend to dine at his club. A dish is set before them containing a large fish and a small fish. The host helps himself to the large fish and his friend to the small one. 'I say, I say, old man!' says the friend. 'What's the matter?' asks the host. 'Well, you know, I should never have done that.' 'Done what?' 'Well, if I had been the host and you the guest, I should have given you the large fish and myself the small one.' 'Well, you've got it.' May the Germans be called in, Mr. Chairman?"

The Germans are called in.

"You have always wanted an overseas colony, eh, gentlemen?"

"Natürlich."

"Well, you've got it. East Prussia will be your first overseas colony. And at a very handy distance, too. Good morning, gentlemen."

So much for the Polish Corridor. And please do not mistake flippancy for foolishness. Unless the Germans are prepared to evacuate East Prussia they must be content with the sea route. The "sealed trains" business across the corridor didn't work. It was a constant, irritating reminder of the "Corridor" grievance. There is nothing more outrageous in the idea that East Prussia should be separated from

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Germany by the sea than that Ulster should be separated from England by the sea. Access to the sea is another thing altogether, and Poland's road to Gdynia must be safeguarded without debate.

And while we are on the subject of frontiers may I ask you one question? When you look at a map of North America, do you share my sneaking contempt for all those straight lines and right angles which denote the State frontiers? Do you have a feeling that only a parvenu would call a lot of arbitrary lines by the dignified name of "frontiers"? Does it give you, as it does me, a superiority complex to look first at them and then at our lovely, serrated, irregular, jig-saw European frontiers? It does? Well, I'm afraid we are both the victims of illusion. Because those straight lines are testimony to the fact that the people inhabiting a vast area of the earth's surface are getting on very well without any real frontiers at all. For administrative convenience they have State frontiers represented by lines on a map, but they cross and recross them at their pleasure and convenience. And if you say yes, because they are all the same race, you couldn't say anything less true. And if you say, well, because they speak the same language, I point out to you the long straight line which divides Canada from the United States, and dare you to tell a French Canadian—or any other Canadian, for that matter—that he speaks American. No, if anybody is to have a superiority complex over frontiers, it should be the inhabitants of a continent which does without them. I am not suggesting we should square the counties of England. Tradition has its uses and much charm. But the less "frontier-minded" we can become the better. Frontiers are part of the make-up of Nationalism, and we have seen in a previous chapter what *that*, as Lady Bracknell would say, leads to.

How far will the Peace-makers have a free hand in drawing the frontiers of Europe afresh? In one sense the Big Four, having absolute power in Europe on Armistice Day, will have

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a free hand to do anything on which they can agree among themselves. But one of the things we are, or ought to be, fighting for is international good faith. How far should the Peace-makers feel themselves bound by earlier treaties? What about the treaty between Russia and Poland, signed on July 30, 1941? Under this agreement Russia recognised that the treaties she had signed with Germany in 1939 with regard to territorial changes in Poland were invalid. Which means that Poland's frontiers to-day are, at any rate *de jure*, what they were before the war. And we happen to have guaranteed them. Does this preclude us and the Russian Government from re-drawing the frontiers of Poland if we see good reason to do so, in applying the principles mentioned above? Or is the sanctity of treaties the paramount consideration?

I think the answer depends upon King Charles' head — the question of whether or not the Allies have already established security upon a permanent foundation through the World Police Force. There is a doctrine of so-called International Law that agreements only continue to be binding "*rebus sic stantibus*" — so long, that is, as the circumstance they were framed to suit remains unchanged. Now it must be assumed that all treaties affecting frontiers made hitherto were drawn partly with an eye to security. That is, the frontiers were in some degree "strategic". And if after the war the Allies are unable or unwilling to find a better system of safeguarding security than heretofore, they will have no right to upset existing frontier agreements without the full consent of both parties. Which means that if Poland insists on her 1939 frontiers she must have them.

On the other hand, if we have the sense to begin by safeguarding security, we shall have worked such a revolutionary change in the "circumstances" that we shall, I think, be perfectly entitled to apply the doctrine of "*rebus sic stantibus*", and to tell the Poles that the old maps are to be rolled up and the new maps re-drawn. Poland may get, from her

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point of view, more, or she may get less. But she will know that the principles applied in drawing her frontiers will be the same principles as are being applied to everyone else. And with fear lifted from her heart, sweet reasonableness may take its place. Only buffer States can know the exhilaration of shedding bufferdom or buffery or whatever the horrid thing should be called.

### *Could you draw a Map of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania?*

But the supremely awkward moment will be when the Peace-makers reach the item on the agenda headed "Baltic States". The Chairman will clear his throat, and the rest will look down their noses and draw Hitlers on their blotting-paper. (That is, if no security system has been set up.) Then the American delegate will clear *his* throat and, turning a righteous and menacing eye upon his British colleague, will speak in a low level voice about the sanctity of treaties and the rights of small nations. His arguments will be unanswerable. His British colleague, quailing, will with difficulty suppress an impulse to raise his hand and say "Please, sir, it wasn't me, sir." But the Russians, whose armies managed to answer the apparently unanswerable on the steppes at Stalingrad, will do it again. Quite unabashed, their delegate will reply that he agrees with all the American has said. But he will point out that in a world where might is right, small nations, unfortunately, have no rights, because they have no might. He will remind the Conference that some years ago M. Litvinoff pointed out that peace was indivisible, but that nobody paid any attention. And he will finally observe that twice bit, thrice shy, and if it is again to be the rule that we are all to look after ourselves in this wicked world, Russia is going to look after herself. And that it is her considered opinion that the Baltic seaboard is strategically necessary to her. And, not being a cad, he will refrain from mentioning Iceland. Whereupon the British delegate will ask if he may have a few words with his American colleague outside. And

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in the lobby he will ask the American, "What can we do?" and the American will say, "Buddy, there's nothing you can do. Only we Americans will never, never understand that."<sup>1</sup>

So they will return to the Conference room and the Chairman will cross out "Baltic States" on the agenda and pass on to the next item. And the Americans will do nothing except go on never-never-understanding how the British could have let down the Baltic States. And nobody will ever dare mention the Atlantic Charter again. And the Peace-makers (all except the Russian delegate) will do the rest of their work with a bad conscience, and for fear people will laugh if they mention "principles" they will talk big about "expediency"; and the bottom will have fallen out of the United Nations New Order.

A very unfair story, you will say, because I deliberately assumed earlier on that the Conference, sitting with the World Policeman outside, would have no concern with "strategic" frontiers. I agree; but I have all the time a horrid underlying fear that public opinion on the question of World Security may be too divided, or too apathetic, or too late to get anything done before the Peace-makers sit down to the job. So that my assumption will, after all, be a mistaken one. In which case, depend upon it, that one item "Baltic States" will be quite capable of blowing the Atlantic Charter, and the unity of the Allies, and all our high hopes to bits. To-day that item is being slurred over. In fact it is a lack of tact, even in an essay like this, to mention it. The Baltic States are, as Mr. Chamberlain would have said, "distant peoples of whom we know little". But in America, where European emigrants are intelligent and vocal, the Baltic States are not so unknown. And they will be regarded as a test case, whether we like it or not.

Now the Russian case cannot be answered so long as the

<sup>1</sup> This is not fantasy. These actual words were used by a distinguished American man of affairs speaking to his British *vis-à-vis* on this topic.

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Russians can go on asserting that, in practical politics, only Might is Right. And might will go on being right, in international affairs, until either there is a change of heart in nations, acting nationally, or a strong protective police force which will be the only Might. And since a change of heart will not come over-night, and the problem of the Baltic States will, you must either have your police or some equivalent system of security, or give in to the Russian thesis, or fight Russia. You pay your money and you take your choice.

During the last years before the outbreak of the present war, our Hoares and Simons and Edens and Halifaxes, holding the once proud position of British Foreign Secretary, found themselves impotent to do what was right (and I mean *right*) in foreign affairs and compelled to do what was miserably and humiliatingly expedient, because they lacked the backing of Might. It must have been a sickening experience for them, as it was for you and me. But the shame of those years will not have been suffered in vain if it has taught us to make the right choice this time. We must not give in to the Russian thesis. And we must certainly not fight Russia. What we must — and can — do is to establish a collective Might which will make Russia feel secure, and enable you and me to get out our atlases and find out just where Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania really are without blushing as red as a boiled lobster. But it will take some doing, and there is not much time to spare.

### 3. POLITICS

The Peace-makers may well take the line that "politics" has no place on their agenda, because the Atlantic Charter has already laid it down that all peoples must be free to choose their own form of government. Well, one is as reluctant to speak disrespectfully of the Atlantic Charter as Sydney Smith was to speak disrespectfully of the Equator. All the same,

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that famous document is a trifle woolly. Why is that? Nobody could accuse Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt of woolliness. They are not only great men, but very astute men. How then could they have jointly produced a woolly pronouncement? If you have ever dined, during the last twenty years or more, with an Archbishop, or in company which included an Archbishop, you must have been struck with the contrast between the salt and snappiness of his dinner-table talk and the woolliness of his address next morning to the Upper House of Convocation. Or if, like me, you don't dine with Archbishops, you must at least have contrasted the pith and pungency of the Vicar's conversation at a whist drive with the woolliness of his sermons. The sad truth is, I am afraid, that whenever we have to address our fellow sinners on any high theme of morals, woolliness creeps in, because of the enormous gap between the goodness of which we assume them to be capable, and the very moderate amount of goodness of which they are in fact capable. At the whist drive the Vicar meets us on our own ground, and talks to us in our proper character of good-natured, self-seeking rascals; in the pulpit he has to assume we are full of Christian endeavour, and knowing we are not, he becomes woolly.

Now the Atlantic Charter is a sermon. A sermon addressed to nations on the assumption that they are, after the war, going to turn over a new leaf and be good. Hence its woolliness. You may think that it hardly lies with me, who have been stressing the enormous importance of statesmen acting on the highest moral level in their dealings with other nations, to turn round and criticise the first sermon the Allied leaders have given us. But words are not deeds, and if the Atlantic Charter makes us feel good for a moment — as many sermons do — and so inhibits us from examining our black hearts, it may prove in the end to be a stumbling-block.

Frankly, what I am afraid of is that the clause about leaving all peoples to choose their own form of government

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may mislead the Peace-makers into neglecting certain precautions they ought to take.

Because, as has already been pointed out, we cannot afford to be indifferent to the systems of government chosen by other nations. We know — by the example of the French people in 1852 — that peoples are capable of setting up Dictators by popular vote. And it is no longer any use saying, if they prefer a Hitler or a Mussolini or a Franco, let them have them. Absolute power is so corrupting, and ruffians so incapable of limiting their ruffianism to their own back-yards, that they cannot be tolerated. Fascism is not just one of many forms of government, it is a disease, and a highly dangerous and contagious one.

What can the Peace-makers do about it? The answer has already been given in the chapter on the World Code. It was suggested there that the suppression of certain rights and freedoms in any country should be made a "criminal" offence and drastically punished. But, in addition, it would seem that something might be done to start the peoples off on the right foot. As regards our oppressed Allies, there will be no need for any officious interference by the Peace Conference — they have had their bellyful of Fascism, and may be trusted to take their own precautions.

But as regards Germany and her satellites, the case is different. Here we are dealing with peoples who have never yet succeeded in making parliamentary or democratic government work. There is a double vice in them; the vice of loving to dominate, and the vice of loving to be dominated. It is this second vice of which I am the more afraid. We can guard against the German wolf; but the real danger is the German sheep. The Germans have an enormous capacity for being ordered about. If we leave them to themselves, the danger is that, after a half-hearted attempt at running themselves, they will advertise for a good strong shepherd. And it's a safe bet that the advertisement will be answered by a wolf — not in sheep's, but in shepherd's clothing — a much



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more dangerous form of disguise. Now, could we not turn this sheep-like character of the Germans to good account ?

Consider what the position is likely to be at the Armistice. Our major war aim, as has been said, is revolution in Germany — the overturning by force of a discredited political system. And revolution there will be. It is likely to be chaotic, bloody, violent and disruptive. The official classes having been Nazis or pro-Nazis will be largely dead, in hiding, or chivied by the mobs. Civil administration, transport, public services will have broken down in many places. If the Germans were a cussed, independent, self-reliant kind of people we could probably leave them to it. They would work out their own salvation, and so much the better. But they are not. They will be asking us to supply the strong hand to restore order, and we shall have to do it. And here will be our opportunity. Avoiding the pitfall of creating Quislings, and placing the full responsibility for the choice of provisional administration upon the most competent native somebodies thrown up by the revolution, wherever they may be, the Peace-makers should quickly get down to shepherd-ing the frightened sheep into the way it suits us for them to go.

What is that way, and how far is it practicable to shepherd them into it ?

The ideal, of course, if it could be done, would be to compel them to set up a system of thorough-going State Socialism. That would suit us all, whatever our opinions. It would suit the Tories and Liberals, because, confident as they are that Socialism is the very devil, it would be a great feather in their caps to see it tried out and fail in a large-scale experiment. It would suit the Socialists, because, confident as they are that Socialism is the only sensible system for social beings, it would be a great feather in *their* caps to see it tried out and succeed. And neither would be in danger of having their illusions shattered. Because if it succeeded, the anti-Socialists could say, yes, but only because they are Germans,

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sheep-like people who positively enjoy being regimented by a vast bureaucracy. And if it failed, the Socialists could say, yes, but only because they are Germans, a people who never have been able to work democracy, and are only happy under the Prussian jack-boot. So everybody would be happy.

But you can lead a horse to the water, etc., and I see no prospect of the Peace-makers being able to impose any positive system of government upon eighty million people if the people won't play. But I think it would be practicable, and well worth the effort, to try to start the Germans off on the right foot to this extent. We could, during the provisional period of military occupation, insist on the maintenance of a kind of political framework within which the Germans could make their own arrangements. Like the Ten Commandments, the framework would consist of a series of "Thou shalt *nots*". You cannot make a horse drink, but you can prevent him from drinking from forbidden troughs. For instance, we should veto any legislation or executive action which violated any of the freedoms mentioned above in the chapter on the World Code. We should veto any attempt to tamper with the complete independence of the Courts; civil or criminal. In short, we should insist that certain fundamental liberties, and safeguards for such liberties, should be maintained. It may be we should have to invest the Military Commander with the power to exercise this veto. Or it might be preferable to set up a Civil Governor-General, holding power from the World Commission of the Peace — that same prestigious body which, one hopes, will be the political directorate of the World Police. But these are, in a sense, details to be settled by the Peace-makers. My only point here is that we should make it clear from the first that the Atlantic Charter does not mean all it says, and that it will be part of the responsibility of the Peace-makers to see that the rights of the Germans (and of their satellites and later on the Japs) to choose their own government are rigidly circum-

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scribed. And if we do mean to see to this, the sooner we say so the better. We all remember the use German propaganda made in the years after the last war of Wilson's Fourteen Points. Do not let them, this time, have the chance of throwing the Atlantic Charter in our face and proclaiming us to be dirty dogs.

You may think all this very disappointing. "Here is a chance", you may say, "of doing something in a big way for Democracy — a clean page to write on; nobody to jog your elbow; and all you propose writing on it is a few 'don'ts' and 'shalt nots'. Surely the Peace-makers can be a little more constructive than that? You quote the old proverb about leading horses to water, but Germans aren't horses. Is there *anything* one couldn't make a defeated German do? — even to governing himself according to the most approved methods of Democracy?"

Well, that's just the rub. Democracy — unfortunately Democracy does not mean quite the same thing to all of the Allies. To Marshal Stalin, for instance, it means winking the other eye. The Americans, bless their hearts, think they have it in its finest flower, and that we British are only beginners. They see a King and a House of Lords, and conclude we are barely out of the feudal ages. In fact, of course, the converse is nearer the truth. British political Democracy is to the American brand as wine is to water. The American President has personal powers and prerogatives such as no English monarch has enjoyed for over two hundred years. The Senate, it is true, is composed of favourite instead of eldest sons, but has powers, such as that of making war and peace, which would make the House of Lords stare (through its seven hundred and ninety-six monocles), and while our House of Commons can throw out the government of the country any day of the week, abolish the House of Lords itself (after a polite interval) and thereafter exercise unlimited sovereignty in any direction, the American House of Representatives not only must put up with the President

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and his advisers during the whole Presidential term of office, but put up with his acts as well. And not only have they this powerful independent Senate and still more powerful and independent President to limit and thwart them ; they are also frequently up against that most powerful and independent authority of all, the American Constitution. Do you think a real democracy like ours would tolerate for a moment interference from the dead hand of a document written over one hundred and fifty years ago to suit circumstances which long ago ceased to exist ?

But so loosely are words used, and so easily do we all muddle up social Democracy, which the Americans have largely achieved, with political Democracy, which they jealously restrict, that it will not be the slightest use trying this on your American friends. (That they have the most democratic institutions in the world is just one of those things they *know*.) But I have allowed myself this digression to illustrate the enormous difficulty there would be, if it was decided to impose political Democracy on the Germans, in agreeing just what political Democracy is. And even if, with Marshal Stalin as umpire, we and our American allies did find a formula, we should still feel rather foolish if the Germans, pricked to the ballot-boxes by Allied bayonets, exercised their free democratic votes in choosing something quite different, while chanting Clause 3 of the Atlantic Charter instead of the Horst Wessel song.

*Why need the British Commonwealth of Nations be the only International Club ?*

Before leaving the subject of " Politics ", there is one more item which should, I think, be on the agenda of the Peace-makers. It might be called " International Clubs ". The phenomenon of the British Commonwealth, a voluntary union of self-governing peoples, must needs make us enquire whether something of the same sort could not be set up in Europe. It is true the basis of a common race and language

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would be lacking. But it is by no means certain that race and language are any longer the true foundation of the British Empire. General Smuts, for one, could hardly be expected to think so, or the French of Quebec. And have not the Indian peoples been promised full membership at the first moment they can agree among themselves? Personally I have never seen why membership of the British Commonwealth should not be thrown open to any people who are prepared to abide by the Club Rules. (It was, in fact, offered to the French in 1940, but refused.) The real basis, to-day, would seem to be not race and language, but a common political ideal of freedom and self-government.

Now one thing is certain; you cannot run a successful Club if membership is compulsory, and, all-powerful as the United Nations will be at the Armistice, it would be futile for them to think of attempting to organise anything of the sort, in Europe or elsewhere. But — and this is why I believe public opinion should insist on the subject being placed on the agenda — the Allies ought certainly to welcome and encourage the idea. Because their job will be peace-making, and the more nations can be induced to sink some part of their nationalism, and surrender some part of their sovereignty, for the sake of forming a first-class Club, the easier will peace-making be.

What inducements could the Peace-makers hold out? Well, as has been said above, in imposing upon the world a Police Force and a Criminal Code, the United Nations, or rather the Big Four, will be behaving in a very high-handed and undemocratic way. They will be acting, at the outbreak of peace, as governments have to act domestically on the outbreak of war. But as the years go by and things settle down, it will be necessary to find a broader basis for both the Police and the law it will enforce. All nations, big and small, will expect a voice in the direction, and a share in the execution, of the policy of the World Commission of the Peace. But it is highly unlikely that all can be allowed to have it. The League

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of Nations exposed the weaknesses of nationhood suffrage — one nation one vote (or, to make it quite clear to the celebrated British working-man who was puzzled over manhood suffrage — “one bloody nation, one bloody vote”). But the difficulty would be greatly lessened if groups of nations had organised themselves into clubs, federations, confederations or unions with a common political authority in all external affairs. If the Central Union<sup>1</sup> in Europe, for instance (comprising Poland, Hungary and all the Baltic and Balkan States), or a South American Federation were to come into being, such powerful groups would undoubtedly be entitled to representation on the World Commission with Class I rights and obligations.

So that the inducement would take the form of a promise, by the paramount Powers who will also be the Peace-makers, of admission to full and equal partnership in all World Authorities to be set up by them, for any international Group or Union capable of satisfying certain tests. The tests would have regard to the coherence and proved political stability of the groups, as well as to their size, and could legitimately include some democratic shibboleths. They should not be — and obviously could not be — hard and fast and pre-determined. But just as, without being able to describe an elephant in a single correct anatomical or biological term, I know one when I see one, so it can safely be assumed that, without being able to prescribe on paper the attributes of a first-class Club, the Big Four will know one when they see one.

And if, at the Peace Conference, they feel the whole thing is a bit beyond them, and decide after all to do nothing about the item “Clubs” except scratch it out, they may find themselves changing their minds again when they turn, with a groan, to the next main heading on their agenda papers :

<sup>1</sup> See *Central Union*, by G. Harrison and P. Jordan. British Continental Syndicate Ltd., 1 Cheapside, Fortis Green, N.2.

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### 4. ECONOMICS

Well may they groan. How surprised the Greeks would have been, could they have foreseen that their word for Household Management would, more than two thousand years later and in a tongue not yet invented, become the most devastatingly boring word in the world. It makes one feel tired even to write it down. How much more tired will it make the already weary statesmen feel when they come to it after a long hot day listening to the Russian delegate explaining how "freedom" must surely include freedom to imprison people who don't agree with you.

The Big Three at the last Peace Conference avoided this fatigue by leaving out "Economics" altogether, with the consequences which Lord Keynes prophesied and we have experienced. Or at any rate they limited the subject to fixing the amount of Reparations, or rather to accepting the amount fixed for them by the then Governor of the Bank of England, and he in turn evaded undue fatigue by accepting a figure which came to him in church.<sup>1</sup> And that was that.

And now I am going to postpone the bad quarter of an hour when "Economics" must be tackled, and play for time, by embarking on another digression. But not, I think, an entirely irrelevant one.

#### *A Digression on Materialism*

For the last decade or so we have had it dinned into us by serious-minded people, and especially by the Churches, that we Westerners live our lives sunk in what they call materialism. They do not exactly define materialism, but broadly it appears to mean that we have lost all sense of

<sup>1</sup> I had this story from the late Mr. Robert H. Benson. According to him, when asked upon what basis he had calculated the total figure of Reparations, given by him to, and adopted by, Mr. Lloyd George, the late Lord Cunliffe replied: "Oh, it came to me in church."

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spiritual values and live only for such frivolities as beer or cocktails, sex and silk stockings, golf and the dog races. Rich and poor alike, we have but one aim — the attainment of ever more varied, complicated and refined sensual gratifications. And this materialism has made us soft, dissatisfied, envious, self-seeking and corrupt. And finally has set us at each others' throats and must be held chiefly, if not solely, responsible for the war.

In spite of appearances, I believe this reading of modern Western society to be profoundly untrue. What is wrong with the world, as it seems to me, is not that it is unconcerned with spiritual values, but that it is far too much concerned with them, only with the wrong ones. "Spiritual" must not be confused with "good". Pride, arrogance, the love of domination, Devil-worship, State-worship, these are all things of the spirit. The greatest war of religion ever fought is being waged to-day. Is that the result of materialism? Is it materialism which causes hundreds of thousands of young Nazis to think it the supreme honour to die in their boots for their Führer? or which forbids the Japs to surrender? or which impels Mr. Gandhi to instigate violence, which he hates? or which leads Irishmen into cherishing their hatred of England to the loss, not only of much material comfort, but of honour itself? These people are not thinking of movies and silk stockings; they are not even thinking of bread and butter. They are thinking of their religions — Hitler-worship, Emperor-worship, self-worship and the hatreds which go with all forms of fanaticism and intolerance. These black religions of theirs are lifting them out of themselves, making them count pleasure, comfort and ease as nought, and preferring to such things hardship, suffering, wounds and death. That is the devil of it — that the Devil is a spirit. If he were a materialist, we could buy him off with a good dinner and a cigar. Instead, he is going to and fro on the earth like a flaming sword. Voltaire said a supremely wise thing when he advised us to cultivate our gardens.



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Cabbages and peas are material things, and while the pleasure of making them grow may have a spiritual side to it, gardening must on the whole be classed as a material rather than a religious occupation. If the Germans and the Japs had gone in for cultivating their gardens instead of dreaming of dominion, might, majesty and power, the world would have been a lot better off. And what it needs to-day is a rest from "ideologies" and other spiritual excesses, and a little healthy gardening.

And after all, when you come to think of it, how many of us have even the opportunity of sinking into the materialistic morass of which we hear so much? The bulk of the populations, in all Western Europe and America as well, live far too laboriously, far too near the bone, to have the faintest chance of falling into that bog. It's a question for them of being fed, not over-fed, of having a play-time at all, not of frittering away their time in idle amusements. They too suffer from frustrations, resentments and hatreds — all spiritual evils, mind you — which a good house, a good garden and a little leisure for amusement would appease.

No, so far from materialism being the curse of the age, it seems to me that what we need is a homeopathic dose of it all round. "Give us this day our daily bread" has high authority as a prayer, but it seems to have gone out of fashion. "Give us this day our daily Rally; our daily flag-wagging; our daily trumpeting; our daily Victory; our daily Pogrom; our daily Goebbels; our daily Gayda" — these seem to be the characteristic prayers of our time, more's the pity. And all for things of the spirit, please observe.

And if you object that I have taken my examples of spiritual evil almost exclusively from our enemies, whereas the materialism which so much perturbs our Churches and moralists is home-grown, I can only reply that I seem to find plenty of perverse spirituality in the Western Democracies. Take, for instance, the betting craze, dog racing and football pools. People don't bet for the sake of the material things

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they buy with their winnings. (In the long run they don't have winnings, they have losses.) They bet for the spiritual excitement and exhilaration of it, and count their winter coat, or their children's shoes, well lost to their "Uncle" in return for the thrill they have had. Nothing flatters one's spiritual pride like picking a winner. Or take, on a very different plane, the Peace Pledge Union. Can perverted spirituality go to greater extremes than to impel a hundred thousand young men to pledge themselves to stand by with folded arms and watch Jews and Poles butchered, women raped, children torn from their parents, homes destroyed? The grossest materialist would be incapable of approaching the depth of selfishness and spiritual pride of these young men. Look at our passion for the movies. In a countryside I know of, even the men no longer cultivated their allotments before the war, but mounted their bicycles and were off to the neighbouring town with their children to be transported to the Wild West, or the South Sea Islands, or to some spiritual home far from the cabbages and carrots which might have fattened their gaunt frames. No, you must go back to the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries to find your materialism, to the days of guzzling and drunkenness, of thrift and husbandry, of stupor and contentment. To-day we are all for ideas, thrills, exhilarations, to the neglect of our cabbage patches.

And what, pray, has all this got to do with Peace-making? Well, I warned you I was to digress, but not wholly irrelevantly. The point I am trying to make is a double one. First, that what the peoples badly need is a dose of materialism, to bring them back to earth from their black religious and spiritual perversities, before your Churches can hope to change hearts and win acceptance for true spiritual values; and secondly, that it is idle to hope too much from economics alone.

After the experiences of the last Peace, when economics were neglected, there is likely to be this time a swing over

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to the other extreme. Already one hears it said that the secret of pacification must be looked for in the economic sphere. Give everybody plenty of raw materials, plenty of living-room, a share in the colonial empires, and we shall all be happy and peaceful. Well, as we have seen, modern man does not live by bread alone, not by a very long chalk ; and just as he prefers the thrills of the movies to growing broad beans in his private and individual life, so he prefers the excitement and exhilaration of Nationalism to a humdrum prosperity in his public and collective life. To convert him from these spiritual indulgences will not be a question of giving him raw materials ; it will be a question of patient, long drawn-out education, by people (where are they ?) who know what education should be. And it is supremely important that the Peace-makers should get this firmly into their heads. (Among which I include your head and my head, in so far as we help to form that public opinion which will, it is to be hoped, badger and bully the actual statesmen sitting in Berlin.)

And, with this warning, we and they can get down to seeing what can be done in practice towards administering the dose of materialism. Which brings us, after all this jibbing, bang up against Economics at last.

### *Economics at last*

The Atlantic Charter includes a dash of Economics when it promises all nations, victors and vanquished alike, access to raw materials. It sounds well ; but in actual fact it only promises them what, with a few minor exceptions, they have already. The favourite Axis division of the nations into the " Haves " and the " Have-nots " has no validity. It is as if I stood outside Selfridge's and cursed Mr. Selfridge for being a " Have ", instead of going inside and thanking him for selling me such excellent articles at so reasonable a price. So long as we, and the U.S.A. and the Dutch, and the other store-keeper nations are prepared, as we always were

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prepared, to take anybody's money for our tea, rubber, tin, coffee, copper, nickel and so on, and charge the same prices all round, the so-called "Have-nots" had no more reason to grumble than you and I because we don't happen to be grocers or ironmongers. No doubt grocers sometimes make profits, but at other times they make losses, and it must always be remembered, when "exploitation" is used as an international word of abuse, that the profits nowadays don't go into the pockets of the nations "owning" the territory, but of the shareholders of joint-stock companies whose shares, for the most part, can be freely bought by anybody, Christian, Jew or Infidel, who likes to send an order to his stockbroker. If you can't bear the idea of Unilevers having so much palm-oil, or the Shell Co. so much oil, when you have none, you can buy a few shares and put yourself behind the counter.

No, the trouble in the past has been, not that foodstuffs and raw material were not available, but that the peoples who needed them most had no means of paying for them. Selfridge's windows may be stocked with goods, all most reasonably priced, but if you have no money in your pocket, little good that is to you.

Since the last war we have seen the atrocious spectacle of wheat being burnt and coffee thrown into the sea while millions — more particularly in China — were dying of starvation. The Chinese had nothing to offer in exchange, and the more they starved the less able were they to make, borrow or beg some exchangeable commodity which would be accepted by the American farmers who were burning their wheat, or the Brazilian growers who were drowning their coffee.

Here then is a problem for the Peace-makers to solve if they can.

Is there any solution? It has always been a commerical tradition, if your customers are temporarily hard up, but respectable, hard-working people, to give them long credits,

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thus enabling them to carry on until they have made and saved enough to pay you for both goods and credit. But there was never a credit or banking system strong enough, or optimistic enough, to finance the carrying of wheat from the American prairies to the central provinces of China. The Chinese peasant has always been respectable and hard-working, but what chance has he, with his primitive implements, and those solely agricultural, of growing anything which the American wheat farmer is likely to want or value ? The more indigent people are, the less credit-worthy must they be, with the result that no existing credit institution can be expected to break down the impasse.

### *One up to the Americans*

But this war has seen a new principle in actual working, probably for the first time in world history. I refer of course to " Lease-Lend ". The name " Lease-Lend " was coined to get over certain technical difficulties of a constitutional nature ; actually, as everybody knows, it means that the Americans are making free gifts of gigantic sums to the cause of the United Nations, on the honourable understanding that we shall repay as much, and only as much, as we conveniently can. Lease-Lend gives rise to no great war debt of the kind which so greatly embarrassed Anglo-American relations after the last war. We sign no bonds, we mortgage no assets. Now the Americans are a hard-headed people. And it is no disparagement of the imaginative generosity of Lease-Lend to say that, in the long run, they saw it would be good business. Because it is always good business to save your own life.

And would it not be good business for the world at large to save, not merely its physical life, but that moral life which was disgraced and degraded by the state of affairs I have described ? (Because it *was* disgraceful and degrading that a so-called civilisation should tolerate such a monstrosity as burning food while millions starved.) If the Peace-makers

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take that view, it should not be beyond them to organise a World Lease-Lend Institution which would give long credits to the indigent peoples to enable them to buy not only food, but the tools and materials through which they could come by the means of repayment.

It would have to be backed by all the commercial and industrial nations underwriting its liabilities according to their means. This is not the place to go into details. But its main object would be, working hand in hand with a Commodity Survey Board (or some such international committee whose duty would be to know what countries had things to sell and what countries were short of them), to see that no deserving buyer had to go without solely for lack of any means of payment. And its advances would be made strictly on the American Lease-Lend pattern, which means, repay if and when you can, but no debt to be created. And if you ask me "How will it get the dollars?" I must refer you to the White Paper embodying Lord Keynes' "Bancor" Scheme. (But I am too old a hand to be drawn into a discussion of that.)

The object of the Peace-makers should be, as I have said, to wipe out a disgrace. But it is by no means certain that in the long run such an Institution would not be good business, in the ordinary sense of the word. Its work would be analogous to land reclamation. For long slow years you laboriously build a sea-wall, with immense expenditure and no return; but at long last you have your valuable saltings. And it would be directly linked-up with Peace-making, whether you hold, with many, that poverty and misery breed wars, or think with me, that a little moderate prosperity inclines men to healthy "materialism", and damps down those spiritual ardours which too often seem to turn black. "Cultivate your gardens" is admirable advice, but more likely to be taken if accompanied by a loan of tools, and a full manure-cart, on "Lease-Lend" terms.

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### *No World Planning, but—*

Let us imagine, then, that the distinguished statesmen at the Conference table, having had this need for an International Lease-Lend Institution explained to them by Lord Keynes or some other warm-hearted expert (did you know that one or two economists have even been known to fall in love and marry ?), decide to do something about it. Some tiresome delegate is sure to say : “ Wait a minute. Didn’t Lord Keynes slip in something about a World Commodity Survey Board which would have to go hand in hand with your Lease-Lend thingummy-bob ? What Board is that ? It smacks to me of World Planning, and I thought we had agreed, Mr. Chairman, to stick to Peace-making here, and not get tied up in all these Planning ideas ? ”

Whereupon Lord Keynes — or whoever it may be — is recalled, and explains that the Survey Board is a perfectly harmless affair — no World Planning about it whatever — just a committee of people who know the ropes about commodities (yes, there’ll be an American member, of course, and a Russian — yes, and Dr. . . . Dr. . . . never can remember these Chinese names, but he’s a very good man) to collect statistics and make surveys, and find out where things are produced, and where they ought to be produced and so on. And the Chairman says : “ I don’t think we need be afraid of that,” and Lord Keynes goes off and sets up his committee and the first sod for World Planning has been turned without frightening anybody.

And the tiresome delegate says : “ Well, that’s all right, and I don’t want you to think me obstructive, only you know, this World Planning is so frightfully unrealistic. When you look at the strength of nationalistic feelings everywhere, especially where economic questions are concerned — it’s simply childish to think that we can get anything really co-operative going. That will take years. We’re strong enough to impose Peace by force ; and we big boys are rich

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enough on our own to start your Lease-Lend show. But that's about all we can do."

And, as was pointed out earlier in the section on Reparations, there's a lot in what the tiresome delegate says. World Planning depends more upon working people being ready to face painful dislocations than upon the Peace-makers being ready to set up International Planning Committees.

### *—A Little Common Sense*

But if the Lord Keyneses — by which I mean the experts who combine hearts and imagination with brains — know what they are about, they will take a hint from the way he got his World Commodity Survey Board, and try it on again. World Planning will never be mentioned. But from time to time, just as they are gathering up their papers, they will say something of this sort: "By the by, Shipping. We've been having some talks with the Americans and the Norwegians about that, and that Dutch authority was there too, and that clever Greek chap, what's-his-name. We thought of having some sort of permanent committee to see that what ships the U-boats have left — and all this new tonnage coming along — is put to the best use. You probably heard of that absurd case of the Atlantic liners — plying half empty, at cut rates which don't pay. We could stop all that sort of thing. Naturally we shall have to ask for some powers; *we* can't order the shipowners about, but you could. And as you're all together here — and it's really rather urgent — we thought perhaps —" and so on. And if the Peace Conference, with the picture before them, don't agree to tell that committee to go ahead and that they will make it a matter of confidence in their respective parliaments (those that have them), I'll eat my hat. And note this: it's not a World Committee. The members are drawn from those nations who have the most knowledge of, and interest in, ships. Nobody need feel affronted at being left out, and quite small nations, like Norway, will find themselves sitting as acknow-



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ledged authorities on the subject alongside the big ones. The test of membership will be knowledge and interest and nothing else.

Nor will there be any demand for a surrender of sovereignty. If Parliament can give orders to British ship-owners, it can authorise a committee — even if there is a Norwegian and Dutchman on the panel — to give these orders on its behalf. And the same is true of Congress and any other democratic body.

And so another day the Peace Conference will be asked in the same casual manner: "What about Civil Aviation? The place is getting cluttered up with National Air Lines, all talking big about prestige and honour — dash it, you might think there was another war on! We've been doing a little surveying, and know pretty well where people want to fly to, and how many at a time, and the best take-off and landing-places. And if you would let us and the Americans and that Russian bloke and the Dutchman — oh yes, and a South African and an Indian — did I say an Australian? — if you would let us form a kind of Shipping Committee — only for aircraft — there's a precedent you know — with the same sort of powers——" And, depend on it, the Conference will be only too thankful to say, "Go to it." Even a Peace Conference wants a little peace, and if early signs mean anything, the rows over Civil Aviation and air routes are going to be noisy ones. And next will come European Rail Transport — a committee which you might think could dispense with an American member, but you will be wrong. All railway committees have American members whether they like it or not. And after that, the Continental Canal Committee. And one day one of the foreign delegates will hold up his hand and say: "Plees, may I spik?" and he will tell the Conference that his friends have been studying the Tennessee Valley Authority, and that they would like a Committee of Danubian States to see if the Danube couldn't be harnessed and made to do a bit of work in its old age,

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instead of just flowing and looking blue. And the Chairman will be crusty and say : “ Oh, hell ! what’s that got to do with *us* ? ” and after that the smaller nations will just form their own committees, and endow them with powers, without bothering the Peace-makers. Because once a practical and sensible plan gets going, it soon becomes fashionable. And there’s no economic subject of interest to two or more nations to which the joint-committee habit might not spread. Because it will be done quietly ; the necessary powers will be asked for *ad hoc*, “ just to get a special job done ”, and so the press and parliaments will have no cause to shout about sacrificing national interests, surrender of sovereignty and so on. But the committees will soon find that they cannot work each on its own ; the shipping men will discover that you can’t plan sea routes if you know nothing of air routes ; the railway men will find that railways have a way of coming to a sudden stop when they reach the sea — and if there’s no ship there, where are you ? And the wireless man (did I mention the Broadcasting and Communications Committee ?) will have to plan with the cables men, and both with the Post Office men. So what with joint committees, and co-ordinating committees, which will soon be indispensable, there will be a real and horrible danger of a World Co-ordinating Committee. And let us hope that will be avoided at all costs, or if it cannot be dispensed with, may it be called the Friday Committee, and kept very dark indeed. For if the cat got out of the bag, the politicians might wake up to the fact that there had been some World Planning going on after all. And some of our Tories and half the American Senate would fall down dead, and there would be a dreadful hullabaloo. The fact remains, however, that you can get people to co-operate for a particular job, provided you don’t frighten them into thinking they are surrendering their precious sovereignties or principles. But when you have counted up all the jobs which need doing in a modern civilised world, shipping, transport, air-ways, communications, in fact all the public services, as

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well as the survey and allocation of commodities and raw materials to the people who need them, and the provision of long credits to those who, needing them, yet cannot pay for them, you will find the sum-total of "special jobs" has covered a good deal of ground. But if the committees are chosen on the grounds of skill and experience alone, without regard to "national" claims or jealousies, there is no reason why they should not work together quietly and efficiently. They will have to have full powers, of course. But it will be easier for shipowners to take orders from a strong committee of international shipping experts than from the Board of Trade, and the "controls" we dislike so much when they are exercised by our own civil servants, or by the big business men who are always, however unjustly, suspected of having axes to grind, will be more acceptable in the hands of whole-time experts serving on what will be, after all, a decidedly august executive instrument. It goes without saying that if Lord Mauretania is to sit on the committee, he must sever his connection with shipping lines. If that means £10,000 a year for him, no matter. It will be money well spent.<sup>1</sup>

### *"Doings first, Feelings afterwards"*

If you did not skip the chapter on "The Cause of War" you may remember that I there evoked Mrs. Ewing's small boy, and remarked that there were certain "doings" of governments which might conceivably lead to "feelings afterwards". What I had in mind was this very method of collaboration, not through any form of political union or federation, but by sharing certain specific tasks. These would be "doings" which would place no undue strain on our nationalistic prejudices. A government could hardly be accused of betraying the national interests because it backed an inter-

<sup>1</sup> I am largely indebted for the foregoing pages on *ad hoc* International Committees to Professor D. Mitrany's pamphlet *A Working Peace System* (The Royal Institute of International Affairs), which all of us should, and few of us will, alas, read.

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national committee which saw to it that ships were being used to the best advantage. But habit is one of the strongest things in the world, and if, as the years went by, we got into the habit of tackling our economic problems through these expert committees, it may be that in the fulness of time we should find our nationalistic prejudices growing more elastic and beginning to stretch. Governments would habitually view the economic problems dealt with by these committees through the eyes of the committees themselves, which would be international, not national eyes. If a troublesome international question arose, they would be inclined to shove it into a new committee, much as in domestic affairs they shove a knotty point onto a Royal Commission. The ruling passion of all governments is to avoid responsibility at awkward corners, and here would be a new means of escape. But if governments once got the habit of using international spectacles for viewing world affairs, the habit would soon spread to parliaments, thence to the press and the broadcasting instruments, and finally down to the people themselves. And from this habit, "feelings" might be induced. Feelings that after all the nations were a family party. And once we began to feel that, there's no knowing to what lengths of co-operation we might not go.

### *"Smoot"*

I have only headed this paragraph "Smoot", because that is what the Chairman of the Conference may possibly write on the margin of his agenda paper to remind himself that the next item will greatly interest the American Senate, and that he must watch his step; for the item is that resolution of which, a few pages back, the Balkanian delegate gave notice, making it a criminal offence under the World Code to erect Trade Barriers. (The Balkanian delegate, of course, will have no say in the Provisional Peace Settlement. But he will presumably be called in from time to time by the Big Four to give them the Balkanian point of view. And

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he will be permitted, it seems, even to make suggestions — although not, of course, to vote upon them.)

The Balkanian's argument will be a simple one. "We are all agreed," he will say, "that our cupboards are devilish bare. We are all out to produce, and get into the hands of the consumer, as much of everything as possible. Then why put any obstacles into the free flow of goods from the places where they are produced to the places where people are greedy to consume them?" Put like that, of course, the argument seems unanswerable. But it makes one big assumption which, unhappily, cannot be sustained as things are to-day in the world. For it assumes that everything which world-industry produces, world-consumption can absorb. It is possible that, for a short period after the war, when nearly everybody will be short of everything, and a vast quantity of material damage is there to be repaired, his assumption will be true. And during that period it will be impossible to find a valid argument against universal free trade. But once the cupboards have been re-stocked, the old problems of under-consumption here, and over-production there, will inevitably arise unless and until World Planning becomes a reality. And since, whoever the statesmen at the Peace Conference may be, I think you can take it that they will not be World Planners (or, even if they are at heart, will not consider it a suitable subject for an urgent Peace-making agenda), I suspect that the Chairman will reply to the Balkanian somewhat after this sort: "My dear sir, please don't use the phrase 'Trade Barriers'. They sound so indefensible. The British nowadays call it Safeguarding of Industries. That change of name had an almost magical effect in Britain before the war, — even the oldest Free Trade dogs just growled and lay down quietly — and it will help us if we stick to it. Because the fact is, and we have got to face it, that there are too many people to-day making cotton goods, and too many making steel, and too many making artificial silk and so on. Too many, that is, for the consumers who can afford

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to buy those things. And what makes the position worse is, that a lot of that steel and cotton goods and silk and so on is being made in the wrong places — where the raw materials are not to hand, and that makes them too expensive for the poorer consumers. And then there's the different standards of living complicating matters. The Jap textile workers are so obstinate about being able to live on a handful of rice, and the Lancashire workers equally obstinate about not being able to live on a handful of rice. So you can't expect Lancashire to make textiles as cheaply as the Japs. It's all very well for your World Planners to say Lancashire must go out of the textile business — what will the Lancashire workers have to say to that? We're all for World Planning in principle — just as we're all for universal Free Trade — but it doesn't lie in the hands of us statesmen. We could make a plan, no doubt. But it's the workers who will, in the first event, suffer from it, and it's the workers who will have to accept it if it's ever to come to anything. Which means a degree of education, and a readiness to make very real and painful sacrifices, which you can hardly expect them to achieve as yet. Certainly not over-night.

“ No, I'm afraid if we made it an offence to erect Trade Barriers — I mean, that is, to Safeguard Industries — we should be up against a much more formidable crowd than the American Senators. We should be up against the working people, and their bread and butter, and their love of home and their dislike of migration, all the likes and dislikes, in fact, which you and I share with them.

“ But I tell you what you could do. You Balkanians and your neighbours are not very highly industrialised, you are largely agricultural. There's not the least reason why these Safeguarding fences — which, alas, we are not prepared to pull down altogether — should follow your national boundaries as they do to-day. Safeguarding fences are intended to enclose industries, not races and languages. To put a tariff wall round a field because the people who live in it speak

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Bulgarian and have a Slavonic origin doesn't make sense. And you'll all have to grow a great deal fatter than you are before you find yourselves over-producing food, and even then you can send it to the Chinese. Besides, more than half the goods you can do with aren't manufactured in your part of the world at all. The more freely they flow in to you the better. Why don't you and your neighbours put your heads together and find out what is the largest area which can absorb the goods made by the industries inside that area? And then, if you find cheaper foreign goods of the same kind coming in (manufactured on rice, let us say) to an extent which spoils the market for those industries of yours, you can put a Safeguarding fence round the whole area. It will save you all the irritations and hold-ups of those ridiculous fences you now have round your languages. And if you say, 'Yes, but what about our revenues?', have you never heard of excise, or income-tax? And you needn't have a political union, if you prefer being old-fashioned. A customs union is a perfectly practicable thing, like a postal or a currency union, without any fear of damage to your precious sovereignties. And we Peace-makers will back you all the way; because although, for the reasons I have given you, we can't pull down the fences altogether, the fewer there are of them, and the less they are used to enclose political instead of economic areas, the better it will serve our peace-making aims."

Upon which the Chairman will look round for signs of assent, and find all the delegates asleep. Because the world is made up of Free Traders who go to sleep when Safeguarding is mentioned, and Protectionists who go to sleep when Free Trade is mentioned, but mainly of ordinary people who go to sleep when either are mentioned. But if by chance you haven't fallen asleep over this dreary speech of the Chairman's, you might (as one of the Powers behind the Peace-makers) try to make up your mind as to which of the following courses you favour :

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- (a) To go ahead with World Planning now, risking the rows that will ensue for the sake of the ultimate benefits it will bring (in which case you had better urge the Peace-makers to include Safeguarding among the criminal offences which the World Police will have to suppress); or
- (b) Forbid Safeguarding during the immediate post-war period when over-production of anything is almost unthinkable, but when Habit and the Senate may very well cling to it none the less : that is, make it a criminal offence to safeguard until such time as unemployment and economic disequilibrium force the World Commission to repeal the veto ; or
- (c) Leave things as they are, as the Chairman recommends, and depend upon the committees, and education, and the growth of common sense and, perhaps, the mitigating effects of the Lease-Lend Institution, to lead the world gently towards a more reasonable outlook.

But if you decide for (c), you might at least send a post-card to your Member (and a letter to your local paper) to say that unless he backs the committees and the Lease-Lend Institution it will be the worse for him, by one vote at any rate, at the next election. Members of Parliament, in the last resort, are the only people who can get things done. Only they must be bullied and threatened, which in point of fact they rather like, as it gives them a lead. Have I said this before ? I have. But as regards the Chairman's advice to the Balkanian delegate, however much you agree with it, there's not much you can do about it. There are some things, people, even foreigners, must be left to do for themselves. But it might do you no harm to reflect on it for a little ; to reflect, that is, on the curious fact that our own Safeguarding fence follows the capes and headlands and bays and other indentations and serrations of the British Isles. The reason being that inside that complicated outline we all speak



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English (when it isn't Scots or Welsh or Lancashire) and are subjects of King George. Which seems a queer reason for erecting a fence which has nothing whatever to do with our speech or our allegiance, but only with economics. (It is quite an interesting game to see how big an area that fence *might* enclose, with no hurt to anybody and much advantage. Because the bigger the area, the fewer the fences; and the fewer the fences, the freer the flow. Which sounds, by the by, like a slogan — and you might have a worse one.)

### *A Shocking Affair*

And now, thank goodness, the Peace-makers have finished. But a sudden storm arises which threatens for a time to upset their efforts at appeasement. In many parts of Europe, in the liberated as well as the vanquished countries, economic revolution breaks out. All sorts of shocking things are done. Land is nationalised; banks are nationalised; collective farming is instituted; every kind of wild experiment is being tried. And in the Western Democracies there is great consternation and alarm. True, these European peoples are totally disarmed, and for that reason not only are revolting without riots or bloodshed, but couldn't impose these mad schemes outside their own borders even should they wish to. "No, but think of the bad example it is," shrieks the press. To which it will be no good replying that if these schemes are in fact so mad, bad, shocking and fraught with disaster, they will be in point of fact a very good example, — of what to avoid. When people are frightened (and some of us will be very frightened) it's no good arguing with them. And while these economic revolutions rage in Europe, and the Right and Left parties in this country and America roar and ramp about them at home, it will be a miracle if the noise doesn't disturb the Peace-makers pretty seriously. And there will be pressure put upon them to do something about it. "You are the Big Four," they will be told; "you occupy Europe with your Police contingents; you have absolute power;

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why don't you veto all these revolutionary goings-on? Do you want to see us all Bolshevised?" And after the Chairman has explained to his Russian colleague that "Bolshevised" is only pretty Fanny's way, and no offence meant, the Balkanian delegate will no doubt turn up again like a bad halfpenny and begin his grumbles once more. "How can you expect Europe," he will ask, "to keep quiet and refrain from economic revolutions when Great Britain sets them such a bad example? Here are the British, whom we always regard as patterns of conservative moderation, carrying through one of the greatest social revolutions ever witnessed, and with such low cunning on the part of the revolutionaries, that most of them don't even know it has happened? Who would have thought that Britain, the home of the wealthy, the country of unequal incomes, would have abolished personal wealth almost over-night? And by such a simple expedient, too! No riots, no barricades, no tumbrils; just a ten-shilling-in-the-pound income-tax and a graduated super-tax, with E.P.T. to look after the joint-stock companies! Why, there isn't a rich man left in Britain; not what the Americans would call a rich man. It's true you can still have £6000 a year to spend, if your gross income is about £250,000 a year. But even in Britain that was an exceptional figure. And taken lying down, too. Not a grumble, not a murmur."

"That," will reply the British delegate, "is because we had to destroy Hitler."

"But now that he is destroyed, you will find that there are other things almost as bad. Your slums, for instance. You didn't know much about them, did you, till you had the evacuees in your homes? And poverty — now that you all have to look at both sides of a half-crown you will begin to sympathise with people who have to look at both sides of a halfpenny. And ignorance — having discovered that hundreds of young men in forgotten hamlets failed to join the Home Guard because they had never heard of Hitler,

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you will be keener on education than you used to be. If I know you slow-moving but practical people, you will decide to make war on these things as you did on Hitler — in the end. And these wars will cost money. So that your income-tax and your super-tax and your E.P.T. will have to be prolonged, to fight these wars. And by the time they are over, and slums and poverty and ignorance are beaten, you will be so used to living in smaller houses and keeping fewer servants, that you will have lost the habit of wealth. And you will have so enjoyed the holiday from the hard work of looking after your mansions and grounds and retainers and town houses and yachts that you will be reluctant to go back to it. And so your social revolution will be well under way. And then how the devil do you expect us Europeans, with that spectacle before our eyes, to be able to keep our own people from revolving likewise ? ”

Upon which the British delegate will declare that he never heard such nonsense in his life. But his colleagues, being foreigners, and susceptible to logic which would never deceive a hard-headed Briton, will agree that there is something in what the Balkanian has said, and that until Britain gives up having revolutions they don't quite see how they can come down heavy on Europe. And that in any case to suppress popular movements by force savours of Fascism, which after all is the very thing we have been fighting against. And although the Russian delegate will shake his head, and say it's all very well but what if the spectacle of all these revolutions in Europe should upset his own people, who have to do what they are told ? and wouldn't a firm hand be the best thing after all ? Still, in the end they will no doubt agree to resist the pressure from the frightened people at home, and let things rip, while they get on with their Peace-making. And if you think they are wrong, you will have to join the other frightened people and add your cries of alarm to theirs ; but if you have a steady nerve, and think the opportunity of seeing social and economic experiments tried out

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on foreign soil, where they can't affect you either way, is one not to be missed, you will back up the Peace-makers in their decision.

And now, thank goodness, I have done with Economics, although, to be frank, I'm afraid it will be a long time before Economics have done with you and me. Like a poor and neglected relation, once they have been allowed to come and plague us, I'm afraid they will come again and again. Man has, unfortunately, certain basic needs which it is the business of Economics to satisfy, and until they are satisfied, we shall have to go on being bored stiff. One way out, of course, would be to satisfy them. But that would mean World Planning. Which in turn would mean thought and effort. And who wouldn't rather be bored than use his brains ?

### 5. HOW LONG SHALL WE BE EX-ENEMIES ?

When the Peace-makers, after a period of patient trial and error, at length declare their labours done, and the world pacified, someone may ask them "With whom are we at peace ?" Unless the answer can be "With everybody," their job will not be done. But if the answer is "With everybody," then "everybody" must obviously include the vanquished nations, probably officially known throughout the Peace-making period as "ex-enemies". Now the Peace-making period, if we are to avoid the mistakes made last time through working under pressure and going for "peace at any price", may have to be a very long one. Frontiers, for instance, are almost certain to need revision after a "try out". The instructions to the Frontier Commissioners to have regard to the wishes of the population, and also to race and language, are almost bound to lead to some mistakes. Because what populations wish immediately after a savage war is by no means certain to be what they wish five years later. After a war, hatreds and nationalistic feelings are

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the ruling passions; later, peoples may be more interested in living under what they consider a more enlightened administration. Even the language test is likely to lead the Frontier Commissioners astray. There was a case, after the last war, when in a plebiscite where 46 per cent of the voters spoke Polish, only 2 per cent voted for union with Poland.

So that it will not be surprising if the final Peace arrangements are held up for five years, seven years — perhaps ten years. Are the Germans and their satellites to remain official “ex-enemies” during the whole period?

So long as we have to occupy their countries, and impose restrictions on their freedom of choosing and operating their political systems, they will still be, for all practical purposes, “ex-enemies”, call them what we may. But everybody concerned will be anxious to cut this period of occupation as short as possible. The victors, because it will mean vast expense with little chance of recouping themselves, and the vanquished for obvious reasons.

Of course, if a World Police is established in quick time, prolonged occupation will be unnecessary. The Police will not only see to it that there is no secret rearmament, but, if given an adequate Code to administer, will be in a position to keep the political systems on the rails. So that long before the Peace-makers had finally adjusted territorial and economic questions, there would be no valid reason for treating the vanquished peoples as enemies at all.

But even failing a W.P.F., there is a great deal to be said for getting rid of the “ex-enemy” taint as soon as practicable. Peace, if it is to be a real one, cannot be just a state of not being at war. It must warrant some measure of mutual tolerance, if not of active goodwill.

But an early dropping of the official designation of “ex-enemy” will not go very far, though good in itself. The test will be, not what we call the Germans, but how we treat them.

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### *The Ruhr*

Let me take as an illustration, the Ruhr. A suggestion has been put forward on very high authority that the Ruhr industries should be denationalised, or internationalised, after this war. The idea is, of course, to deprive Germany of the means of making armaments (of the 1944 type). If we have a Police Force, that reason goes by the board, but if we are foolish enough once again to do without Police, there is sure to be widespread support for the plan. Because we have already experienced the difficulty, in fact, the impossibility, of preventing rearmament through inspection and supervision alone. Allies, in a world of national armaments and security years, just cannot and do not hold together firmly enough or long enough to keep a third party down for all time. To take away the workshops where the weapons are made is decidedly a better idea. But the result we shall have to face is that, whether we go on calling the Germans "ex-enemies" or not, we shall be *their* "ex-enemies" till all's blue. It takes two to make a real peace, although one, kneeling on the other's stomach, can make him call "Pax!"; and if a large industrial population, like that of the Ruhr, is to live in a sort of no-man's-land, not from any choice of theirs but because their beautiful Vaterland can't be trusted, well — they are not going to regard us as friends. And we are making a present of the Ruhr as the new "running sore", "intolerable humiliation" and all the rest of it to the next generation's Hitlers and Goebbelses.

All of which we must cheerfully lump if there is no other means of holding Germany down. But we must face up to it that in such case, however much we may talk about making friends, the Germans will not; nor would you and I if in their shoes.

With a Police Force, on the other hand, there does not seem to be any reason for treating the Germans differently from other peoples. There will be some reparations to be

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made, and the lowest place for Germany on the Allies' "priority" list for re-stocking Europe. But, having drawn their teeth and established security for all, I can see no sense in prolonging the "ex-enemy" period, and a good deal of sense in trying to make friends.

I am not writing these words for the Bishop of Chichester and those true Christians who want us to love our enemies because we have been enjoined to do so by the Greatest Psychologist Who ever lived, — as we must, whatever our creed, admit. I am writing them for myself, and those of you like me, who have such black, vengeful hearts that, for my part, I have often felt like throwing something at the Bishop of Chichester's head for being so inhumanly Christian. Knowing in one's bones that the man is right, only makes him the more provoking. I don't love the Germans, and there it is ; but if I can see how sensible it would be to try, at least, to make friends, I may be making a bigger contribution to real peace than I know. The response to a gesture of friendship, even though made reluctantly and only from policy, might conceivably surprise us all.

## 6. COLONIES

This war differs from the last in one respect, that we have no conquered German Colonies to dispose of. But we have some of Italy's, and are likely to end up with some of Japan's. So "Colonies" will figure on the Peace-makers' agenda once again. I cannot at the moment remember what happened to the League of Nations one used to hear so much about. But if I am right in thinking that the less the League is mentioned the better, it may not be so easy for the Chairman to write "Mandates" against the item "Colonies", and pass on.

On the assumption that Tripolitania and Libya and Eritrea and the Japanese-owned islands in the Pacific are not auto-

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matically to pass under the League's mandate, or alternatively that you and I and Public Opinion generally are damned if they shall without fresh consideration, let us see if we can agree upon any principles worth passing on, with or without threatening letters, to the Peace-makers. Where Colonies have been filched from their lawful owners by conquest, as Abyssinia was filched by Mussolini, I have no doubt you will agree with me that they must be restored. (Hear hear!) Abyssinia has, in fact, already been so restored. Anything else would have been unthinkable. And Libya of course will have to be given back to the Libyans?

"Of course; — no, wait a minute, are there any Libyans? Didn't Libya belong to Italy? I mean, she colonised it, didn't she?"

"Certainly she did, after dropping a few Libyan notables out of aeroplanes *pour encourager les autres*, and dispossessing the inhabitants."

"Then I suppose the Libyans ought to have it — let's put Libya down for the Libyans."

"And what about Tripolitania?"

"Oh well, Tripoli's practically a European city — that really did belong to Italy, didn't it?"

"By right of conquest only. Through unprovoked aggression. She filched it from Turkey exactly as she filched Abyssinia, only about thirty years earlier."

"How very shocking! Then Tripoli, too, must be given back to the owners."

"To the Turks? They also conquered it."

"Oh no, to the — Arabs, aren't they?"

"Arabs, Berbers, Negroes — very mixed lot."

"Well, they must have it."

"And Italian Somaliland to the Somalis?"

"Of course."

"And French Somaliland?"

"Of course."

"And British Somaliland?"



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"Of course — no, I mean of course not. That's quite different. It's a British Colony."

I think it would be more tactful not to pursue this line of argument any further. Many things are done which ought not to be done, but cannot be undone. Since there is no International Law of Real Property which fixes the period after which a prescriptive right to ownership arises in the matter of filched territories, it is as well to realise that it won't be easy to find a general principle to guide us in the disposal of these Colonies.

The Peace-makers could hardly announce that successful aggression would be officially recognised after ten, fifteen or twenty-five years. And yet where substantial colonisations have taken place, deserts irrigated, swamps drained, every kind of material improvement made out of the aggressor's pocket, you can hardly order the colonists out and hand over their homes to the original possessors of a barren, unproductive land. It is one of those cases where two wrongs would most decidedly not make a right.

The only positive advice I think we can and should give the Peace-makers on this thorny question is, "Make no promises; go slow; and experiment". It was promises — two contradictory promises — which made the Palestine settlement to this very day almost insoluble. But the Peace-makers may reply, "How can you embody 'experiments' in a Peace Treaty? Somebody must be made responsible for the places. They can't remain 'in the air' for years, while the United Nations are making up their cautious minds."

Which is true enough. Somebody must be made responsible. Only, remembering Danzig, for heaven's sake don't let it be the League of Nations (if, after all, that shame-faced entity is still lurking somewhere in the background). So why not take a bold decision while we are about it and set up a new Authority to take charge of these war-babies while their future is being slowly determined, by trial and

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error ? And why not go further ; why not see whether, after all, we could not use that new Authority to settle, not only the legacies of this war but some of the awkward Colonial questions which have often disturbed the amity of nations before, and may well do so again.

### *Prestige, not Profit*

To possess Colonies in Africa has for long been a matter of prestige with European nations, rather than one of profit. Profits there have been ; but they have gone, for the most part, into the pockets of joint-stock companies (always excepting the late King Leopold) whose shares could be bought on the European stock exchanges. Governments — and certainly the British Government — have not, as widely believed, made money out of them. On the other hand, just before the outbreak of the present war, the African Colonies of the European Powers, taken as a whole, appear to have been self-supporting. With few exceptions they were able to pay for their own administration.<sup>1</sup> But so long as it remains a matter of prestige to possess a Colony in Africa, so long will the lives and destinies of the Africans be bones of contention in far-away Europe. Hitler pretended he was not much interested in Colonies ; but Graf von Schnee was, and there was a powerful association in Germany working for the return of Tanganyika, West Africa and the Cameroons to the Vaterland. That, of course, can never be allowed. But cannot this “ prestige ” business, with the malaise it gives rise to in the dispossessed or “ Have-not ” nations, be got rid of once and for all, in a bold, but not unpractical, way ?

<sup>1</sup> Judging by figures in the *Statesman's Year Book*. Belgian and French budgets are shown to balance, but may not be reliable. Of course far more expenditure is needed for development. But the bigger the borrower, the greater his facilities.

## *Peace-Making*

*To whom does Africa "belong"?*

Before I dare make my proposal, I must ask you to accept the startling thesis that Africa belongs to the Africans. We have so long talked of the Congo "belonging" to Belgium, and Nigeria "belonging" to Great Britain, and so on, that it gives one quite a jolt to hear of anything "belonging" to the native Africans. And yet I suppose they might claim that to have inhabited a country since man's memory runs not to the contrary, as the lawyers have it, does give rise to a pretty good claim of ownership. And if you will admit this, and concede the principle that Africa belongs to the Africans, in spite of our presence there to cultivate and administer it, I feel emboldened to put forward the following suggestion.

Why should not "Africa" (with the exception, for obvious reasons, of the Union of South Africa, Egypt, Abyssinia, Morocco and Algiers, and the possible exception, for good if less obvious reasons, of Mozambique, the Rhodesias and the Mediterranean coast) be recognised as the country of the United African Peoples, "belonging" not to Britain, France, Belgium and so on, but to them, and unified under one Central Administration? (Now don't begin cheering, you Bloomsbury idealists, who believe all black men everywhere to be capable of self-government, and all white colonial governments to be slave-driving exploiters.) This Central Administration would be vested in a Board of Trustees, presided over by a Governor-General, and composed of representatives of the colonising powers. It would be known as the "Government of Africa", and the Board would consist, in the first place, of the existing Colonial Governors, presided over by the Senior Governor, or some specially chosen veteran with African experience. The United African Civil Service would be open to all the colonising nations, and the members of it available for service in any part of Africa, although in practice it would be found that, at first at all events, Englishmen would be posted to the

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former British, Belgians to the former Belgian, Colonies or Protectorates, and so on.

The advantages of such a change would be many. It would raise the worst of the present African Colonial administrations to the level of the best — and the best is very good indeed — through the insistence by the central government on unified practices, on equal cultural levels.

As things are to-day, if a Lyautey in French Morocco, or a Sir Donald Cameron in Tanganyika, makes a forward stride in Colonial practice, through increasing, not diminishing, the responsibility of native rulers, Morocco and Tanganyika benefit, but the Congo and Dahomey do not. But a central government could have insisted on such a forward stride being taken whenever native aptitudes made it suitable. There would be a free exchange of ideas and practice and a free interchange of "star" administrators, controlled by a central government, publicly pledged to consult native interests first, last and all the time. The peculiar virtues of each colonising power — such as the French capacity to ignore the colour bar, and the British knack of dealing out justice through a young man in shorts sitting on a packing-case — would be pooled to the common advantage. The political education of the natives would no longer depend on the luck of the draw.

### *A new Foreign Legion*

In time a very fine African Civil Service could be built up, offering attractive careers to the right type of men from all nations. Nor need it be confined to members of the present colonising countries. Germans of the type of the gallant commander in Tanganyika in the last war could find their proper niche. There would be lingual and educational standards to be reached, but the Central Selection Board would select mainly on character and type. The creation, in the African Civil Service, of the first international service in the world (outside the Foreign Legion) would in itself be

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a forward move, and a contribution to building a world civilisation, in the place of our present national ones. It would also provide a training-ground for the Africans themselves, who must of course be admitted to the Service if they can qualify. The sense of being an African, rather than the member of a tribe, and of taking service on equal terms with white men of diverse races, must have a broadening and stimulating effect.

### *A bigger thing still*

And lastly, such a scheme would, by its open acknowledgment of Trusteeship and the disappearance of the word "Colony", mark an advance in our conception of what the relation of the so-called "civilised" to the backward peoples ought to be. This was in fact recognised in the mandatory system adopted after the last war, and has long been the theoretic basis of British Colonial administration, even if practice has often fallen short of principle. But by limiting the mandatory system to the Colonies taken from Germany, and by handing the mandates to nations — such as the Japanese, for instance — who could by no stretch of imagination be regarded as trustees, we certainly wore the appearance of not quite believing in it. In practice, the change-over should cause little disturbance. For most of the officials it will mean little more, at first, than a great deal of tongue-wagging at the club, and for some no doubt a better rate of dollar exchange for their salaries. (One of the main obstacles to administrative unification which you will point out — the currencies, will, one may hope, largely disappear through the plans now being laid for linking all national moneys to a world standard of value.) But the Colonial Governors will have to charter 'planes and do some flying, rallying at a central headquarters to compare notes and systems, and there to hammer out the structure of the first African government. Many people, and with good reason, will see the Union Jack hauled down, and the flag of Africa hoisted on our Govern-

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ment Houses with a real pang. And indeed we have a right to be proud of much of our African record. But it will be a bigger thing than we have yet done in Africa, to take our part in the creation of the first great international Trusteeship.

Others will be inclined to echo Mr. Churchill's "What we have, we hold." But with all the respect due to that great man, this was not one of his most happily inspired utterances. (In Italian, it would have sounded devilish like the voice of a bullfrog on a balcony. In German, it would have evoked several minutes of rhythmic "*Sieg heils*".) And in any case, do not forget, when you are cheering him for his having and holding, that he is capable at any moment of telling you that part of what we have is a great liberal tradition of disinterestedness in Colonial affairs, and that he means to hold to that. Besides, must the creation of a new Africa, in which by virtue of our experience and the character of our Colonial service we are bound to take the leading part, necessarily be counted as a loss? Who knows? Is it too much to hope that the day will come when Africa, firm on her naked black feet, applies for admission to the British Commonwealth?

### *No Second Palestine*

If such an African Government were in being, should it not be to that government that the responsibility for Italy's African Colonies should be given? Eritrea and Somaliland might even be embodied in the new Africa. The Mediterranean coastal strip will no doubt need different treatment. The white colonists of Tripolitania and Libya have certain prescriptive rights (it was no fault of these settlers that Mussolini was a brigand), and the Arabs do not look south, across the deserts, but eastwards for their friends and relations. But we do not want a second Palestine on our hands if we can avoid it, and with the League out of business, who is to confer a mandate on whom? To find a *modus vivendi*

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between colonists and Arabs is bound to take time and patience; and it would be far better to hand the whole question over to the Board of Trustees — themselves men grown grey in the Colonial service and detached from political currents — than to the harassed political Peace-makers, with their fatal penchant for making promises. If a politician, instead of making a promise, says “Wait and see,” this sensible reply hangs like a millstone round his neck ever after. But an independent Authority, like our new African Government, unconcerned with problems of general pacification, could afford to go on waiting and seeing until the happy day when the Arabs take to farming and the colonists take to the Arabs.

Here, then, in very bare outline, is another piece of practical advice to the Peace-makers. Whether you agree or disagree with it, please remember that the question of these Colonies is a real, live one and has got to be solved when the war ends. It is difficult to discover any Public Opinion about it. There ought to be one. The case of Palestine should put us on our guard against trusting the statesmen blind. But Public Opinion can only grow out of active discussion, and it is discussion which I have tried to provoke.

## CONCLUSION

It would, perhaps, have been more satisfactory if this essay on Peace-making could have ended with some touch on larger issues. In a sick world, men are looking beyond the cessation of the pain of war, and the cure of the disease of Nationalism, to the discovery of a régime which will keep their world in health. In looking for that régime some lay stress on political and social institutions, others on a change in our wicked hearts. But belonging, as I do, to the “change of heart” school, in so far as it seems to me that if we all loved righteousness and hated iniquity there would not be

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many problems to solve, my own contribution would have to be an excursion into the Kingdom of Heaven, for which this is hardly the place. And as for political remedies, there is such a diversity of men in the world that it would take many volumes to prescribe for them all, even if they were willing to take the medicine. That celebrated pronouncement in the American Declaration of Independence "that all Men are created equal" has led to a lot of building on sand. For it just is not true. The Creator may have endowed us "with certain unalienable rights, Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness" (as the Declaration asserts), but most certainly He did not create us equal. He gave us long skulls and short skulls and round skulls, big brains and small, and apart from us all needing food, drink and something to laugh at, it's a question whether we all see eye to eye about anything else.

Not that, on a long view, there is any need for discouragement. Anthropologists tell us that while man may have lived a few million years on this planet, his ethical and social consciousness may not have been developed for much over 5000 years. One can hardly regard him, taken in the mass, as having yet passed the schoolboy stage. And we all know how some even of those greedy self-seeking little devils are capable of growing up into decent, unselfregarding men. Even our present plight need not discourage us; if the abominations of Hitlerism and Fascism have shocked us into realising to what depths we can still fall if we don't mind our ways, they will have served their purpose, at whatever ghastly a cost.

And it may be that (as the originator of this book would have contended had he been able to carry out his plans) for the Western peoples at any rate the right political and social structure, if one could discover it, would in itself go far to bringing about that change of heart by which alone real progress can be judged. It is an open question how far political or social institutions can be educative and character-



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making to the degree required. And whatever our views about that, we can only take off our hats to those who believe in them and fight for them. The faith and the fighting by themselves are of incalculable worth, irrespective of what is achieved.

Or it may be, as some of us think, that the road lies through an ethical, rather than a political or social reformation. But in either case these great issues are for us all to thrash out, and there is nothing much that the Big Four in Berlin, with whom we are here concerned, can do about them. Because social and political systems cannot be imposed from above, or by force ; they must issue from the peoples themselves. And while one may hope that the Peace-makers won't forget, in the stress and storm of their labours, Who it was that once called them blessed, we can hardly expect them to make the changing of hearts a part of their agenda.

One last word. Writing colloquially, not to say with occasional levity, has one grave drawback, — it somehow seems to diminish the stature, so to speak, of the topics. Many things in these pages, and more especially the sections on the World Police, the World Code and the International Committees, ought to have been written with passion, with a concentrated fury of conviction. Only the tongue or pen of a Churchill could do justice to such issues. But who knows ? If you and I and the rest of us are keen enough, and clamorous enough, the day may come when a Churchill will make these questions burn with his eloquence, and the Peace-makers, to everyone's astonishment, make peace.

THE END

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